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J"Human nature does not lose by becoming 
intelligible, but comes into its own."
S. Alexander. 
"Space, Time and Deity."
. The .. /problem ant be ., Time
The striking ahhlevement.s of natural'science. r.
eenWry and the Inoreasing oo':x::%'o.l over, the eOr/LrioL.l
woi'ld which Its applications make poséiblo has prh t:ventle': .
Qm;ikv:;r^  hudmnlty In a position which là p'r
d/m.t Ih. h.'(%ani hlAto%T*"' adve^ fÿf has - revolutionize,^ the
ù(xic.l:;lctTa of biman life and 'alWred'the whole ou.ticok of
3rcmk;eo'ltti, Ir; 0 rig^ oaht in which vai'/h.-u... %,;ithors
dl&ôna.â' the. -of o:ieléoo^  - ^ n.d Civ fî:o'.:D
diftwcot coiwlwion l8/d.re..'tm .rl'i^^
on- th.e of' - la ove'ate,-invaoj'O- ho.'o&r 1-
INTRODUCTION.
T#:hy h.tr: '^'-h.LooAJv trof^ LTn-.ily tct-i .^.:-,e
u . ; ;
Aowt '<ÿ.sp.ycl&lly thf» it '.'.no '. f'ton he-
ont. that tr..-:? rh'.plioat'lo.o-o^ f &11 the 
w?ilêh phyaloal GCle.nce ()rl.og^ 3 7;hlle l.t m&koâ Y./Cooih:'e a.0 
in thO. GoWitloho O.f llte, 9.I00 b.r't/..rn 'r.'l-t.;.; 1' 
0501^^:00 hanparo Anh dlfrie'U.i-!:.lo;%. It is seen ;:hat nn..' :o-., 
. liyl'ii a. way .that wllil 't'o'r.ihy tbout tils owe d00t.0n.ct::' 
&:-'od t:.'t:i:'kf it Is 1& teo.aus.o ma?î'-$"knù'wl@d^ <9 o';? h'Uiav^ l/'
of the -eThoisi^ jS of hl^ à ooMùüe':,' eiiM of-the''nature of hie 
to hica. féilluwR .hat not kept pace v/Ith- hle^ of the
€^ xte.rnal vs^ ùi^ lô* .Xnowlêçlgo leadlhg., tofth'è éoMit'O.l of 'thl'nc 
far Chit:';tKïppel kh.6wled^é -leading to th.») w % W # K  of life. 
Iherw$W. 'molentlfio Know3.%dge of bu;ijeoi and of .hnma.:
(1; F. 1 hÂr#^ln; "gclonoe #o<t H W ^ h  -Affairn'h
0B%%y in *' i %n(l Civ ''M/«T ty-.rn f
J":
1.
. The Problem and the Timet
The striking achievements of natural science during the 
last century and the increasing control over the physical 
world which its applications make possible has put twentieth- 
century humanity in a position which is entirely without prece­
dent in human history. Its advent has revolutionized the 
conditions of human life and altered the whole outlook of 
humanity. In a recent Symposium in which various authors 
discuss the relations of science and civilization from 
different points of view, the conclusion is drawn that "science, 
or the spirit of seeking order in events, invading human life
from many angles, has already profoundly altered both the
(1)
general mind and the institution of civilized man". In 
recent years, and especially since the war, it has often been 
pointed out that the application of all the new knowledge 
Which physical science brings, while it makes possible a great 
amelioration in the conditions of life, also brings with it 
enormous dangers and difficulties. It is seen that man may 
utilize it in a way that will bring about his own destruction; 
and this, it is said, is because man's knowledge of himself, 
of the springs of his conduct and of the nature of his relation 
to his fellows has not kept pace with his knowledge of the 
external world. Knowledge leading to the control of things has 
far outstripped knowledge leading to the oontral of life^ 
Increased scientific knowledge of human nature and of human
(1) P. S. MarK^ in: **Science and Human Affairs", concluding 
essay in "Science and Civilization".
sQclety is needed if there is to be that progress through 
science which was so confidently believed in.
mile it is true that the physical sciences are, in 
acpuracy and completeness, far ahead of the sciences that 
deal with life - and particularly with human life - it is 
also true that these latter have in the last few decades made 
very marked advances. There has been brought to light from 
various, sources an enormous body of new knowledge concerning 
man and his nature, and it is constantly being added to. The 
sciences of anthropology, of biology and of psychology are all 
in an exceedingly active condition, and each is making, valuable 
contributions to the knowledge of man; writing of the develop­
ment pf pcience and the power which it brings, William 
McDougall says; "Most important of all, we are beginning tP 
understand something of the nature of man, something of the 
history of development of the species, something of our bodily
frame and mental powers, and of the long.process by which our
( 1)
intellectual and moral culture has been achieved". A biologist, 
Julian Huxley, has recently claimed that the progress in 
biology is now such that the centre of gravity of science as 
a whole is shifting. "The rise of evolutionary biology and of 
modern psychology," he says, "have not only changed our outlook 
on specially human problems, but have altered the whole balance, 
if I may so put it, of science. There was a time when the basic 
studies of physics and chemistry seemed not only basic but 
somehow more essentially scientific than the sciences dealing 
with life. Distinctions were drawn between the experimental 
and thé observational sc1enbes --oftén ha1f-consciously imply­
ing a di81inctioh bëWeeh!a %ciehtifio ^ self-respecting
(1) "National Welfare and National Decay", po 28,
/.
sciences and blundering, hit-or-miss, tolerated bodies of
knowledge. Biological phenomena are now, however, seen to
be every whit as susceptible of accurate and experimental
analysis; and indeed to present so many problems to the
physicist and chemist that in fifty years or so, I venture
to prophesy, the wise virgins in those basic sciences v/ill
(i)
be those who have laid in a store of biological oil".
In every sphere accurate scientific knowledge means the
possibility of control, and biologists are now talking of the
biological control of life - the conscious control, by man, of
(2)" :
the process of evolution. Something has already been done
in controlling the lower forms of life, and new possibilities
are opening up - even so far as man himself is concerned.
To take only one example of the light which biology is now
throv^ing on the nature of man - there is the recent discovery
of the profound importance of the internal secretions of the
(3)
ductless glands in determining bodily and mental grovfth.
(-)
Exaggerated claims may be made by enthusiasts, but it cannot 
now be denied that the interdependent system of endocrine glands 
play a very significant part in determining not only bodily 
growth, but temperament and feeling, and so conduct and 
character. Unless there is full and orderly development of 
this system mental powers fail to develop in normal fashion. 
Psychopathologists are now finding that endocrine and mental
(1) "Essays of a Biologist", "Biology and Sociology", p. 70.
(2) Cf. J. Arthur Thomson; "The Control of Life"'.
(3) For a brief account of the significance of this dis­
covery, cf. F. W. Mott: "The Biological Foundations of Human 
Character", Edinburgh Review, July, 1923.
(4) Cf. for example Berman'à'hl^ly-coloured:-book, "The 
Glands Regulating Personality" i
factors are interdependent throughout in the production of
certain types of mental disorders. , And now this is known
it is possible to intervene, to adjust the defective endocrine
( 2 )
balance and to put right the bodily and mental abnormality.
In the essay already quoted, Julian Huxley points out 
that the biologist’s attitude towards mind has now changed.
He no longer seeks to explain it away as a% epiphenomenon, but 
s.tudies it as a phenomenon. His science in fact is the con­
necting link between physico-chemical science on the one hand 
and psychology on the other; between physics and chemistry and 
definitely human affairs. Psychology deals with definitely 
human affairs. One of its leading exponents at the present 
day has recently declared its aim to be "to render our know­
ledge of human nature more exact and more systematic, in order
that we may control ourselves more wisely and influence our
(3)
fellow men more effectively". Psychology, it has been well
(1) It is interesting to note that this fact seems likely to 
modify some of the conclusions of psycho-analysis, cf. "The 
Psychical and Endocrine Factors in Functional Disorders",
H. Crichton Miller. Brit. Medical Journal, 1922.
(2) The possibilities which.progress in the biological 
sciences open up are enthusiastically set out by Julian Huxley 
(op. cit. Pre^. viii). "The biologist cannot fail to be im­
pressed by the fact that his science to-day is, roughly and 
broadly speaking, in the position.which chemistry and physics 
occupied a century ago. It is beginning to reach down from 
observation to experimental analysis, and from experimental 
analysis to grasp of principle. Furthermore, as the grasp of 
principles,in physico-chemical science led speedily to an 
immense new extension both of knowledge and control, so it is 
not to be doubted that like effects will spring from like causes 
in biology. But whereas the extension of control in physics and 
Chemistry led to a multiplication of the number of things which 
man could do and experience, the extension of control in biology 
will 'inter alia' mean an alteration of the modes of man's 
experience Itself. The one, that is to say, remained in,essence 
à quantitative.change so far as concerns the real life of man; 
the other can be a qualitative change. Applied physics and 
chemistry bring more grist to the mill; applied biology will also 
be capable of changing the mill itself. The possibilities of 
physiological improvement, of the better combination of existing 
psychical faculties, of the education of old faculties to new 
heights, and of the discovery of new faculties altogether - all 
this is no utopian silliness, but is bound to come about if 
science côntinues her current progress."
(3) W. McDougall: "An Outline of Psychology", p. 1, cf. also 
the same author "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", 
Proc. Royal Society of Medicine, 1918. "We are now in the age of 




said, is a very old study but a very young science. It is, 
in fact, the latest of the sciences, the last to 'arrive'; and 
it is now arriving with something of a rush. The reason for 
its lateness seems to be not merely the inherent difficulty 
of its subject matter, but also the fact that this latter is so 
near to us, and our interest in it is so intense, that dis­
passionate, scientific treatment of it is almost impossible.
It is difficult to be as indifferent to the results of investi­
gation as science requires. The same difficulty was formerly 
felt in biology in connection with the doctrine of the evolu­
tion of species. Remarkable advances have, however, already
been made in psychology, particularly in the last few decades. 
Some of these and their significance it will be our business 
later to consider. The progress in psychology has been such
that the President of the Psychology Section of the British
' ' ' '
Association was recently optimistic enough to claim,,,^ te% "the 
main outlines of our human nature are now approximately known 
and the whole territory of individual psychology has, by one 
worker or another, been completely covered in the large . At 
the present time interest and activity in psychology is parti­
cularly widespread. "An age of psychology," says one vfriter,
(2)
"comes to crown an age of biology." Interest , in the 
various applications of psychology is also widespread.
"psychology," says McDougall, "is coming into its own, and 
the psychologist, instead of ploughing his lonely furrow in the
: ' ' (Contd.x J:' % ^
there has been growing up a biological and inductive psychology, 
a science not springing full-blownj like the psychology of James 
Mill or of Herbert Spencer,, from the reason one powerful
mind, but^a science, based like other sciences# on a^yast.mass 
of minute and careful observations, a slowly growing product of 
W  .CQf opération of a milti W e ,  wp^ers* V i
y (3.) . C» Burt: "Menti^l .piffgRenpeo i^tween Individuals’’.
(2) P. 8. Marvin* opt y Pit, yy
vague hope of contributing to a science that may some day be 
recognized as of value to mankind, finds himself embarrassed 
by the fact that men of the most varied occupations are 
calling oh him for help, expecting from him definite pronounce- 
ment8 and safe guidance in a multitude of practical problems .
So enthusiastically is the subject being pursued and so keen 
is the sense of its importance, that there is a tendency to 
overlook the extreme youth of the science, and the tentative­
ness and incompleteness of its conclusions. There is much 
point in the warning uttered by the late Dr. Rivers, and at a 
time when psychology is being made into something of a popular 
'stunt*, it should be kept carefully in mind. "There is 
now a serious danger that psychology will fall into discredit, 
partly owing to the zeal of its votaries for the unconscious 
and infantile aspects of the mind, but still more owing to 
premature attempts to utilise its supposed discoveries practically 
while the basis upon which they rest is uncertain and insecure.
It seems to me almost certain that there will be a reaction 
against the almost universal interest which the study of 
psychology excites to-day, and that we are approaching a 
period when it may even become a matter of ridicule to make 
those references to psychological explanation and interpreta- 
tion which now arouse such hopes and interests." Though he
, y(l) v:’An X^tline pf Psychology", Introd.
: (2) "Psychology and Politics", p. 6. The danger^ of the,
process of 'popularization' and inflation which psychology has 
undergone.is also pointed out by Wm., Brown; "Responsibility and 
Modern Psychology", "Psyche", Oct. 1922. "One of the most 
characteristic features of modern intellectual life is the 
extraordinary degree of popular interest in problems of a 
psychological nature. The general educated and sémi-educated 
public would seem to ;have realized, by a kind of ihtuition or 
instinctive insight, the tremendous possibilities of development 
of mental science in the near future, and the great importance 
for practical life of a profounder knowledge of psychological 
laws. Unfortunately, popular interest in the subject appears 
all too frequently as a fashion or fad of the moment instead of 
a serious study; and catchwords like 'hypnotism*, 'psycho­
analysis' and 'auto-suggestion', with a special jargon to 
match, monopolise attention and encourage an extremism which 
is foreign to the spirit of all true science."
//
was doubtful about the immediate practical value of psychology 
Rivers was not at all in doubt concerning its ultimate value.
But apart from its practical applications psychology has 
undoubtedly succeeded in throwing much new light on the nature 
of the human mind, on the modes of its operation, and on the
nature of the forces that move man to action. Though we
must regard its conclusions as tentative, yet, taken with the 
results of anthropology and biology, they present a, wealth of 
new knowledge for the understanding of human nature and conduct 
such as has never been available before.
The question inevitably arises - what is the relation of 
all this new knowledge concerning the nature of man, and the 
new outlook which it brings to the study which has traditionally 
concerned itself with the conduct of human life,, namely ethics 
or moral philosophy. Has it made any difference? What 
answer we give to this question depends on the viev/ we take as 
tO; the nature of ethics. When we go into this further question
we find that the present status of ethics is ambiguous and
uncertain in the extreme. It seems in fact to be in a transi­
tional condition. Prom its beginnings among the Greeks ethical 
theory has been one of the great philosophical disciplines.
With the extension of scientific inquiry, the rise pf the 
sciences of man, and particularly the emergence of psychology 
from philosophy a new situation seems to have been created 
demanding some readjustment in our conception of the nature of
ethics. What this situation is has been admirably stated in
(1)
the writings of John Dewey. He points out that ethical
(1) Cf. "Reconstruction in Hhllosophy", Ch. VII:.."Human 
Nature and Conduct", Introd. and Pt. IV: also in "The Influence 
of Darwin on. Philosophy"^ "inteïiigencè and Morals". ,r
/ : l .
theory, ever since its inception, has conceived its business 
to be the discovery of "some final end or goal, or some ulti­
mate, and supreme.law". This, he says, is the common element 
in all the diverse classical theories; and it is the existence
of this common premise which has made their age-long disputes 
(1)
possible. This common element Dewey calls in question. He 
believes that the day of such theories is over, and as a result 
of the extension of the scientific spirit, it is no longer 
possible to assume in this way a single end or good, a single 
supreme law, or a,single moral motive. According to Dewey (and 
his view seems to the present writer undeniably sound) what is 
now needed is not a further propagation of varieties among 
ethical theories, but a transformation of attitude. From this 
changed point of view there is "no separate body of moral rules; 
no separate system of motive powers; no separate subject -îsfttee-s 
of moral knov/ledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated 
ethical science". So that "if the business of morals is not 
to speculate upon man's final end and upon an ultimate standard 
of, right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychol- 
pgy to,discover all that can be discovered of man, his organs, 
powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for 
the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all the 
instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, 
eponomics, and political science upon the construction of 
intelligent methods of improving the common lot".
Almost without exception the classical moral theories have 
declined to take account of the empirical facts of.human nature.
(ïy'"#i#:pôih^ m ï ï " c # r W r " 'me àlithor-br
the article "Ethics" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says that 
ethics is concerned with: "The Supreme Good or the Final End 
from which ail partleular duties and virtues may be deduced".
/J.
As a result they seem abstracted and apart from the practical 
conduct of life. In the face of this Dewey's watchword is: 
"Morals are human", and the study of morals is of all subjects 
the closest to human nature and "ineradicably empirical".
It is not something with a separate province. "Since it 
directly concerns human nature everything that can be known 
of the human mind and body, in physiology, medicine, anthrop­
ology and psychology is pertinent to moral enquiry". The 
divorce of ethics from human nature has resulted in the divorce 
of human nature, in its moral aspects, from the rest of nature 
and from the actual social environment. "A morals based on 
study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would 
find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of 
nature and would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology.
It would find the nature and activities of one person continu­
ous with those of other human beings, and therefore link ethics 
with the study of history, sociology, law and economics. IVhat 
is needed is the abandonment of 'sterile metaphysics* in 
dealing with human conduct and the recognition of the integrity 
of ethics with the facts of human nature and of both with the 
environment. The human sciences do not supplant ethics, nor 
do they exhaust it. They supply it with its subject and this 
it treats from its own particular point of view. Isolated 
from the facts vhich they supply it is entirely in the air.
But on the basis of them it concerns itself with the valuation 
of a "plurality of changing, moving, individualized goods and 
ends", and with the use of "principles, criteria, laws" as 
"intellectual instruments for analyzing individual and unique
■ . (i) ■ ■'
Situations".
(1) With Dewey's point of view may be compared that of Holt 
in "The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics". While it is not 
possible to agree with either the extreme Freudian!sm or the 
extreme 'behaviourism* which this book brings together we may 
agree with the view of the nature of ethics which Holt puts 
forward. He quotes Epictetus to the effect that morals is a 
question of "dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence".
(Contd.)
Some such view of the relation of ethics to the natural 
sciences seems now inevitable. In this essay we will be con­
cerned with one aspect of this relation - with some of the 
facts of psychology as they bear on the problem of conduct.
We must now go on to consider more in detail the relation of 
ethics to psychology.
Psychology and. Ethics. ,
James Drever has recently formulated what he terms the 
psychologist’s creed. It runs as follows: "For all those arts 
and sciences which are concerned with the human factor in the 
World process in any of its phases, the science of psychology 
is as fundamental as is the science of physics for all those
.r",: ' :■■- - vv . 1 )
arts and sciences which are concerned with physical processes • 
in another work he has shown how this claim can be made good so 
far as the science of education is concerned. It is difficult 
to see how it can be refuted: yet it is only very gradually 
being generally acknowledged. One of the reasons why the close 
bearing of psychology on the sciences that deal in any way with 
human affairs was so long uhacknov/ledged is to be found in the 
fact that until very recently the aspect of psychology which 
is particularly concerned - the dynamic aspect - was in a very 
undeveloped condition. McDougall pointed out some fifteen 
years ago that "the department of psychology that is of primary
(Contd.) ,, . : ., .
Traditional and ’academic’ ethics has been largely an ethics 
’from above * ; an attempt to impose moral ideals on human nature• 
§uch theories hang in the air. V/e must be content with an ethics 
^from below' - the ’unassuming ethics of the dust’ - based on 
the reaiities of human nature ’ as'-science discsloses , them and on 
the realities of social situations.
(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", Pref. The same writer has 
also given ^ an expe11eht definition of psychology. It is "the 
science which takes as its field of study the behaviour of living 
organisms so far as it is mentally or psychically conditioned, 
and can be interpreted in mental and psychical terms". ("Intro­
duction to the Psychology of Education.")
/'■b
importance for the social sciences .is that which deals with
the springs of human action, the impulses and motives that
sustain mental and bodily activity and regulate conduct".
This, he says, of all the departments of psychology, "is the
one that has remained in the most backward state, in which the
(1)
greatest obscurity, vagueness, and confusion still reign".
Since this was written it is on this aspect of psychology
that interest has been almost wholly centred, and as it has
developed there has been a growing recognition of the place of
psychology as a foundation for the social sciences. McDougall
has himself endeavoured to work out the psychological basis of
( ^ )
political theory, and numerous writers have tackled the 
psychology of education. Though Drever has.recently said that 
"the newer ethics is largely a psychology of ethics", there has 
really been little attempt so far to work out the psychological 
basis of ethical theory. If evidence were needed as to the 
necessity for a sound psychological basis for the social 
sciences, it could easily be found in the fallacies which have 
resulted from the lack of it. A body of established psycholo­
gical doctrine not being available assumptions concerning the 
mind and its mode of operation were consciously or unconsciously 
adopted, often with the most fallacious results. Psychological 
assumptions have also been made by those who had some normative 
doctrine to establish or a preconceived view to support. Ethics 
provides numerous instances. The doctrine of psychological 
hedonism is an outstanding bne. As McDqugall has remarked 
treatises on ethics, have Q)f ten consisted of amateur psycho lo­
gis ing; and now that a body of psychological doctrine, is
(1) "Introduction to Social Tsychbloj^", Ihtrod.
(8) Gf. , .yf , .
(3) Op. cit., p. 5.
/<;
becoming available, assumptions which have been made still 
hold the field and are very difficult to dislodge*
The relation of psychology to ethics may perhaps be 
made clear by reference to Drever’s recent discussion of its 
relation to education. He points out that the theory of 
education presents two aspects: there is a philosophy of 
éducàtiôn, and a science Of education. "The main task of 
the philosophy of education," he says, "is to'examine ahd 
evaluate the ends with reference to which educational influences 
are brohght to bëar on the child. The task of the science of 
education is to describe àhd explain ..... the process by which 
the behaviour of the child is cbhtroiled and modified and his 
character moulded." It isfairly clear thât psychology 
underlies the sciehCë of educatidn. But the scheme of values 
which the phlibSophy of education adopts must also be psycholo­
gically possible and it is only through psychological knowledge 
that "the results achieved by the philosophy of education can 
cOm'e to have anything more than a merely academic significance". 
Yet these values, while not Independent of psychological investi­
gation,' also depend on a general philosophy of human life.
Drever goes on to point out that not only education, but all 
the other sciences which deal with man have an aspect which is 
primarily philosophy rather than psychology: but this aspect is 
of varying degrees of importance. So far as the importance of 
this philosophical aspect is concerned education occupies a 
middle position# Where it is- relatively insignificant, as, in 
medicine or industry; "the realization, of the .significance of 
psychology has come; suddenly .in. our. own, time". #ere._the , , - >
philosophical, aspect iisjmoref fmdamental;caSain-ethicsa dr-; ^
, V. (i) : ’Introduction /to : the: Psychology; of Education" ; p. 4.
' ' V - ^ - .;a ai"- th':-;
; a:' . .aaa ,..C"' à.à -. , a
political theory, recognition of the need for a psychological
basis is more difficult to obtain. It is in ethics, probably,
that this philosophy aspect is most fundamental; and there
/
has never been any lack of recognition of the fact. As Dewey
has shown, there has been little recognition of any other
aspect. And this point of view is still exclusively maintained
by some. Ethics is declared by one writer to be "a philosophy
and not a science", and "one of the chief tasks of ethics is
to prevent the intrusion into its own sphere of inquiry of
(1)
ideas borrowed from other and alien sources". But it is 
possible to distinguish also ethics as a science of conduct, 
drawing its material from all the sciences that deal with man - 
and particularly from psychology. The one aspect of ethics 
is concerned with ends and values, the other with the facts of 
human nature, and throughout the two must be kept in the closest 
relation. It should be possible to recognize and to do 
justice to both of them. They are clearly distinguished 
in a recent article by Laird. "It is a commonplace, surely, 
that the ordering of our lives is always the ordering of our 
impulses, instincts, and desires. Consequently, if these can 
be ordered, the essential problem is plainly which of them are 
best worth fostering, and how far our control of them extends. 
The first part of this question is a problem of values, and 
men will continue to argue about it so long as their sense of
(1) Art. "Ethics", Enc. Brit.
(2) "Moral Responsibility and the New Psychology", Hibbert 
Journal, July, 1922. Of. also the view of the relation of 
psychology and ethics advanced by J.K. Tufts in an essay "The 
Moral Life" (in "Creative Intelligence" by various authors).
He says that writing about ethics has tended to take one of two 
forms : 1. Description of conduct in terms of anthropology and 
psychology; 2. Examination ofjconcepts such as good and bad, 
right and wrong, duty and freedom. In ethics as in knowledge 
thoughts without contents are empty, percepts without concepts 
are blind. The 'thoughts’ of ethics are the terms 'right*, 
'good', 'ought', 'worth!. The percepts are the instincts and 
emotions, desires and aspirations, conditions of time, place 
and institutions.
values continues to differ. The second part of the question 
is a problem of psychological fact, and it would be settled if 
we could determine the relative powers and potencies of the 
different impulses in men (including, of course, the reflective 
impulses)." Psychology, then, while it is basic for ethics 
is distinguished from it and does not exhaust it. It would 
be quite mistaken to attempt to reduce ethics to psychology.
It should be possible to see and to keep in mind both the 
validity of psychological explanation and also its limits.
There will be no attempt here to cover the whole field 
of the psychology of ethics: but only some parts of it which 
are at present in dispute. However important the philosophical 
aspect of ethics may be, no one.who has any knowledge of modern 
psychology would deny the fact that, at the moment, in view of 
the new and far-reaching developments which have been rapidly 
taking place in psychology, its scientific aspect is(not also 
vitally important. What these developments are we will 
endeavour to make clear. It is not suggested that ethics should 
accept uncritically current psychological theories as they 
relate to conduct. Such acceptance must always be carefully 
guarded against, and especially at a time when theories are so 
rife. But they cannot simply be ignored. What is needed is 
an endeavour to examine, them critically and an effort to deter­
mine how far. they are well-grounded and what they really imply.
Recent Developments in Psychology. ’
William McDougall j^ as made the,prpphecy th^k "a century/ 
hence the present time(will(be held to be'remarkable.for the 
great advances made in.our nnieretanding^ of the mind", and many
(1) "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", loc. cit.
/f
think that'this is true. As has already been remarked the
present is a time of extraordinary activity in psychology, and,
as a nece 8 sary re suit, the subject is in a very fluid condition.
fièvelopments in the science have taken place so rapidly that
there has been something of a break in its continuity. And
since many of these new developments have come from outside
the main body of psychological doctrine there is at present a
tendency in many quarters to make a sharp distinction between
the older 'academic ' psychology and the 'nevf' psychology.
While the reasons for this contrast are quite intelligible it
cannot be regarded as other than unfortunate and efforts
Should be made to incorporate the new discoveries in the general
(1)
body of the science. The terra 'New Psychology' now so very
much in the air and very freely and loosely employed covers a 
number of different tendencies, though all with much the same 
outc6rae> which result from the adoption of the biological, the 
clihical and the social modes of approach to the problem of 
mân's mind.
#hat is needed in a science at a time when new theories 
fill the air is, above all things, a rigjht perspective and the 
ability to see things in their due proportion. It should help
(1) Of. Some remarks by Wm. Brown on the 'new' psychology 
and its wide applications (Art. Psychology and Psychotherapy, 
journal of Mental Science, January, 1922). "There is just now 
a strong tendency towards a turnlhg away from earlier modes of 
thought with regard to psychology, almost a looking down upon its 
past history and attempting to form a new science ready-made 
upon the basis of certain modern theories and observations.
And yOu have a group of people who talk proudly of the 'new 
psychology' although when you get into their antecedents you 
find that, in their intellectual ambition, although they may 
sfart. out from facts of pathological psychology, they are ..even- 
more anxious to extend their generalisations, mainly based upon 
those facts; to wider àhd wider probiems of hUmah hature^ of * 
iqCioiogy ahd of civilissttlôh. - 4hat; at the present day 
there is a danger bf( à new philosophy - I might call it 
féllowing William^ Jaitieb '(s nomenclature - a chromo-philosophy - 
being built upbh the basis of certain observations, and worked 
out in undue dissociation from earlier modes of thought."
us to do this if we remember that this is not the first time 
there has been a 'new' psychology. Nearly thirty years ago 
there was a similar enthusiasm. Writing then, William James 
said, "The 'new' psychology has become a term to conjure up 
pretentious ideas withal" - and it has become so again. The 
'boom' in psychology to which James referred resulted from the 
application of experimental methods which, while it has led to 
important results, has certainly not fulfilled the exaggerated 
hopes of some of its advocates. The tendencies which make up 
what is nov/ termed the 'new' psychology have already been 
flourishing for some time, and it is beginning to be possible 
to see what has been established.
Throughout, this movement has been characterized, nega­
tively, by a strong reaction against the 'inteliectualism' o f 
the older psychology. It is claimed, and very justly, that
there clung about it an air of unreality; it seemed divorced
(1)
from the facts of mind and conduct as men actually knew them.
This was well put, some years ago, by one who is not a 
psychologist at all, by H.G. Wells, in one of his novels.
"It seems to me one of the most extraordinary aspects of all 
that literature of speculative attack which is called psychology, 
that there is no name and no description at all of most of the 
mental states that make up life. Psychology, like sociology, 
is still largely in the scholastic stage; it is ignorant and 
intellectual, a happy refuge for the lazy industry of pedants; 
instead of experience and accurate description and analysis it 
begins with the rash assumption of elements and starts out upon
(1) James printed out that the official outlines of the 
subject were "far too neat to stand in the li^t of analogy
with the rest of nature  ..... Nature is everywhere gothic,
not classic. She forms a real jungle> where all things are 
provisional, half-fitted to each other, and untidy".
ridiculous synthesis. imp with a sick soul would dream of 
going to a psychologist?" However true this was when it was 
written, it is certainly less true now.
The reason for the almost exclusively intellectual pre­
occupation of psychology and its resulting barrenness so far as
understanding conduct and character is concerned is clear if
(1)
we consider the history of the science. To quote Rivers:
"Fifty years ago psychological teaching and research were 
entirely in the hands of men whose interests lay in the direc­
tion of philosophy. Psychology was regarded as a branch of 
philosophy and was treated by methods differing little, if at 
all, from those which were utilised in the study of logic, 
ethics and metaphysics. To men whose lives were devoted to 
such pursuits, intellect and reason were the salt of knowledge 
and their interest was turned predominantly, often exclusively, 
to the intellectual aspect of the mind. Even much later the 
text-books and manuals of psychology which formed the basis 
of academical instruction were almost exclusively concerned 
with purely intellectual processes. Feeling, emotion, and 
desire took a secondary place, while instinct was often omitted 
altogether". Rivers goes on to point out that two developments 
which took place in psychology did not rid it of its intellec­
tual bias but, if anything, strengthened it. These were the 
introduction of the experimental method and the application of 
psychology to education. Intellectual aspects of the mind 
lend themselves far more readily to experimental investigation, 
and they were almost exclusively treated. Also the psychology 
of education, in its earlier phases, was concerned chiefly with 
the processes of memory and association, and others which are 
Involved in the acquisition of knowledge. Little attention
(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", App. VII, "Psychology 
and the War".
^ 2  .
was paid to the affective aspects of the mind. This neglect 
was also due to the fact that, until very recently, introspec­
tion was the chief method of psychology and the psychologist 
himself was his main subject. Vdiile introspection is a valu­
able and adequate method for investigating cognitive processes 
and must always remain one of the chief methods of psychology, 
it is difficult and almost impossible to apply it to the 
affective and active aspects, of the mind. Instincts, emotions 
and sentiments, being so difficult to investigate by introspec- 
ti^, tended to be overlooked. As Rivers says, before the war 
psychology had reached a phase in which it was becoming more 
and more obvious that the intellectual factors v/ith which it 
was chiefly concerned were wholly inadequate to account for 
human behaviour.
Now the reaction has come with a vengeance and there has
been a complete shift of emphasis. On their positive side
the newer tendencies in psychology stress the fundamental
importance of all the non-rational aspects of the mind - of
instincts, emotions and of unconscious mental processes, and
they have been concerned wholly with their elucidation. As
contrasted v^ ith the static elements in mental life with which
traditional psychology had been concerned, all the tendencies
which make up the new psychology agree in emphasizing the
dynamic aspects of the mind. So much ia this so that a recent
writer speaks of dynamic psychology as a nev; .science concerned
with the study of "instincts, motives, emotions, and imaginative
(or autistic) thinking as opposed to the static functions of
attention, perception, memory and similar conscious logical
processes"; this new.science.growing up "from the observâtions
and speculations of sociologists, anthropologists, criminologists,
neurologists and psychiatrists, and to a less extent from the
(1)
work of the psychologist . with the normal man". Wliat are
(1) J. T, MacCurdy: "Problems in Dynamic Psychology", Pref.
characterized as the 'arm-chair* and the 'laboratory' schools
of psychology are both scorned by the newer writers. So also
is introspection as a method. "The days of the 'a priori'
psychologist are over," says one writer, "a man can no longer
sit in his study and spin out of himself the laws of psychology
(1)
by a process of self-examination."
As was said the new influences now operative in psychology 
came more or less from without the subject. They did not arise 
within academic psychology itself. They came from investiga­
tion in various spheres in which observers found that they 
received little help from established psychological principles. 
These investigations have forced the academic psychologist to 
recognize the importance of the factors which he had neglected.
It seems possible to distinguish three lines of influence 
which have brought the new psychology into being, and with it 
the shift of emphasis in psychology from the intellectual to 
the instinctive, affective and unconscious aspects of the 
mind. These are:
1. The biological mode of regarding the human mind: the 
application to mind of the doctrine of human development from 
sub-human ancestors;
2. The study of abnormal and pathological states of mind;
3. The study of the mental processes underlying man's social 
activities. Let uslook at each of these in turn.
1. In his "History of Psychology Brett says that "the most
decisive factor in the progress of modern psychology is undoubted-
{2 ) - 
ly the theory of evolution". It is only of comparatively
recent work in psychology that this is really true. Psychology
has, in fact, been late in being seriously influenced by the
(1) H. Head: Article in ''Brain", 1918.
(2) Vol. Ill, p. 285. : .
doctrine of evolution. In one of the chapters of the "Descent 
Of Man" Darwin declared that his purpose was to show that 
"there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher 
animals in their mental faculties". He undoubtedly established 
his case for the continuity of development of the animal, and 
the human mind. But it was long before tiis point of view was 
generally adopted and the mind of man regarded as a product 
of evolution no less than his body. Now it is being very 
energetically proclaimed and constitutes one of the keynotes 
Of the new psychology* There is no serious gap> it is said,
S.nd no difference in kind, but only those of degree between the 
reflex activities of the protozoa and the highest mental 
processes of man - a continuously graded series between the 
"pursuit of its prey by the amoeba and the moral struggles of 
man"* "We have to regard the human mind," says McDougall,
"not as different in kind from the animal mind, but rather as 
built up on a foundation which is essentially similar to the 
animal mind, especially to that of the animals nearest to us 
in' the tree of ■ life. We must look for evidence of the persis­
tence of the types of structure and function of the animal mind, 
remembering that these fundamental structures are overlaid by 
later evolved structures, and that their functioning is compli­
cated and disguised by the activities of the more recently 
évôived structures." The adoption of this point of view has 
meant that those mental characteristics wvhich man shares with
the lower animals have been increasingly emphàsized and claimed
(2)  ^  ^ \ 
as of fundamental importance; and it is claimed that ahy- real
understanding of man* s behaviour must depend on a knowledge of
(1) Outline of Psychology, p. 57. ...
(2) At the moment the resemblances of the human and the 
animal mind seem to concern many witers more than the differ­
ences. For an admirably balanced Account of man's relation 
to the rest of the organic world, cf. Julian Huxley: "Essays 
of a Biologist", p. 76 ff. From a less general point of 
view cf. C. Read: "The Differentiation of the Human from the 
Anthropoid Mind", Brit. Journal of Psychology, VIII.
the relation his mind hears to that of the animals. Hence
the emphasis on instinct. Primitive man, it is said, inherited
his instincts from the animals, modern man from privitive man.
To quote Trotter: ’The instincts are tendencies deeply
ingrained in the very structure of his being. They are as
necessarily inherited, as much a part of himself, and as
essential a condition for the survival of himself and his
race, as are the vital organs of his body. Their persistence
in him is established and enforced by 'the effects of millions
of years of selection, so that it can scarcely be supposed
that a few thousand years of civilized life which have been
accompanied by no steady selection against any single instinct
can have had any effect whatever in weakening them. The
common impression that such an effect has been produced is
doubtless due to the great development in civilized man of the
(1)
mental accompaniments of instinctive p r o c e s s e s W h a t  are 
f^eamod the ’higher* - the characteristically human - mental 
functions are not completely ignored by these writers, but 
they are regarded as later and ’relatively superficial” develop­
ments ’built on a groundwork of largely unconscious and non-
rational instincts, desires and emotions which are inherited
(2)
from primitive man, and from man’s non-human forerunners”.
These latter influence human activities profoundly, often in 
quite unsuspected ways. The ideas which man often believes 
influence his conduct are regarded as but ’’eddies and ripples 
on the surface of the stream", deep within which are "the 
currents and forces of the mind". To quote from McDougall 
again: "The instinctive strivings of the animals generally 
bring them surely to their biological ends, without clear
(1) "instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", pp. 95-6.
(2) A.G. Tansley: "The New Psychology and its Relation to 
Life", p. 23.
consciousness either of those ends, or of the means by which 
they are achieved, or df the objects which, by impressing 
their senses, guide their successive steps. And it is not 
otherwise with man; he also is borne on to his biological . 
ends, for the most part but dimly conscious of those ends or  ^
of the mental forces and processes by which he acl^ieves them. " 
This, then, is the outcome of the biological way of looking 
at the human mind.
2. Just as the advent of the biological viewpoint has led
to emphasis on the factor of instinct in man* s mental make-up,
so the viewpoint of psycho-pathology has resulted in a greatly
increased emphasis being laid on the closely allied affective
and Unconscious factors. Very important developments have
taken place in recent years in psycho-pathology, and they are
the most important and best-known source of the new psychology.
Here is another prophecy which indicates how important some
writers believe these developments to be for the general
understanding of the mind. . "When the twenty years Just past
come to be looked back upon from the distant future, it is
probable that their chief claim to interest will be that they
(2)
saw the birth of abnormal psychology." Probably the most 
far-reaching general conclusion of psycho-pathology is that 
disordered conditions of mind are simply extreme and heightened 
developments of functions and processes which characterize 
mind in general. They differ from normal states in degree 
and not in kind, and the two shade into each other imperceptibly. 
Mental disorders give variations in conditions such as are 
supplied in other sciences by experiment and by means of the
(1) J^ rt. "Thp Present Position in Ciihical. Psychology’,, ;
fit" : . x " ' ' R:; "/a -/1 \ -
7^study of them it Is claimed, that light is thrown on much that 
has hitherto been inexplicable in mind and behaviour. In 
mental disorders such as hysteria and insanity it is found 
that emotional conflicts and processes which lie beneath the 
level of personal consciousness are all-important. It is 
concluded that they play a far greater part than has hitherto 
been realized in the normal mind.
These new developments have been associated chiefly with 
the names of Janet, Freud and Jung. When they commenced their 
investigations these workers found that the principles of 
psychology as generally accepted were of little or no help to 
them: so they cast these aside. Their work has developed on 
such independent lines and has resulted in so many new concep­
tions being introduced that it has been difficult to bring it 
into line with general psychology. Especially is this so in 
the case of the theories of Freud, and the early boycott of 
his views in scientific circles drove him and his followers 
into a dogmatism and an exaggeration such as often results 
from intellectual isolation. This has heightened the opposition 
of the psycho-analysts to academic psychology and has eveg, led 
to the claim that psycho-analysis is a separate science - a 
claim which no psychologist would admit. Freud*s work, it is 
asserted, signifies "a great deal more than the formulation of 
a series of new conclusions or the announcement of new discoveries,
important as they may be: it involves a radical change in our
(1)
attitude towards the structure and functioning of the mind”. 
Freud’s theories have, of course, long passed beyond the sphere
(1) Ernest Jones: PsÿchoiogicaT Bulletin, 191Ô. ■ For a
recent exposition of the Freudian psychology cf. S» Levine:
"The Unconscious"; cf. also Rivers: "Instinct and the Unconscious" 
App. I. For a brief account of the Freudian and various ’post- 
analytic’ schoolsj Cf. J. Ernest Nicole: "Psycho-analytic 
Bchools: Old and New", L^ 1922.
of psycho-pathology. They have been very widely applied, 
very extensively discussed and very variously appraised.
.His followors do not seem likely to underestimate the importance 
of Freud’s work. They have found in him. "the Darwin of the 
mind". Ernest Jones, for example, writes: "Half a century 
had to elapse before the, advent of a Darwin of the mind. Now, 
thanks to Freud, we have for the first time a purely naturalis­
tic theory of mental evolution, one free from any admixture of 
metaphysical, ethical or supernatural mysticism". Whatever 
may be the final judgment on Freud’s theories and his thera- 
peutic methods, practically all psychologists would nov/ agree 
that he has been responsible for many valuable contributions 
to their science: contributions which modify and enrich very 
considerably its modes of interpretation, and which have given 
much, now impetus to the v/hole subject. A well-known American 
psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, has recently gone so far as to 
say that "the advent of Freudianism marked the greatest epoch 
in the history of our science. Not only did it bring the 
element of feeling, which had received comparatively little 
attention from scientific psychologists, into the very fore­
ground of attention, but it made it the prime determinant of 
human development".
The Freudian theory not only stresses the importance of 
affective factors in, mind and conduct. It stresses also the
(1) "Papers on Psycho-analysis", p. 6. The exclusively 
positive nature .of Freudianlsm is often emphasized. It is 
illustrated by a remark of Freud’s when questioned whether his 
doctrine of psychical determinism did not rule out all moral 
estimates. He replied "that it was not moral estimates that 
were needed, for the solving of the problem, pf human life and 
motives, but more knowledge". (J.J. Futham, "Addresses on 
FsyçhoYanalysis . ) ou:-c :n v" ol'
.(2) And it must always be kept in mind that successful 
clinical results are not necessarily evidence of the truth of 
the psychological doctrines on which they claim to be based.
(3) "Life and Confessions of a Psychologist", Ch. VIII, 
"Progress in Psychology".
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importance of processes which lie outside the field of conscious 
awareness. It claims that the mind has.deep unconscious 
foundations and that consciousness, often gives no indications 
of the real causes determining thought and.action, and is not 
to be taken at its face value. One of,the leading exponents 
of this theory, Erne st Jone s, in a „ paper read before the 
International Congress of Psychology, sums up its contributions 
to psychology as follows; "Psychoanalytic investigation of the 
unconscious mind, the region from which proceeds the greater 
part of our mental activities, leads one to attach vastly more 
importance than is generally done to (a) the instinctual and 
emotional elements as compared with the intellectual; in fact 
one can see no dynamic significance whatever in ideas except in 
so far as they function as the representative of some impulse 
or other; to (b) inborn tendencies rather than acquired habits; 
and to (c) appetitive impulses as compared with reactive ones.
The weight of these conclusions is hard to appreciate without 
some knowledge of the importance of unconscious activity in 
our mental life". McDougall, in a critical estimate of this 
theory, says that Freud has brought to light two great allied 
facts. These are; 1. The impulsive,^ demoniac, illogical 
nature of much of human thought and conduct; 2. The very partial 
and inadequate way in which consciousness reflects and repre­
sents the workings of this impulsive force. . Other conceptions 
which are due to Freud are those of mental conflict, of repress 
sion and of sublimation, and these are ho# widely accepted and 
seem to be of considerable value.
In general the outcome of this approach to the problem 
of mind a M  bonduct, like the butcome of the biological approach, 
has been to give prominence to all the non-rational aspects of 
dentalylifbV-: uncs  ^vo. /
3, Very similar conclusions to those of psycho-pathology
have been reached independently through the study of social
psychology. In this sphere also there has been a turning
away from the ’intellectualism* of academic psychology. When
attempts were made to understand the mental processes which
underlie associated life it was found that what Dewey terms
(1)
"the rubrics of introspective psychology" were of little 
assistance. Not intellectual and reasonable considerations,
but emotions and sentiments resting back upon instinctive
trends, and prejudices whose foundations were often quite
unconscious, were found to be primary in determining the
behaviour of man in his social relations. These conclusions
(2)
are well illustrated in the earlier work of Graham Wallas.
In his "Human Nature in Politics" he endeavours to get at the
real working forces of political life and he discovers the
falsity of the intellectualistic assumption that the human
adult is a reasoning being who acts according to certain
rationally approved ends. The ’intellectuality’ of mankind
has been vastly exaggerated, and Wallas discovers the enormous
strength of mental processes other than rational - of the
instinctive and affective processes. Another writer who has
(5)
been led to somewhat similar conclusions is Le Bon. Rivers
sums, up the outcome of this line of study; "We have learnt that 
the behaviour of man is far less subject to reason and 
intelligence than was once supposed, and that his reactions
(1) See "The Need for Social Psychology", Psychological 
Review, Vol. 24. l.l' .... V -
(2) 'Graham Wallas’s change in point of view should be 
noted. In the preface to his "The Great Society" he says 
tihat while his "Human. Natüre in Politics" Was an argument 
agàinst 19th century inWeliectualism, his later book is, at 
times, "an argument against certain forms of 20th century anti- 
intellectùalism". As McDougall says somewhere Wallas seems to 
have become alarmed by the success of his early attack on
’intellectualism’ and to/have set himself to undo the work he 
had achieved.
(3), Cf.'ïhe Crowd"; on this topic cf. also W. Trotter; 
"Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War".
J(
to circumstances are often with difficulty to he distinguished 
from the behaviour of the unreasoning brutes. This absence 
or deficiency of reason is especially pronounced in those 
social reactions in which individual differences dictated by 
reason sink into insignificance before the mass reactions of 
the crowd".
These three points of view, the biological, the clinical 
and the social, and the conclusions to which they lead were 
all in evidence in psychology before the war,' and were begin­
ning to influence it. The war served to emphasize, to exem­
plify and to confirm the conclusions of all three. Since the
war, as a result, the ’new’ psychology has boomed. The
spectacle of the civilized world at war, and the impulses 
which war called forth in combatants and non-combatants alike 
gave a new and heightened significance to the study of the 
biological foundations of human nature. "War," it is said,
"strips off the later deposits of civilization and allows the
' (2)............
primitive man in us to reappear." It certainly gave added
emphasis to the doctrine of the coimnunlty çf human and animal
nature, and added colour to the doctrine of the persistence 
■ (3)
and strength of. primitive instincts in the human mind, v
(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 40. Cf. also by.the 
same author "Psychology and Politics"; Ghs. I and II of this 
book indicate very well the great change which, has come over 
this aspect of psychology.
(2) S. Freud: "Reflections".
(3) Since the war there has been, very naturally, a marked 
tendency to take a much less optimistic and more disillusioned 
view of human nature. Of. e.g. a recent article by Dean Inge: 
"Man to-day is what half a million years of evolution have made 
him. He has many noble qualities, but he is also the most 
cruel, treacherous and destructive of wild: beasts.: He. submits 
to the law of the pack as wolves do. The higher qualities of 
mankind seem to be very closely intertwined with the lower". 
Kipling, in a recent speech, defined man as "an imperfectly 
denatured animal subject to the unpredictable reactions of an 
unlocated spiritual area". There is at present no end of 
popular psychologising of "the Cave-man Within Us" and "Our 
Savage Mind" type. As for reason in man the authors of this 
sort of book seem to take absolutely literally the couplet 
that
"Er nennt’s Vernunft und braucht es nur allein 
Ja thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein".
Further, the conditions of modern warfare produced 
mental disorders on an entirely unprecedented scale, While 
the experience in treating these did not confirm Freud’s 
doctrine of the sexual origin of all psycho-neuroses, it did 
to a considerable extent confirm his theory of the mode of 
causation of these disorders. Not the sex instinct, but the 
powerful instinct of self-preservation and its associated 
emotions were found- to be the causal factors, psycho-pathologists 
were strengthened in their belief in the s^^pificance of 
instinctive-emotional factors in mental life.
Finally, the experiences of war-time were far from
reassuring students of social behaviour as to the rationality
of human nature. They found everywhere evidence of the
( 2 )
operation of ’herd’ instinct.
The significance of war-time experiences is thus summed 
up by a recent writer on the psychology of the war. "The war," 
he concludes, "has shown very little of reason as the fundamental
(1) For an account of the effects of practical war-time 
experience on psychology, cf. F.O.S. Schiller: Art. "Psychical 
Research", Enc. Brit., New Volumes. "Psychology during the war 
made considerable progress because numbers of academic psycholo­
gists were compelled to practise and to apply their theoretical 
conceptions to clinical problems, while numbers of medical men, 
finding themselves unable to cope with the profound disturbances 
of mental equilibrium inaccurately, but conveniently designated 
as ’shell shock’, were compelled to reckon with the psychical 
side of medicine. Thus were large bodies of intelligent men 
forced not only to apply their theories to concrete cases and 
to correct them by their working but also to recognise the 
power of the disordered mind to simulate the most various 
lesions and diseases of the body. As .might have been expected 
the older systems of academic psychology, being compiled out 
of. aesthetic preferences, metaphysical prejudices, methodological 
assumptions, introspective observations of conscious states, and 
highly artificial and limited laboratory experiments, did not 
stand the test of the application to the bàttléfield at all 
well."      .. . . . _. _
2-)- Qf 0 0 gi g. i^ i Ibe rt Murray y  ’’'Herd In st inc t and the ~War ", ■   
in "pe Iptern^tlon^l  ^ .yf
basis of huraan activity. . It has :shown that when reasoning
powers were brought into operation it was solely in the
interests of some affective-conative disposition, and for the
purpose of adapting means to ends v/hich had already been '
( 1 )
presented to the minds by non-rational causes."/
4.
The New Psychology and the Problem of Conduct.
, ; William James says,, somewhere, that the. philosophers who 
defined man, as the ’rational animal’ always had; much more to 
say about the ’rational’ than the ’animal’ part of the defini­
tion - which is quite true. Now as we have seen the psycholo­
gists, have turned the tables completely. Reason has become 
very much out of fashion. Its influence is belittled on every; 
hand;. As so often happens in reactions of this sort the 
pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction. It is 
undoubtedly true as Rivers has pointed out that "there is now 
a tendency to underestimate the importance of the intellectual 
factors in the determination of human conduct. It is only 
gradually that,we shall come to see just how intelligence and 
the intellectual factor take their part in controlling and. 
directing the more affective elements, and how the ultimate 
factors upon which sane conduct, whether of individual or
group, depends are those in which the basic instinctive elements
(2)
have been modified by reason". On the basis of what has been; 
discovered about the human mind, sweeping generalizations about 
conduct and its motivation have been hastily madeé: These are
often, as we shall see, of an exceedingly loose and exaggerated
(1) W. N. Maxwell; "A Psychological Retrospect of the 
Great War". . /.1-- ocr ;
(2): "Psychology and Politics", p. 5.
kind showing a complete lack of careful analysis and a
failure to take into account all the factors actually involved
in behaviour. Numerous examples could be given from current
psychological literature. Two or three will suffice. "The
first point to appreciate about human character," says one
writer, "is that motives spring from instinct not from reason;
that the human mind consists of feelings to which intellect is
(1)
merely a superficial veneer." Another writer refers to man’s 
"simple childish belief that his mind is simple, rational, and 
straightforward", which ignores "the fundamental fact that the 
human mind is built up of a bundle of instincts, which, it is 
true, are kept in check, and therefore often masked, by their 
interactions, but which are just as much alive and just as 
vigorous as they were in the days of Neolithic man, which indeed 
furnish the sole driving* power that enables man to do whatever
Is)he does do, good or bad . One more quotation: "As a result 
of the far-reaching investigations of Freud and his followers 
it would seem that we shall probably have to look to the uncon­
scious for an understanding of the ultimate nature of all the
(3)
deepest and most powerful motive forces of the mind".
Statements such as these, and they could be multiplied 
almost indefinitely, seem to show the need for some attempt to 
determine what has really been established by recent psychologi­
cal investigation, and how it actually bears upon the problem 
of conduct. Some attempt to sift out what is true from what is 
simply picturesque exaggeration. Some that now passes for 
’new’ psychology can be written down as "pseudo-scientific
(1) H. Taylor: Human Character, p. 3.
(2) A.G. Tansley: "The New Psychology and its Relation to 
Life", p. 181. This book is quite the most able of all those 
dealing with the new tendencies in psychology and stands in a 
class itself.
(3) J. C. Flügel: "The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family", 
p. 7.
verbalism"; but it cannot all be so dismissed. Much that 
is valuable has been brought to light. What is wanted is 
neither a new psychology nor an old psychology, but, so far 
as it can be discovered, a true psychology of human conduct - 
one that will do justice not merely to some, but to all the 
known facts. It is certain that old theories have been 
rudely shaken, and in particular the problem of the intelligent 
guidance and control of conduct has been acutely raised. It 
has become necessary to ask the question: can man be rational, 
and if so, in what sense?
\¥hat is attempted here is a critical survey of the current 
theories of instinct and emotion, and an endeavour to see what 
part they play in motivating conduct; also some account of the 
elaboration of the life of feeling and the various factors 
which sre involved in this process. An attempt will also be 
made to examine the nature of the guidance and control which is 
effected and to indicate some conception which will show the 
different factors involved in conduct in their right relation 
and under which the self may be looked at as a unity.
The problem of understanding the nature of the forces 
that move man to action is certainly not getting any simpler.
We are beginning to see how amazingly complex the mind is, 
and how subtle and unexpected are the interactions of all its 
functions. This is no time for simple and clear-cut theories. 
In the face of the complex tangle of facts all that can be 
hoped is to state the problem as clearly as possible, for we 
believe with Rivers that "if it is possible to state a problem 
clearly and unequivocally, one has already gone a long way 
towards its solution".
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. Our first business will be to éxamine the conception
of instinct as applied to man and to seek to discover, by an
examination of some representative theories, what grounds
there are for believing that instincts play any considerable
part in the motivation of human conduct.
It has recently been asserted that "the recognition of
the importance of instinct in the functioning of the human
11)
mind may be said to be the keynote of modern psychology".
Certainly the subject is being very freely discussed. In a
recent survey of current literature on this topic no less than
(2)
sixty titles are quoted. But when we come to look into this
literature at all closely we find that, so far, there is little
agreement. There is, in fact, a very great deal of confusion
and uncertainty prevailing; so that one may well hesitate before
accepting the sweeping statements made by some writers. The
excessive use which has been made of the notion of instinct
in man, and the many attempts to apply schemes of instincts
in various of,the social sciences, have provoked a reaction,
13)
so that noY/ some are tending to repudiate instinct altogether. 
Much of the confusion, as we shall see, arises over the use of 
terms. Great diversity of opinion still exists as to the 
meaning which should be attached to the terms ’instinct’ and 
’instinctive’. It is unfortunately quite misleading to 
imagine that when different psychologists use these terms 
they mean the same thing by them. The terms are old ones 
and they have been used in different departments of study, in 
quite different ways. They are also widely current in popular
(1) Bernard Hart: "Primitive Instincts in the Human Mind" 
in "The Mind and what we ought to know about it", p. 9.
(2) See E. C. Tolman: "The Nature of Instinct". Psychologi­
cal Bulletin, April 1923.
(3) See W. E. Hocking: "The Dilemma in the Conception of 
Instinct as Applied to Human Psychology", Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology: Vol. XV,
speech and literature where, it is said, they are used with 
a minimum of meaning and a maximum of vagueness". All this 
makes it exceedingly difficult to come by a clear view of the 
nature of instincts as constituting part of the innate basis 
of the huraan mind.
I.
It is a mistake to imagine that the view, now so widely
current, that -innate tendencies are important in determining
conduct is a new one. To go no further back, such writers
as Dugald Stewart and others of the Scottish school of
philosophers treated the active side of human nature fully
and distinguished what they termed ’implanted* or ’instinctive
(1)
propensities’. Dugald Stewart, in fact, enumerated a list
of these which contains almost all the instincts generally
recognised to-day. But it was the doctrine of organic
evolution, which, throwing light on the nature of instinct
in animals and revealing man*s relation to them, raised in a
new form the question of the place of instinct in human nature.
Among psychologists one of the first to take up this, question
was William James. He defined an instinct in terms of
behaviour as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to
produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without(2)previous education in the performance . In some respects 
his treatment of human instincts seems much more adequate and 
nearer to the facts than many more recent ones. He believed 
"no other mammal, not even the monkey, shows so large an array". 
But he points out that the number of human,instinctive tenden­
cies , and their susceptibility to modification, have important
(1) cf. James Drever: "Instinct in Man", Ch. II.
(2) "Principles of Psychology", Vol. II, Ch. XXIV.
consequences. "They contradict each other ...... The
animal that exhibits them loses the ’instinctive* demeanour 
and appears to lead a life of hesitation and choice, an 
intellectual life; not however because he has no instincts - 
rather because he has so many that thqrblock each other’s 
path. "
The writer who, more than any other, has been influential 
in advocating the view that instincts play an important part 
in human conduct is William McDougall. His "Introduction to 
Social Psychology", first published some fifteen years ago, 
has had a very remarkable influence on thought on this subject. 
His book is, in fact, now regarded as something of a classic 
in psychology. It is the source of almost all the attempts to 
apply schemes of instinct to practical human problems, and it 
has been the inspiration of much other writing# on the subject. 
One reason for the wide acceptance of the theory of the 
instinctive motivation of conduct which it sets forth is to 
be found in the fact that, at the time of its publication, a 
satisfactory theory of action was lacking. Psychological 
hedonism - the pleasure-pain theory which had held the field 
for so long - had been successfully refuted. Miat was termed 
the ’ideo-motor* theory, that every ’idea* is not only a state 
of knowing but also a tendency to movement, had never been 
satisfactory. It was no longer possible to explain conduct by 
referring it to such unanalysed faculties as ’Reason’ ^and ’Will*. 
McDougall then advanced his clear and simple scheme of the 
instincts and their accompanying emotions as the moving forces 
in all human activity. It filled a void and even where not 
accepted in its entirety it has exerted a striking influence.
It has not, of course, escaped criticism. In its original 
form it was much too definite and clear-cut* McDougall has 
since introduced various modifications into it and has very
recently completely restated it in a form, however, which 
has lost much of the original definiteness. It is important 
to consider it in relation to his views as a whole. It rests 
hack on the system of animism which he expounds in his "Body 
and Mind", and on his whole doctrine of the ’purposiveness* 
of all human and animal behaviour of however lowly a kind.
In his most recent statement of the theory he connects it 
with vdiat has come to be termed the ’hormic’ view of human 
activity. The term ’hormic’ was suggestive by T. P. Nunn 
who thus states the theory. "We need," he says, "a name for 
the fundamental property expressed in the incessant adjustment 
and adventures that make up the tissue of life. We are 
directly aware of that property in our conscious activities 
as an element of * drive*, ’urge’ or felt tendency toward an 
end. Psychologists call it conation, and give the name 
’conative process’ to any train of conscious activity which
is dominated by such a drive........  To this element of
drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men 
and the higher animals or in the unconscious activities of 
their bodies and the (presumably) unconscious behaviour of 
lower animals, we propose to give a single name - ’horme*.
In accordance with this proposal all the purposive processes 
of the organism are hormic processes, conative processes being 
the sub-class whose members have the special mark of being 
conscious." Schopenhauer’s ’will-to-live*, Bergson’s ’élan 
vital’ and Jung’s ’libido’ are conceptions closely analogous 
to this of ’horme’.
According to McDougall each of the instincts expresses
(1) See "Outline of Psychology" 1923. c£ also a long and 
important article in which McDougall answers criticisms: "The 
use and abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology", Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, Dec. 1921. Also "Instinct and 
Emotion", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1914-5, 
"Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion", Mind, 1920.
(2) "Education: Its Data and First Principles", uh. II.
"an urge, an impulse, a striving towards some goal by the 
attainment of which it may be allayed or satisfied". But 
they are to be regarded, not as a collection of separate 
faculties, but rather as specific differentiations of a primor­
dial capacity to strive, originally undifferentiated. The 
instincts are so many channels through which the vital or 
hormic energy flows. In essence instinctive activity is the 
liberation and direction of energy and McDougall has attempted 
to give a basis for this belief in the physiology of the 
brain and nervous system. He maintains that "each instinct 
seems to be in some sense a great spring of psychophysical, 
energy, a source from which, when it is tapped, when it is 
excited by the appropriate conjunction of circumstances, psycho­
physical energy wells up in a great gush to reinforce and 
sustain mental and bodily activity". In his latest statement 
McDougall defines an instinct as "an innate disposition v/hich 
determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any 
object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence 
a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which 
finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation 
to that object". The word ’disposition* is important in the 
definition. McDougall stresses the Aristotelian distinction 
of structure and function. For him the instincts are facts 
of structure, part of the innate structure of the mind, though,, 
of course, known only through their functioning. It is also 
important to note that this definition of instinct is based on the 
familiar threefold division of mental activities into cognitive, 
affective and conative aspects. This is a break with the 
traditional view of instinct as merely inborn tendencies to
(1) See "The Source and Direction of Psychophysical Energy", 
American Journal of Insanity, 1913.
certain types of activity. As the result of experience the 
the cognitive and the conative aspects undergo considerable 
modification and complication. New objects excite the instinct 
and evoke the impulse to action, which action may take very 
varying forms. But the central aspect, the emotional excite­
ment, remains unchanged throughout. However much modification
the instincts may undergo and however they may be elaborated
in the course of the development of character, they remain
throughout, it is claimed, the sole motives of all thought 
and conduct. Habits are secondary and derived from them. 
Pleasure and pain serve,merely to guide their direction.
"We may say then," writes McDougall, in a much-quoted passage, 
"that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers 
of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of 
some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), 
every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may 
seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity 
is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses deter­
mine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by
which all mental activities are sustained, and all the complex
intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but 
a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which 
these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and 
pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of means.
Take away,these instinctive dispositions with their powerful 
impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity 
of any Itind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful 
clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam engine 
whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental 
forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and 
societies, and in them we are confronted with the central
(p
mystery of life andmind and will."
(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 44. Gf, also 
"The great instincts common to most of the higher animals were 
evolved long before mountain ranges such as the Alps assumed 
their present form; and they mavwell survive when all the 
wg^ftains that we know shall have been worn away". "National 
Welfare and National Decay", p. 147.
(1)
li/hen it comes to classifying instinctive activities 
and distinguishing the separate instincts McDougall*s basis 
is the quality of the emotional excitement which accompanies 
the various types of behaviour. It is a fundamental aspect 
of his theory that "each of the principal instincts conditions 
some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific 
or peculiar to it, and the emotional excitement of a specific 
quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any 
one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion". 
This one-to-one relation of the instincts and primary emotions 
is the aspect of the theory which has come in for the most 
damaging criticism. McDougall retains it in the latest form 
of the theory, though he does not make it quite obvious whether 
he still uses the quality of the emotional accompaniment as 
the sole criterion for distinguishing the separate instincts.
He now distinguishes in man the following instincts and emotions, 
recognising, however, that the specificity of these instincts 
is of very varying degrees.
Instincts.
1. Instinct of escape.



















(1) William James ("Principles", Vol. II, p. 442) had called 
attention to the close relation existing between Instinct and 
emotion; "Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade 
imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an 
instinct excites an emotion as v/ell". McDougall has tried to 
give a definite explanation of this reaction.
Instincts. Emotional Qualities.
11. Pood-seeking. Appetite (in narrower sense)
12. Acquisition. Peeling of ownership.
13. Construction. Peeling of creativeness.
14. Laughter. Amusement.
Criticism of this theory of the instincts has, in the
main, followed tv;o lines, Lloyd Morgan, Thorndike and more
recently Dunlap have tackled it from the side of instinctive
behaviour. Shand and Drever have found it defective from the
point of view of the relation between instinct and emotion.
Let us consider the first of these lines of criticism. Lloyd
(1)
Morgan contends that what McDougall has termed instincts are 
simply class names under which are summed up varied modes of 
response which appear to serve the same general end. None of 
them is in any way elementary.
"So far from regarding any one of them as a primary 
element," says Lloyd Morgan, "I regard each item on the list 
as denoting a class to which a group name is attached - a class 
comprising varied modes of behaviour and modes of behaviour! 
and modes of experience: a class within which these varied modes 
are grouped because they have certain features in common, and 
tend towards what we may term, in a very general way, the same 
end." McDougall*s terms thus become not explanatory, but 
simply descriptive. Lloyd Morgan further criticises the view 
that the instincts, thus regarded, are moving forces or deter­
minant of activity. "If we say that pugnacity makes the 
robin pugnacious, or self-assertion makes the child self- 
assertive ....... are we not in some danger of regarding each
instinct as a faculty in terms of which the instinctive process 
may be explained? We have such a way of making our general
(1) Instinct and Experience, Ch. IV.
and abstract terms pose as so-called forces.....i.. Instinct 
(or a committee of instincts) is not something that through 
impulsive force and motive power drives bodily or mental 
processes towards their ends; it is a concept in terms of 
which we can in some measure interpret these processes as
(p
facts presented in nature.
A somewhat similar Criticism of McDougall is advanced
(2)
by Thorndike , whose point of view is very similar to that of 
William James. He characterises instinct in McDougall*s 
sense as "mythical potencies" to postulate which is altogether 
unnecessary. "It is no more necessary, and it is much less 
accurate, to describe man loosely as possessed of ‘an instinct 
of self-preservation* than it is to describe oxygen as 
possessed of an instinct of rust production. The real facts 
meant, in this and in all cases, are a multitude of more or 
less specialized responses to certain actual situations." He 
finds it necessary to part company i^vith "stock descriptions of 
instincts" and endeavours to replace them by a statement of 
the specific responses to specific situations which human nature 
displays. More recently Knight Dunlap has raised the question 
"whether there are instincts in the teleological sense - the
(3)
sense in v/hich the term is used in McDougall* s Social Psychology". 
His answer is that thefe are not. Wbat are termed such are groups 
of activities and such grouping of activities "may be admitted 
to be a useful procedure, if it be clearly understood to be a 
device of convenience only similar to the arrangement of docu­
ments in a well-ordered filing system". It is pointed but
(1) The danger of regarding instincts in much the same way 
as the old ‘faculties* were regarded is pointed out by G,0.
Field: "Instinct Psychology and Faculty Psychology", Mind, 1921.
(2) "The Original Nature of Man."
(5) "Are there any Instincts?" Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, Dec., 1919,
that the same activities are, at different times, regarded as 
the expression of different instincts. "There are very few 
actual responses of the animal which do not form part of a 
number of ‘instincts* whatever the system of classification.
The same physiological processes, and in fact the same conscious 
processes are involved, in primitive man, in pursuing a deer 
for food, and in pursuing a female for amatory purposes. In
other cases the same reactions may now be classed as mere 
‘flight*, now as manifestations of ‘gregariousness*, now as
manifestations of ‘self-abasement* ........     I am sure that
all the activities physiological and psychological, of v/hich 
the animal is capable, participate at some time or other in 
the expression of the ‘reproductive* instinct." This is an 
important point. Criticism of this nature, and much more 
from a purely *behaviouristic* point of view, has compelled 
McDougall to modify his theory in a rather important way. He 
now admits that there was a confusion involved in the original 
form of his theory. Yfhen he set it out he was still influenced 
by the view that an instinct is simply an unlearnt motor 
mechanism. This view he tried to combine with the hormic 
view of instinct as expressing an inner urge or striving.
The two views, he says, are radically incompatible and cannot 
be combined. This fact he has only just realised. He there­
fore rejects the view that an instinct is an innately organised 
mechanism of a reflex nature. Such a view was formulated under 
the influence of accounts of animal behaviour which exaggerated 
unduly its fixity and regularity. Later observations have shown 
that quite low down in the animal scale responses are not 
fatally determined, but that there is a surprising amount of 
adaptability. In the case of man especially we must abandon 
the notion that there are specific motor mechanisms corresponding 
to each.instinct. Such motor mechanisms as exist are not
instincts but merely "the instruments of instincts". One
instinctive impulse may make use, according to circumstances,
of a variety of motor mechanisms and the same response may be
the result of the functioning now of one and now of another
(1) 
instinct.
With this modification of the theory on its motor side,
it is clear that the central or emotional aspect of the instinct,
which it is claimed is its permanent feature, becomes of even
greater importance. But in this aspect the theory has not
(2)
fared at all well. Shand makes three strong points against 
McDougall*s view that each instinct can be characterised by 
some one kind of emotional excitement, and he backs them up 
with numerous illustrations, 1, It is possible for an 
instinct to be excited and characteristic behaviour to follow 
v/ithout any specific emotion being experienced. Rivers has 
recently confirmed Shand*s contention that in the case of the 
"danger instinct" fear or emotional excitement of any kind may 
be lacking. 2. The same primary emotion may be connected 
with several instincts. McDougall himself points out that the 
emotion of anger may be aroused in connection with the obstruc­
tion of any instinctive impulse. 3. The same instinct may at 
different times be connected with different primary emotions.
The instinct of flight for example may be connected with the 
emotions of fear, anger or disgust. Drever, who in many other
respects agrees with McDougall, also finds himself unable to
(3)
accept this aspect of his theory. His view is that the 
affective aspect of instinctive activity is best described as 
‘interest* and that the more complex affective experiences which
(1) See: "Outlines of Psychology", p. 117.
(2) "The Foundations of Character." "Instinct and Emotion." 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1914-5.
(3) "instinct in Man", Ch. VII.
4^^
we terra emotions only arise as parts of instinctive responses 
under certain special conditions, namely the checking or 
arresting of the instinctive impulse. When impulse is thus 
checked, ‘tension* results and emotion appears. Drever agrees 
that some of the generally recognised instincts are closely 
related to some of the familiar emotions but adds: "Personally 
I am not prepared to regard an emotion as a definite psychologi­
cal entity in the way McDougall apparently does. Nor am I 
disposed to limit the instinctive tendencies to such tendencies
as show in their activity a characteristically emotional 
(1)
component".
McDougall has thus abandoned the view that an instinct 
can be characterised by a specific form of behaviour, Uriti- 
cisra seems to have established the fact that it cannot be charac­
terised by any one type of emotional accompaniment. The facts 
of emotion are too complex for the simple generalisation that 
they bear a one-to-one relation to the instincts. The question 
then arises how, on this theory, are the different instincts 
distinguished at all. McDougall seems left v/ithout a criterion. 
He makes one suggestion on this point in his latest statement.
He says that we can define and recognise an instinct "by the 
nature of the goal, the type of situation that it seeks or
tends to bring about, as well as by the type of situation or
(2)
object that brings it into activity". But this is not a 
psychological criterion at all. It is the abandonment of the 
psychological point of view in classification. McDougall‘s 
scheme of the instincts thus appears, when closely examined, to
(1) "The Classification of the Instincts." Paper read 
before the International Congress of Psychology, 1923.
(2) "Outline." p. 119.
be in a far from satisfactory condition. It is attractive
in its simplicity; but it is simple where, as we shall see
further, the facts are exceedingly complex. He does not
t\at
claim, however, W t  it is more than an hypothesis justified, 
if at all, by it co-ordinating in an effective manner an 
immense range of facts of immediate observation, facts of human 
and animal behaviour and of human experience",
II.
Dr. James Drever in his "Instinct in Man" has given a
full historical survey of thought upon this subject, and in
this and subsequent publications has propounded a theory of his
own. He takes as a truism the statement "the basis of the
developed mind and character of man must be sought in the
original and inborn tendencies of his nature". Original
nature, he says, consists first of all of ‘capacities* such
as those to have sensations, to learn, to reason and the like,
and of certain active tendencies experienced as conscious
impulses. Of these he writes: "The human being comes into
the world with certain active tendencies, derived primarily,
we may say, from the life force itself, shaped and moulded
through long evolutionary epochs into the several forms we find
to-day. These active tendencies, so far as they are tendencies
involving the co-operation of experience in their working out,
though independent of individual experience in their origin,
may be designated instincts, the name by which they have been
designated since the science of psychology came into being.
These instincts are experienced as impulses, each accompanied
by a feeling or interest, evoked by certain particular objects,
situations, or other experiences, and manifesting themselves in
(1)
more or less definite kinds of behaviour". The main problem
(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 20,
for psychology in connection with instincts is the understanding
of 'instinct-motivation', so that the psychologist is concerned
with the inner or psychical aspect of the instincts, with the
’’drive, urge or impulsion” by which they are characterised.
He believes that viewed fromihis point of view they fall into
two great groups which differ fundamentally. These he terms
(1)
the 'appetitive and the 'reactive' respectively. The dlstinc- 
tion is this. The appetitive tendencies, including also 
'aversions’ as well as 'appetitions', are internally evoked by 
affective experience of an agreeable or disagreeable nature, 
and the end they seek has reference only to this agreeableness 
or disagreeableness. Hunger, thirst, sex and sleep are the 
characteristic appetitive tendencies. The reactive tendencies 
take the form of reactions to objective situations and the aim 
is adjustment to them. It is pursued often regardless of 
agreeableness or disagreeableness. Fear, anger, and curiosity 
are typical reactive tendencies. The appetitive tendencies 
are very closely connected with internal bodily changes, 
especially with the internal secretions. The distinction is 
not a new one. It has often been made in other terms. The 
distinction of appetites from instincts is an old one. But 
there are difficulties involved in it in face of the complexities 
of human behaviour. Many instinctive manifestations often 
appear to be both appetitive and reactive, for example, sex.
The distinction does not appear to be fundamental and other 
writers prefer to regard appetite as a factor of greater or 
less importance in all instinctive activity. Drever further 
distinguishes between tendencies which are relatively specific 
and those w^lch are more general. There is also,a third 
distinction. The reactive tendencies are either 'simple' or
(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education”, uh. IV.
j A
'emotional'. This distinction has reference to the facility 
with which emotional excitement supervenes on any impeding of 
the reaction, or the degree to which it is normally involved 
in it. Using these three principles of classification Drever 
gives what is probably the most comprehensive classification 












































In the extensive literature dealing with the theory of 
instincts which has recently grown up some modes of approach to 
the problem are from an almost exclusively biological point of 
view. This results in a classification of instincts into three 
groups: 1. those of self-preservation, 2. those which subserve
the continuance of the race. 3. those which maintain the cohesion 
of the group. These are usually briefly designated as, ego, 
sex and herd instincts. Such a classification, it is important 
to observe, is made on the basis of the biological ends which
> Cl) (2)
the, tendencies serve. It is adopted by Rivers, MacCurdy and
(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious."
(2) "Problems in Dynamic Psychology."
many other writers. As someone has pointed out it is so
simple and obvious that it is not surprising to find writer
after writer adopting it. It plays a great part in the more
popular varieties of psychological literature. A, G. Tansley, 
(1)
for example, speaks of the three great dominant instincts of 
ego, herd and sex", which give rise to the "three universal 
complexes" whose conflicts and interactions are, in his view,
"the most important factors in moulding character and person­
ality" . He attempts to reduce McDougall's list of instincts 
to this threefold scheme, not seeing that McDougall’s classifi­
cation is made on quite another basis. This classification has 
recently been defended by MacCurdy on the basis of its 'prag­
matic* value. It is useful as a working scheme for clinical 
practice. He finds the long list of instincts given by some 
writers too diffuse. "From a dynamic standpoint their analysis 
becomes rather tautological, new instincts being easily hypothe­
sized to account for new reactions. The cataloguing of long 
lists of instincts and disputes as to the existence or non­
existence of separate minor instincts degenerate into sterile 
academic discussionsjknd squabbles about nomenclature." What 
is wanted is the conception of a group of dominant instincts 
which interact to produce normality and which sometimes con­
flict, abnormality being the result. The grouping of instinc­
tive tendencies into ego, herd and sex server this purpose.
But however valuable from this point of view, it is highly 
artificial in its simplicity. As has been remarked it is
"altogether too alluring. It appears to reduce so beautifully 
the complexities presented by human conduct, normal no less 
than abnormal". It throws very little light on some aspect 
of conduct in the concrete to say that it is all the result of
(1) "The New Psychology and its Relation to Life", uh. XVIII,
the 'ego instinct*. It is in fact thoroughly misleading 
to assume, as in so often done, that there is in man an ego 
instinct, ^  instinct of sex or a herd instinct. These three 
are often used as principles of explanation without further 
analysis. This is 'faculty* psychology with a vengeance.
Taken over from biology, this classification of instincts is 
of little value in attempting to understand the motivation of 
conduct.
IV.
The problem of instinct is also approached from the 
point of view of psychopathology. Psycho-analysis, for 
example, claims to recognise the fundamental importance of 
instinct in human nature. In psycho-analysis two interwoven 
strands can be distinguished - that of practice and that of 
theory. In its theoretical aspects psycho-analysis is open 
to criticism by psychologists just as is any other body of 
psychological doctrine. One of the chief exponents of this 
school has recently declared that its chief positive contri­
bution to our knowledge of human nature is "the demonstration 
that the normal sexual instinct is vastly more complicated
in its structure and extensive in its ramifications than had
(1)
previously been recognised". It certainly has demonstrated 
this and has performed a valuable service to psychology in 
doing so. The heated controversy which has raged over its 
treatment of sex and the opposition with which it has been 
met are well known. It now seems clear that the charge of
* pan-sexualism* was not without foundation. However widely
* sex' may be interpreted It has been considerably overemphasised
(1) Ernest Jones: "The classification of the Instincts". 
Paper read before the International Congress of Psychology.
(1)
as a principle of explanation.
It is not at all easy to discover just how writers of 
this school regard instinct. It is certainly regarded very 
widely and loosely. As McDougall has somewhere pointed out 
the Freudian method is not one of preliminary analysis and 
clear definition. Freud does not delay to define the notion of 
instinct, or to discover what part it is or is not capable of 
playing in mental life. His method is rather to postulate 
the instinct and then to attribute to it a whole range of
(2)
phenomena which may or may not really be connected with it.
Freudians "hasten to attribute to the sexual instinct a large
number of mental and bodily activities which are rooted in
other instincts than the sexual, or are highly intellectualized
processes determined by more than one instinct or rather by
highly complex sentiments in which perhaps the sex instinct
has no part". The more recent developments of psycho-analytical
theory have stressed not only sex instincts, but also what are
termed the 'ego* instincts. All instincts are apparently
(3)
reduced to these two groups. The distinction is adopted as
(1) For an admirable treatment of sex in man cf. Julian 
Huxley: "Sex Biology and Sex Psychology" in his recent "Essays 
of a Biologist".
(2) Vdiat Freud has done is well summed up by McDougall 
("The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", Proceedings 
Royal Socy. of Medicine, 1918); "'Without any preliminary attempt 
to consider first principles of mental life, to analyse con­
sciousness, or even to define the terms which he uses, this 
daring and original inquirer has wrestled at first hand with 
the problems of conduct and especially with the problems of 
disordered conduct as presented to him by his patients in all 
their concreteness and complexity. Thus approaching, he has 
been deeply impressed by the great fact that much of human 
conduct, both normal and abnormal, proceeds not from consciously 
reasoned motives, nor from any chain of association of clear 
ideas, but from a great impelling force that works within us, 
expressing itself very obscurely in consciousness as vague 
feeling and uneasiness. This he has recognised as the sexual 
impulse; and, having been deeply impressed by the far-reaching 
effects of this on conduct, and by the obscure and devious 
modes of its operation, he has gone on to bring under the same 
heading whatever other forces of a similar nature he has seemed 
to detect as co-operating with and subserving it, or which the 
vagueness of common speech seems in any way to connect with it".
(3) cf. Freud: "Triebe und Triebschicksale" in "Sammlung 
Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre". ^
the result of Inquiry into the origin of certain types of
psycho-neurotic disorders - what are termed the "transference
neuroses". These are held to result from a conflict between
these two groups of instincts. Freud regards the sex instinct
as made up of a number of partial instincts, which can be
regarded as pairs of opposites. They are originally separate
tendencies, and only gradually become integrated. Abnormalities
in conduct are the result of the failure of this integration
to take place. Of the ego instincts Freud says little.
"Speaking very.broadly, we may say that they are the non-sexual 
(1)
instincts." This is speaking very broadly indeed. The term
seems to cover everything in the personality which opposes or
represses the 'libido* or sexual energy in its strivings for
satisfaction. Freud has treated further of this topic in a
(2)
recent work of a speculative or "metapsychological" nature.
He still stresses the antithesis between the sex and the ego 
instincts, but on an altogether new basis. He admits that in 
the course of the development of psycho-analytical theory the 
qualitative difference between the two groups was found not to 
exist: "A part of the ego-instincts was recognised as libidinous; 
in the ego, sexual instincts were found to be active". Then it 
seemed that Freud must "admit the critics to be in the right who 
from the first had suspected that psycho-analysis makes 
sexuality an explanation of everything". But he now transforms 
the original contrast into a purely hypothetical contrast of the 
sex instinct as 'life instincts* and the ego instincts as 'death' 
instincts. This is admitted to be pure speculation. It looks 
exceedingly like an attempt to find, at all costs, a way out of 
an * impasse *. Freud's last word is that "it remains an awkward ^
(1) Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis.
(2) "Beyond the Pleasure Principle."
that analysis up to now has only put us in the position of 
demonstrating libidinous impulses". This seems to indicate 
that the charge of *pan~sexualism* against this school is still 
well-founded. Freudian writers are all guilty of using the 
terms 'instinct* and 'instinctive* in an altogether illegitimate 
way. Confusion on a large scale is the result. No attempt 
is made carefully to define the meaning of the terms or to 
reach clear concepts. This may not matter very much in 
practice, but when, as the result of such practice, far-reaching 
statements are made concerning conduct in general it does 
become important. •
V.
In view of its amazing.vogue as a popular conception 
it seems worth while to devote some special attention to what 
is termed the ‘herd* instinct. The way in which, in the hands 
of some writers, this instinct becomes an almost universal prin­
ciple of explanation, typifies very well the way in which 
instinct in general is regarded.
The recognition of a 'herd* or gregarious tendency
in man is by no means recent. It is W. Trotter's "Instincts
of the Herd in Peace and War" which is largely responsible for
the present popularity of the conception, and for its use in a
(1)
way which is positively riotous. Trotter writes: "It is 
probably not necessary now to labour the proof of the fact that 
man is a gregarious animal in literal fact, that he is as essen­
tially gregarious as the bee, the ant, the sheep, the ox, and 
the horse. The tissue of characteristically gregarious 
reactions which his conduct presents, furnishes incontestable 
proof of this thesis, v/hich is thus an indispensable clue to an
(1) Cf. also: "Herd Instinct and the War" by Gilbert Murray in 
"The International Crisis". Walter Lippmann ("Yale Review", July 
1922) writing of the irrationality of much social behaviour says:
’The fashionable thing to do in this connection is to pronounce 
the phrase ‘herd instinct* with a sense of finality. At the 




inquiry into the intricate problems of human society". Trotter
treats the herd instinct in the Freudian manner: that-is he
postulates it and does not inquire what is its exact nature : in ;
man, or the limits and scope of its application. He rather
sweeps into its province whatever human activities are in any
way social, which is, of course, most of them. It is thus
made to 'explain* almost all that human beings do in relation
(2)
to one another. No attempt is made at further analysis. The 
tendency to form groups, to imitate the actions of others, 
suggestibility, in general, the dislike of innovation, religion, 
altruism and many other highly developed forms of conduct are 
all covered by it. Using precisely the same method it would 
be possible to make out an equally good^&aii for an .instinct 
of isolation* or a 'solitary* instinct. There are numerous 
phenomena of animal and human life which could be cited to 
support the assumption of such an instinct. There is, in 
human nature, clearly a need not only for association v/ith 
others but also for privacy. Both seem equally primitive.
It might be said that it is the enormous increase in the intimacy 
and complexity of present social relations which has led to the 
emphasising of human gregariousness. But such a procedure of 
explaining by 'instincts* is wholly fallacious. Trotter has 
undoubtedly observed very acutely many of the outstanding 
phenomena of modern social life and he has been struck by their 
irrational character. But to ascribe them simply to *herd 
instinct* is an easy and dogmatic way of explaining facts whose
(1) p. 112.
(2) Gf. also Tansley, "The New Psychology": "Herd instinct 
in its raw form 3^ an animal character, and,the more clearly 
we recognise the fact the better position we. shall be in to 
master it and direct it to worthier ends. It is well for us 
to realize that we constantly act like sheep, like monkeys, or 
like wolves; as well as that in virtue of the same instinct many 
of us are ready to die for our country, and a few to live for 
it, or even for the human race". (Preface)
causes and effects are far more complicated than is admitted.
It is not of course denied that a gregarious tendency is 
Involved in original human nature. But man's gregarious 
is of a very complex sort compared, for example, with that 
of the bee. Viewed historically human gregariousness is 
somewhat complicated. It seems that man became gregarious 
quite late in his evolutionary history. The instinct so far 
as it exists is thus much younger and cannot take place beside 
such tendencies as those of sex, or of self-preservation. The 
need for further analysis before we can talk with any confidence 
of a gregarious instinct in man has been well expressed by 
Rivers. "In recent psychological literature," he says, "we 
read far more about the activity and effects of the herd-instinct 
than about what this instinct is. Singularly few attempts 
have been made to justify the instinctive character of the pro­
cesses by yhich the social group influences the individual, to 
distinguish between those elements which are instinctive and 
those which form part of the social heritage. The whole 
matter requires a prolonged and detailed study based upon 
evidence from amany different fields: from the comparative 
study of different societies; from the observation of the 
behaviour of the child; from the study of disorders of the 
mental life due in the main to conflicts between individual 
tendencies and social or gregarious factors; from that wider
study in which human behaviour is regarded biologically in its
(1)
relation to that of other animals."
(1) "Psychology and Politics'", p. 39. . McDougall has given
a very good account of the operation of the gregarious tendency
in man: "I recognise that the gregarious instinct does play a
part in giving society its great hold upon us, namely, as
follows: Its impulse becomes on the human plane the desire,
not only for the physical proximity of other human beings and
for intercourse with them, but also for the sharing of our
emotions with other men; for it is only then that the gregarious
impulse attains its fullest satisfaction. On the primitive-
human plane, this satisfaction is attained by physical immersion
in the crowd; for then the primitive sympathetic"tendencies
secure uniformity of emotion in all members. On a higher and
imaginative plane this desire for community of emotion becomes
what I have called * the principle of active sympathy*; that is
to say it prompts us to desire to be in emotional harmony with 
those aeout us, and it renders us rneasy and dissatisfied, so long 
as we feel that in any matter our emotional attitude.is widelv 
different irom tn&t qy onr erom or sociaJ circle." (Outline bf Psvcholo^v. nn. )
VI.
A very valuable contribution to the discussion of
the nature and place of instinct in man is contained in John
Dewey's latest book: "Human Nature and Conduct". Dewey
brings some very searching criticism to bear on some of the
exaggerations of the upholders of instinct. Dewey discusses
the original human tendencies in the second part of his book
and justifies this order of treatment by pointing.out that
"impulses though first in time are never primary in fact; they
are secondary and dependent. The meaning of native activities
is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction
(1)
with a matured social medium". This is a fact always to be
kept in mind. He notes that psychology, after ignoring
impulses for years, now usually commences with some inventory
of instinctive activities. This is all to the good. But
fallacies arise when attempts are made to explain the complicated
events of individual and social life by direct reference to
these native powers. To understand adequately the psychological
basis of conduct it is necessary to treat also of environmental
conditions which have "educated original activities into
definite and significant dispositions". The need for this
is illustrated by reference to the extraordinary diversity of
habits, moral codes and institutions of the different races of
mankind which, even allowing for some racial difference, take
their rise from practically the same stock of native Instincts.
"The same original fears, angers, loves and hates are hopelessly
entangled in the most opposite institutions. The thing we need
to know is how a native stock has been modified by interaction
(2)
with different environments." He recognises, of course, the




themselves. He is concerned throughout to stress the plasti­
city of original human nature. This is in fact his main point. 
He uses the terms 'instinct* and ‘impulse* as practical equi­
valents: and this for a reason. "The word instinct taken 
alone," he says, "is still too laden with the older notion 
that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted - 
which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. 
The word ‘impulse* suggests something primitive, yet loose, 
undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, 
precisely because he has so many ‘instincts* that they cut
across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be
(1)
learned. Viewing impulse in this way he lays it down that
any impulse may become organized into almost any disposition
according to the way it interacts with the surroundings. He
criticises at length the widely held doctrine of a few distinct
instinctive tendencies v/hich lead to definite and specific
forms of behaviour; and also the tendency to use these same
as principles of explanation in conduct. It is useful to
classify but "it is unscientific to try to restrict original
activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes
(2)
of instincts . The object of classification - the assisting 
of the mind to deal with large ranges of facts - is forgotten, 
and they are taken as marking things in themselves. This 
tendency is at present very noticeable in theorizing about 
human nature. "Man has been resolved into a definite collec­
tion of primary instincts which may be numbered, catalogued and 
exhaustively described one by one. Theorists differ only or
(y
chiefly as to their number and ranking." Of this artificial 
simplifying and of its influence in social science he gives
U) p. 151. 
( 2 ) Ibid._ . 
(3) p. 132.
6/,
numerous illustrations. Just now, he says, "another simplifi­
cation is current. All instincts go hack to the sexual, so 
that ‘cherchez la femme* (under a multitude of symbolic dis­
guises) is the last word of science with respect to the analysis
(1)
of conduct . His own view is a radical one: there are no 
separate instincts. He writes: "In spite of what has been 
said, it will be asserted that there are definite, independent, 
original instincts which manifest themselves in specific acts 
in a one-to-one correspondence. Fear, it will be said, is a 
reality, and so is anger, and rivalry, and love of mastery over 
others, and self-abasement, maternal love, sexual desire, 
gregariousness and envy, and each has its own appropriate deed 
as a result. Of course they are realities. So are suction, 
rusting of metals, thunder and lightning and lighter-than-air 
flying-machines. But science and invention did not get on as 
long as men indulged in the notion of special forces to account 
for such phenomena. Men tried that road and it only led them
into learned ignorance  ...... It turned out that these
'forces* were only the phenomena over again, translated from 
a specific and concrete form (in which they were at least
( 2 )
actual) a generalized form in which they were verbal".
This method of thinking has disappeared from the physical 
sciences, but it still persists in psychology. There sex, 
hunger, fear and even much more complex active interests are 
regarded as if they were * lump forces*. The fact that specific 
bodily organs are involved is responsible in the Case of 
hunger and sex for assuming that there is a corresponding 
separate psychic force or impulse. But this assumption 
involves two fallacies according to Dewey. ’ First, the activity
(1) Pi 133i
(2)
is never confined to the particular organs but involves the
whole organism. "The whole organism is concerned in every act
to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as
muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc." And since
the total state of the organism is never twice the same,
neither are these phenomena. Secondly, the environment in
which the act takes place is never twice alike: and this social
context is an important part of the meaning of the act. Dewey
criticises the psycho-analysts for failing to see that what
they treat as psychological originals are often the results of
social causes. "Theytreat phenomena which are peculiarly
symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time,
as if they were the result of fixed native impulses of human
(1)
nature. Dewey protests too against the view that there is
a single instinct of fear, , "It is only mythology which sets
up a single identical psychic force which 'causes* all the
(2)
reactions of fear, a force beginning and ending in itself."
But all psychologists are not as bad as Dewey makes out.
Both Shand and Rivers have made efforts to escape from this
(3)
way of regarding fear - and other instincts too. In Dewey's
view it comes to this: "There are an indefinite number of 
original or instinctive activities, which are organized into 
interests and dispositions according to the situations to which 
they respond". Much of current psychologising has derived its 
notion of instinct from an exaggeration of its fixity and 
certainty among the lower animals. Those who still cling to 
this idea are victims of "a popular zoology of the bird, bee 
and beaver which was largely framed to the greater glory of
(1) p # 153,#
(2) p. 154.
(3) Cf. Rivers: "Instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. VII,
God". Not only are instincts in general more fallible than 
was supposed,but, and this is Dewey's main point, "the human 
being differs from the lower animals in precisely the fact 
that his native activities lack the complex ready-made
(i)
organization of the animal’s original abilities".
There is much valuable criticism in Dewey’s book. The 
two fallacies which he points out, namely the artificial simpli­
fying of the facts of conduct by ascribing them to a series of 
instincts, and the transformation of social results into 
psychological originals - both these fallacies are widely 
current. But on other points, by reaction, Dewey seems to 
go too far. There is, after all, a limit to the plasticity 
of human nature. It is not indefinitely variable. Further 
it has itself created the social context in which it operates. 
While it may be misleading to think of separate instincts 
functioning in isolation, distinguishable tendencies clearly 
do exist. Nor is it sufficient simply to say that in man none 
of them are specific. They vary and the great question is, how 
specific are they.
VII.
Several distinct lines of criticism of the whole idea
of instinct in man can be distinguished in current literature.
One comes from the ’behaviouristic’ tendency in psychology.
For the extreme behaviourist the human being is "a mechanism
which makes responses to external stimuli". Instincts become,
on this theory, strings of simple reflexes unfolding serially.
?di'at appear to be inherited instincts are explained by others
(2)
as habits acquired within the lifetime of the individual.
These latter writers seem to overlook some rather obvious facts
(1) p. 107.
(2) Cf. Z. Y. Kuii: "Giving up Instincts in Psychology". 
Journal of Philosophy, Nov., 1921. "How are our Instincts 
Acquired?" Psychological Review, 1922.
of phylogenetic evolution. Still other ’deniers’, as
McDougall terms them, follow up a line of thought similar
to one suggested by Dewey, But they carry it much further,
much too far, in fact. For the explanation of conduct they
concentrate wholly on environmental conditions rather than on
inherited nature. A recent work by U. U. Josey: "The Social
Philosophy of Instinct" well illustrates this line of argument.
This book constitutes a spirited attack on the whole notion of
the potency of inherited instincts in determining behaviour.
The give-and-take relations existing between individual and
environment, natural and social, are held to supply sufficient
explanation. From this writer the conception of the instincts
as moving ’forces’ comes in for special criticism. "There are
no forces which manifest themselves in various ways. The
forces that are experienced are the forces that are born in
the relation of the agent to his environment. The experience
of the social forces of the group are of this sort. The force
which the individual here feels is born of his contacts with
his group, which, like all contacts, profoundly influence him,
(1)
and bring into existence a world of new emotions and ideals." 
The impulses to activity which are called into being by our 
relation with the changing environment must not be hypostatized 
into a set of forces manifesting themselves in the activities 
so aroused. The view that such a set of forces exists is held
(1) p. 70. The argument that psychology must give up the 
notion of ’force’ and of determination from within is often met 
with. On this point cf. the remarks of Drever: "The concepts 
of activity and force are at the present ‘taboo’ in physical 
science. Physical science knows only happenings and laws 
according to which the happenings take place. Activities and 
forces it has discarded as remnants of the primitive anthropo­
morphic view of nature. Some psychologists have argued that 
psychology also as a science must follow suit. But that is quite 
impossible. Psychology, and with it all the biological sciences, 
cannot help knowing real forces and activities. To ignore their 
existence is entirely unjustifiable and would involve a ’hylo- 
mocphic’ view of the living organism as unscientific as the e^thro 
pomorphic view of physical nature. For the biological sciences
p. 8.) It should be possible to distinguish between the concent 
of force or activity which is necessary in psychology and the 
view that instincts are so many separate forces .
to be analogous to the conception of innate ideas which, it
is said, it has largely replaced. On this ground the widely-
held view that social institutions have their roots in the
instincts is assailed. "Institutions are neither expressions
nor repressions of original nature. They are the responses
original nature has made when confronted with certain conditions.
Given one set of conditions, we have one set of institutions
and customs; given another set of conditions, we have different 
(1)
institutions. Just what original nature consist of, if it
does not contain instinctive tendencies, this writer nowhere 
says,
A somewhat similar line is taken by another recent
writer, B. M. Laing, in his "Study in Moral Problems". He too
maintains that for an explanation of action we must look not to
internal conditions such as instincts, but to external factors,
to the situation and its conditions. "It is purely illusory,"
he says, "to assign the cause of an action to an instinct ......
The so-called instincts impulses are really descriptions
of different types of actions. It is not denied that there
is such a thing as ’instinct* or ’impulse*; but it is denied
that they are forces which prompt the individual to activity
and urge him along a certain course.......  The stimulus
or cause of an action is not to be sought in an instinct or
impulse, but in a situation which calls forth or provokes a
reaction. In so far as we refer actions to instincts or
impulses, we are only describing them or distinguishing the
various actions; we are not giving a causal explanation of
(2)
them". Following up this line of thought, he comes 'to the 
rather surprising conclusion, that "there is no ground for
(1) p. 251.
(2) p. 86.
assuming that the sex tendency Is due to any Innate nature of 
the organism; but it Is probably due to external forces and 
conditions operating upon and through the organism". The 
uniformity which is displayed in mental life and in conduct 
is to be explained, not in terms of uniform innate tendencies, 
but in terms of uniformity of conditions. "Psychology has 
tended to ignore the part played by conditions, and in conse­
quence has transformed the uniform mode of activity into a
uniform or invariable tendency or character of the mind in its
(1)
own nature,"
It is surely clear that these writers are seeing only 
one side of the problem, probably because others have seen only 
the other side. In the 'situation*, rightly understood, there 
are two factors involved: an organism of a certain nature on the 
one hand and certain external conditions on the other. Conduct 
is the result of interaction between them. The same external 
conditions at different times and in different individuals 
call forth very different reactions, simply because the particular 
nature of the individual is also a factor. It is no doubt very 
difficult to determine exactly what part each factor plays.
As McDougall has well pointed out, "Development is, at every 
stage, from the moment of the fertilization of the ovum, a matter 
of the interplay of innate constitution and environment, and 
we can never hope to ascertain just what is wholly innate and 
what is wholly due to environmental influences". At birth the 
mind is certainly not a 'tabula rasa'. Its innate structure 
appears to be very complicated. Organism and environment are, 
from the first, the two elerannts in a dynamic relation. For 
a causal explanation of conduct both must be taken into account.
It should be possible to keep both in mind.
(1) p. 90.
VIII.
What general conclusion can be drawn from the fore- 
going discussion? Is it possible to reach,any degree of 
clearness as to the nature and place of instinct in man?
In the first place it is obvious, that in a great deal of 
current writing on the topic the term is used far too broadly. 
Instinct is often spoken.of as though it were equivalent with 
emotion and the term 'instinctive’ is applied to behaviour when 
the term ’emotional’ is really meant. The two are closely 
related, as v/e shall see further, but it is misleading to 
identify them. Further the term ’instinctive’ is often used 
more widely still, as practically equivalent to ’unreflective’ 
or ’non-rational’ in general. If there is an absence of fully 
rational guidance in behaviour, as there so very often is, it 
is simply labelled ’instinctive’. The treatment of sex by the 
Freudians and of the herd instinct by Trotter have been largely 
responsible for rendering this loose usage current, even in 
writing professedly scientific. It is easy; but makes clearness 
almost impossible. It indicates a failure to make a careful 
analysis of all the facts involved.
Putting aside this loose usage of the terra instinct,
it is possible to distinguish two broad ways of regarding
instinct and their place in man. Because these two views are
not distinguished a great deal of misunderstanding results and
much discussion is rendered futile. Plow they came into being
is clear if we consider the history of the concept, and the
changes which have come over it. Traditional definitions of
(1) „
instinct always ran something like this: By instinct is meant
an inherited structure of the organism by which an animal 
manifests a specific kind of behaviour, common to the species
(1) Of. C. Lloyd Morgan: "Borne Definitions of Instinct". 
"Natural Science", May 1895.
to which it belongs, and not acquired through experience".
This concept was first developed in animal psychology. Emphasis
fell on the specific and invariable nature of the behaviour and
on its unlearnt character. Human conduct was regarded as
guided not by instinct but by reason. \dien however it became
clear that inherited factors were also involved in human
activity and that the human mind and organism were continuous
with the animal, the same concept was applied to man. But a
lack of fitness was soon clear. It v/as obvious that there
was in man little of this unlearnt behaviour of a fixed and
invariable character. Incidentally it also became clear that
the regularity and invariability of instinct in animals had
been exaggerated. Some writers, when instinct in man was
discussed, retained the original meaning of the term and still
applied it to unlearnt responses of a specific nature. Hence
they concluded that man possesses only the rudiments of true
instincts. L. T. Hobhouse, for example, takes this view.
He writes: "iVhat is hereditary in man is capacity, propensity,
disposition, but the capacities are filled in, the propensities
encouraged or checked, the dispositions inhibited or developed
by mutual interactions and the pervading influences of the
circunambient atmosphere. Elements of true instinct remain,
(1)
but in a state of delapidation". A. P. Shand takes a similar
(2)
view. He considers human instincts to be few and fragmentary, 
"The child," he says, "inherits only the capacity to perform a 
few: very simple types of instinctive behaviour connected with 
his appetites and primary emotions ....... Most of these
instincts are useless fragments until combined with other means 
which the mother sometimes supplies and the child gradually 
acquires." Lloyd Morgan, who has largely been concerned with
(1) "Mind in Evolution", p. 105.
(2) "Foundations of Character", Appendix.
instinctive manifestations in animals, has also retained this 
traditional conception of instinct. Behaviour, he says, 
implies the total response of an organism to a situation. So 
far as this response is not determined by what has happened 
to the organism in its individual past history, it is termed 
instinctive. "We must realise that the human subject is the 
very last which the investigator of instinctive behaviour 
should select as a basis for interpretation, or for purposes 
of illustration. It is exceedingly difficult to determine
how much purely instinctive behaviour there is in man. "Mo 
doubt in one large field of behaviour - that connected with 
reproduction and the relation of the sexes which is subsequent 
to the period of infancy - there is in man a recognisable legacy 
of instinctive form, as Freud and his disciples hold. But 
marking, as it does, the period of adolescence, and coming as 
it does after so much has been told and read about it, and 
after manifold warnings of the danger to the moral life which
, besets its advent - how difficult is the task of distinguishing
( 2 )
what are here regarded as the purely instinctive. This view
of instinct, then, regards it as inherited disposition to
specific kinds of activity. Since there is in human nature
little which corresponds to such activity in animals, to the
nest-building activity of birds for example, it follows that
instincts in man, from the point of view of developed conduct,
are unimportant. From this point of view Rivers has suggested
that the concept of instinct may have to be rejected altogether
(3)
so far as man is concerned.
The other current line of thought in regard to 
instincts is represented by McDougall and Drever. The term 
instinct is not confined, to innately organized behaviour. This
(1) "Instinctive Behaviour and Enjoyment." British Jo u rn a l 
of Psychology, July, 1921.
(2) Ibid.
(3) p. 31.
view McDougall characterizes as ’mechanistic*. He admits
that he at first confused it with his own theory and tried to
combine the two. He now rejects it completely. He sees
clearly that its acceptance means practically abandoning
instincts in human psychology, and since he is impressed with
the importance of hereditary factors in determining behaviour
throughout life, he does not wish to do this. So he gives the
term a new meaning. Summarizing his theory he says: "If ......
the facts of human experience and of human and animal behaviour
be impartially surveyed, we are fully justified in accepting
the conception of instincts in the human species as innate
tendencies to pursue by purposive actions certain biological
ends, roughly definable as mating, the cherishing of offspring,
the escape from situations of certain types, the breaking down
of opposition to impulsive or purposive striving, the better
acquaintance with strange objects, the dominance over one’s
fellows, the presence or companionship of one’s fellow
(1)
creatures . This is a very different way of regarding
instincts. They are innate tendencies to pursue certain large
biological ends , characterised on their psychological side
by strong impulses and by characteristic excitement. All
behaviour which falls under them can be termed•instinctive.
So regarded the place of instincts in mental life and their
significance for conduct becomes of the first importance.
vVe should keep these two widely different conceptions
of instinct clearly in mind. At the present time they are
hopelessly confused. Those writers who reject the conception
of instincts in McDougall*s sense are usually found to replace
it by some other analogous conception. Shand, for example,
speaks of inherited ’emotional systems’ in much the same sense
(2)
as McDougall speaks of instincts. J.B, Watson, who writes
(1) "The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Dec. 1921.
(2) "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist."
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from a purely behaviouristic point of view is forced to see the
need for some such conception. He writes: "Individuality seems
in some way to depend on man’s original tendencies, not upon the
presence of the completed pattern type of instincts, since these
do not exist in any large number, but apparently upon factors
which, when taken singly, are difficult to detect, but which
when taken together are more important. There is not much
experimental evidence for this conclusion, but there is a great
deal of coramon-sense data". At the present moment various
terms are being suggested to cover such tendencies of inherited
(1)
make-up. Necessary interests" are spoken of by one writer;
(2)
"fundamental desires" by another: "primary urges" and "central"
or "root interests" are also spoken of. The difficulty reduces
itself largely to one of terms. Writers fight shy of the
terms "instincts" and. "instinctive" because of their traditional
significance. The position is thus stated by J. A. Thomson
in a recent book: "One plea is that the term ’instinctive
behaviour* has a definite meaning in regard to animals, and
that we should keep to that meaning when we are discussing man-.
We should think that it made for clearness to say that man had
certain primary ’urges* or appetites - hunger and love; that he
had a number of definite reflexes, such as those illustrated in
jerking away from the painful, or in coughing, or in sucking, that
he has a number of enregistered capacities, such as those of
speech and locomotion; that he had many inborn general tendencies
towards certain types of reaction, such as running away from
danger, actively resenting interference; but that he had very
little capacitv for instinctive behaviour in the strict sense
(3)
of the terra". It is impossible to get away from the fact 
that there are in inherited human make-up certain great tenden­
cies which underlie specific impulses and form, as it were, the
(1) W.E. Hocking: Human Nature and its Remaking.
(2) K. Dunlap: Elements of Scientific Psychology.
(3) "What is Man?" p. 110.
(1)
general ground plan of life. But the complexities of innate 
constitution in man make it difficult, in any scheme of classi­
fication, to do justice to all the facts. A way out of the 
difficulty has been suggested by Lloyd Morgan. He attempts a
(2)
classification on the basis of comprehensiveness and specificity. 
He attempts to distinguish different levels of instinctive 
behaviour. The term 'instinctive* covers 1. that form-of 
behaviour which comes by nature and has not to be learnt, and 
2. the consciousness or ’enjoyment* which accompanies the 
behaviour. The levels of such behaviour are: 1. reflexes
and simple motor tendencies. This class would, in man, 
apparently cover what is understood as instinctive behaviour 
in the narrowest sense. 2. mid-level instincts which make use 
of the motor tendencies comprised under 1. He means "those 
with which many writers on instinct, McDougall for example, 
almost exclusively deal". 3. the most comprehensive group 
with two classes comprising: (a) all the behaviour which falls 
under self-preservation and (b) all the behaviour which falls 
under race-maintenance. In this scheme, he says, two points 
should be borne in mind - "the intimate and multifarious inter­
relations at all levels" and "the presence at all levels of 
factors of acquisition derived from prior experience".
(1) And it is, of course, the height of folly to try to get 
away from them. Here is a vigorous protest against the failure 
to take into account primary factors of this kind: "After perus­
ing during the past twenty years a small library of rose-water 
psychologies of the academic type and noticing how their authors 
ignore or merely hint at the existence of such stupendous and 
fundamental biological phenomena as those of hunger, sex and 
fear, I should not disagree with, let me say, an imaginary critic 
recently arrived from Mars, who should express the opinion that 
many of these works read as if they had been composed by beings 
that had been born and bred in a belfry, castrated in early 
infancy and fed continually for fifty years through a tube with a
stream of liquid mrbriment of constant chemical composition". ___
W. M, Wheeler. V
(2) "Instinctive Dispositions." Scientia, Oct., 1920.
But it is well to keep in mind the relative value of 
any classification of instinctive tendencies. Lists of 
instincts are o^ ftej^  discussed as though there were something 
absolute about them and some one must be true. Attempts are 
made to reduce the constituents of different lists to each 
other. But they are made on very different bases and all 
may be regarded as valid for the purpose in hand. The criterion 
is one of serviceability for certain purposes.
The great point to be kept in mind when discussing the 
instinctive tendencies of man is that, apart from a few simple 
motor mechanisms, they are of a very generalised character.
This is what is meant when their ’modifiability’ is insisted 
upon. It is impossible for man, in any sense, to ’trust to 
instinct’. All his tendencies need interpretation and develop­
ment. It is this which makes him man. He can learn. However 
important biological heredity may be for him, and however its 
importance may have been overlooked, it cannot be denied that 
in him, of all the animals, it counts for least; and in him 
social heredity counts for most. Compared with all the other 
animals, man is least dependent on facts of ’nature’ and most 
dependent on facts of ’nurture*. The human infant is not 
born fully equipped, both as to means and ends, for the business 
of life. Compared with the young of other animals, the human 
infant is born far younger. Its nature is far more incomplete.
This is all well and briefly put by Julian Huxley in discussing
(2)
man’s relation to other organisms. "Great educability instead 
of differentiated instinct, infinite possibility, at the expense 
of the pains of learning, instead of an effortless but limited 
stock of inborn modes of behaviour": these, he says, are the 
things which characterise man.
(1) Cf. on this point: K. Koffka: "Die Grundlagen der 
Psychischen Entv/icklung".
(2) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 82.
TV.
If we accept as a working hypothesis some such scheme 
of human instincts as McDougall suggest we must keep clearly 
in mind exactly what we are doing. We must guard carefully 
against regarding the various members of the list as if each 
were an individual thing in itself and capable of separate 
functioning. To do this is very easy. But it illustrates 
a tendency which exists in all science and which we come across 
again and again in psychology, namely "the substitution of 
artificial conceptual simplifications for the tangle of 
empirical facts". Instincts do not survive in isolation, 
and the self is not an aggregate or a balance of instincts.
As we shall see, with them as a basis, and with the help of 
those factors in human nature which make for guidance and 
control, the self becomes, in the course of development, a 
more or less well integrated v/hole. The impulses to which 
the instincts give rise, powerful as they are, are indefinitely 
interrelated and inextricably interwoven with all the other 
factors in human nature. It is quite fallacious to imagine 
that any one instinct can be used as a principle of explanation 
for conduct of a developed sort. In fact it is hardly too much 
to say that, in conduct v/hich is instinctive at all, every 
instinct plays a part in every act. Human motives are exceed-
"■f",
ingly complete and while we may regard the instincts as the 
original ’prime movers’ of human activity, of actual motives, 
as they exist much more must be said.
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I.
Current theorizing about hiunan conduct seems to
devote far too much attention to the factor of instinct and
far too little to the factor of emotion. It is true that
the tv/o have for some time now been considered in close relation,
a fact which has led to the better understanding of both, but
emphasis has generally fallen on instinct, emotion being
regarded simply as an aspect of it. It is seldom that it is
specifically dealt with or its importance adequately recognised.
As has already been pointed out, much that is termed instinctive
in conduct should more rightly be spoken of as emotional. Some
writers seem to refer indifferently to either term and to use
them both equally vaguely. Emotional states are exceedingly
difficult to investigate and their nature is still far from
being fully understood. Nearly ten years ago A. P. Shand in
his "Foundations of Character" called attention to the neglect
of the study of the emotions and to the importance of such
(1)
study for the understanding of the basis of character. Even 
since he v/rote evidence from many sources has been making it 
increasingly clear that to understand human conduct in the 
concrete it is to the study of emotional qualities that we 
must very largely look. It is declared that: "the chief agents 
in developing and deranging character, and indeed intellect 
and reason as well, are now sought in the field of the emotions: 
in emotional tendencies inherited at birth, and in emotional
(2)
experiences undergone during the formative period of early life". 
Or again, "A very little consideration of the problem of conduct
(1) A recent example of the altogether inadequate considera­
tion given to the emotions in the study of conduct is found in 
Dewey^s "Hnman Nature and Conduct". His sole reference to the 
topic is the remark: "Emotion is a perturbation from a clash or 
failure of habit".
(2) C. Burt: "Psychology and the Emotions", "School Hygiene", 
1916.
makes it plain that it is in the region of feeling, using
(1)
the term in its broadest sense, that the key Is to be sought .
(2)
A recent writer has called attention to the great 
change which has been coming over our attitude towards emotion 
and its place in life. For some time it, has been gaining a 
new significance. It is not so long since it was altogether 
suspect. Emotion was regarded simply as a disturbing factor 
in mental life, or at any rate as an unimportant and unnecessary 
accompaniment of the thinliing processes. Lange, for example, 
whose name, with that of James, is associated with a well-known 
theory of the emotions, looked forward to the time when "through 
the results of education and the intellectual life" man may 
end by realising the ideal of Kant as a being of pure intelli­
gence for whom all the emotions, if he is still subject to 
them, will be looked upon as "mental troubles little worthy of 
him . How far we have come from this point of view may be
seen by comparing with this quotation one from a present-day 
psychologist. William Brown writes: "It is in feeling that 
all values reside and the life of feeling has a logic of its 
own distinct from the logic of pure reason, and not necessarily 
inferior to it. Without going so far as to say, with certain 
modern psychologists, that feeling is invariably the controlling 
factor in its relation to thought#, we must urge that much of 
the best and most effective thought is stimulated and sustained 
by underlying emotional tendencies, and that in many cases, if
not in all, the action of feeling upon thought is much more
(4)
intense and decisive than that of thought upon f e e l i n g " . ____
(1) W. Trotter, op. cit.
(2) G.M. Stratton: "Anger: Its Religious and Moral Signifi­
cance". Introduction. "The New Significance of Emotion."
(3) Quoted from "Les Emotions", by A.F. Shand, p. 4.
(4) "Psychology and Psycho-therapy", p. 89, cf. also J.B. 
Watson in "Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education". 
"We are being led more and more to the view that emotions are 
not useless things put there by an unliind fate merely to disturb 
the even tenour of our ways, but that, properly controlled, they
can be made to serve practical uses ......  They can be made to
serve as incentives or drives to many types of action."
W ;
Vl/hat are now termed ^emotions’ had long been discussed 
and classified under the name of the ^passions*. But bare 
analysis and classification of these had proved somewhat 
barren. It was Darwin, in his "The Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and the Animals", who gave a new stimulus to this study 
and set it as a scientific basis. He called attention to the 
biological significance of the emotions and showed that emotion 
expresses itself in ways which enable the creature to meet some 
crisis in its life. Darwin pointed out that in man many of 
the forms of expression had ceased to be serviceable. Though 
it stimulated new study, in itself this exclusively biological 
conception of the emotions did not carry very far the under­
standing of their place in the human mind. James and Lange 
were really carrying on Darwin* s work. They called attention 
to the effects of the expression of the emotions on the 
individual himself and threw new light on their causation.
They emphasised the * organic reverberation* of the emotion.
It became clear that an emotion was not merely a state of mind 
but very fuller a state of the individual as a v/hole. The 
understanding of this organic aspect of emotion has since been 
carried much further by the work of a number of physiologists, 
Bavooy, Cannon, Crile and others. More recently the psycho­
pathologists have discovered that disturbances of an emotional 
nature are at the root of many mental disorders. "It is," 
says Rivers, "a principle now widely accepted by workers who 
otherwise differ greatly from one another, that mental disease
is predominantly due to disturbances of the emotional and
(1)
instinctive aspects of the mind . These discoveries have 
shown the importance of the emotions in the normal as well as
(1) Article "Psychotherapeutics", Hastings Encyclopaedia 
of Religion and Ethics. Of. also J.A. Hadfield, "Psychology and 
Morals" (p. 122). "Every neurotic symptom emerges during life as 
the result of an emotional conflict", and D. Forsyth, "Psycho­
analytic Review", VIII, "There can be no reasonable doubt that 
neuroses are essentially disorders of the emotions".
the abnormal mind. They appear as the centre of the mind’s
health and balance. They bear on life and conduct at every
point and the question of the organisation of the emotional
life appears as the central problem of conduct. As a recent
psychologist has expressed it: "To say that the control of the
emotions is the most important thing in life is trite, but the
(1)
saying can hardly be overemphasized ,
II.
While all psychologists are now agreed that there is a 
very close relation between instinct and emotion they are not 
agreed as to its exact nature. As has already been mentioned 
James was the first to call attention to this relation and 
McDougall advanced an hypothesis to try and explain it. This 
hypothesis, that the primary emotions are the affective aspects 
of the instincts, has already been referred to. It must now be 
discussed somewhat further. In his latest book McDougall puts 
it forward in a somewhat more tentative manner and tends to 
give a more independent treatment to the problem of emotion.
But he still maintains that his theory is on essentially right 
lines. He says that, faced with the question of motives to 
action, common-sense and literary tradition, which are not 
sophisticated by psychological theories, assume that instincts 
and emotions are the motive powers. Are they then two distinct 
principles of action, impulsive powers of two different orders?
He answers: "Common-sense hardly seems to think so: for in some 
instances it seems to identify an instinct with an emotion, by 
giving them the same name: notably in the cases of fear, curiosit^ y 
and disgust.
"Suppose that psychology, instead of turning away with 
scorn to devise fantastic theories which cannot be brought into
(1) K. Dunlap : "'Elements of Scientific Psychology", p. 322.
any intelligible relation with the common-sense type of 
explanation, should accept this clue offered by common-sense 
and work it for all it may be worth. Might we not hope to 
find that common-sense, the wisdom of the ages, is fundamentally 
right, and that its practice is capable of being developed into 
a consistent and useful theory.
"This was the line taken in my ’Social Psychology’.
For the first time the cue offered by common-sense was franlcly
accepted as a working hypothesis. Emotion was regarded as a
mode of experience which accompanies the working within us of
instinctive impulses. It was assumed that human nature (our
inherited, inborn constitution) comprises instincts; that the
operation of each instinct, no matter how brought into play,
is accompanied by its own peculiar quality of experience which
may be called a primary emotion, and that, when tv/o or more
instincts are simultaneously at work in us, v/e experience a
confused emotional excitement, in which we can detect something
of the qualities of the corresponding primary emotions. The
human emotions were then regarded as clues to the instinctive
impulses or indicators of the motive at work in us. Guided
by this hypothesis, I attempted to sketch the instinctive basis
of our active nature, and its development, under experience and
(1)
education, into character .
As has often been said this hypothesis makes the whole 
subject extraordinarily clear and it has led to a very profitable 
discussion both of instincts and of emotional states. But it 
does seem to have been shown to be too simple for all the facts 
of emotional life. It has been argued that the characteristic 
affective experience involved in instinctive activity is not 
always or necessarily of the nature of emotion. It may be
(1) "Outline of Psychology", p. -128.
something much simpler, though capable of becoming emotion 
under certain circumstances. "The alternative hypothesis to 
McDougall’s," says Drever, "is that the affective element in 
instinct-experience becomes emotion only when action in satis­
faction of the interest is suspended or checked, when interest 
passes into tension. If impulse immediately realizes itself
in the appropriate action towards the situation, then there is
(1)
no emotion in any strict sense of emotion." There is a very 
great deal to be said for this alternative hypothesis. Drever 
backs it up with a careful analysis of the affective accompani­
ment of instinctive activity, showing that it is something which 
is best termed ’interest’. He also analyses emotional experi­
ence and shows it to be something much more complex than this 
instinctive interest. He is supported in his view by A. F. 
Shand who points out that "when the activity of the instinct 
is most sudden and unopposed, the emotion, if it is brought 
into activity at all, will be of less intensity and definite­
ness"; and, conversely, "the arrest of an instinct is that 
which most frequently excites the emotion connected with it - 
there is no anger so intense as when the blood boils and all 
the sudden energy that comes to us cannot vent itself on our 
antagonist". This view of the nature and arousal of emotional
excitement, is also adopted by Carver in an article on "The
(2)
Generation and Control of emotion". He writes: "I wish to 
define the interest of an instinct as the affective tone which 
accompanies the whole instinctive process when it is carried 
through in a normally satisfying manner; and to define emotion 
as the subjective experience which develops when gratification
(1) "Instinct in Man", p. 15V, cf. also "Introduction to 
the Psychology of Education", p. 51 ff.
(2) "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. X. This view is 
not altogether a new one. James discusses and rejects it
(see "Principles", Vol. II, p. 476).
of the instinctive impulse is held in check by higher level
(1) 
control .
Considerable support for this view of the nature of
emotion is obtained from a comparative study of instinctive
and emotional manifestations. It seems to be a fact that
increase in the emotional element in behaviour proceeds ’pari
passu’ with the decrease in the fixity and invariability of
(2)
instinctive response. G. J. Romanes investigated the emotional 
manifestations of animals at different levels of development.
His conclusion was that there appears to be less and less 
emotion as we go down the scale, correlated with increasing 
definiteness in instinctive behaviour. Increase in the 
Intensity and extent of the emotional life and increase in the 
plasticity of instinctive response and in the possibility of 
its control, seem to go hand in hand. As the purely instinctive 
lessens, the emotional life becomes more and more important.
In man this development reaches its maximuni. So that we seem 
led to the very important conclusion that it is because man in 
his behaviour is of all animals the least purely instinctive 
that he is, of all animals, the most emotional. To quote 
again from Carver: "With the gradual increase in plasticity 
of response which develops ’pari passu’ with intelligence, 
there is delay in reaction and with this is associated an 
increase of the emotional excitement. The longer the issue 
of the impulse in satisfying reaction is checked by higher 
level control, the greater becomes the generation of emotion, 
until in man with his practically unlimited choice of response 
we reach a stage where delay becomes almost inevitable. Hence
(1) Cf. the very brief definition of emotion given by Burt 
(op; cit.). It is "the conscious aspect of a curtailed instinct ",
(2) "Animal Intelligence."
it is rare, in man, for response to be unaccompanied by some
(1)
generation of emotion" ....
It seems then that McDougall is right in saying that
in man, activity associated with the instincts is generally
accompanied by some degree of emotional excitement, but that 
this is so because of the complexities which the facts of 
guidance, and control introduce into such behaviour. The 
emotional life becomes in this way far wider than the instinc­
tive life. It is not that each instinct has associated with
it some one primary emotion of a particular quality. McDougall
is, in fact, very hard put to it to fill out his scheme of the 
instincts and the primary emotions, as an examination of it 
will show. ’Peeling of creativeness’ and ’feeling of owner­
ship? for example do not seem to be easily distinguishable
as primary emotions. Throughout he seems to regard the
(2)
emotionffar too much as individual psychical entities.
III.
It is evident that emotion is a very complex state, 
and we may now endeavour to distinguish the various factors 
which seem to be involved in it. We will begin by considering 
the ’organic resonance’ by which it is characterised. This 
brings us directly to the James-Lange theory. Ever since it 
was put forward it has been vigorously discussed and round it 
quite a voluminous literature has grown up. Opinion is still
(1) Op. cit. Another writey has contrasted man’s early with 
his present environment in this respect. "In man’s early 
environment there was no break between the preparation for 
muscular action and its consummation. As a consequence, there 
was much action and little restraint of action-emotion - just
as to-day, v/hen action ensues precipitately upon a stimulne^^^ere 
is no manifestation of fear, anger or sympathy. In the netieu/y 
environment, where there is a minimum of action and a maximum of 
restraint of action, man is in auto-captivity to phylogenetic 
tendencies." G.W. Crile: "Man: An Adaptive Mechanism".
(2) J.Y.T. Greig has recently set out four laws of emotion. 
"Psychology of Laughter and Comedy", p. 21). "l. Emotion arises 
when behaviour is appreciably hindered. 2. Such hindrance may 
have its source either internally or externally. 3. The intensity 
of our emotion depends on the relative strength of the opposing 
forces, the greatest intensity being reached when they are almost 
equal. 4. Success in overcoming the hindrance is felt as pleasant, 
failure as unpleasant.
(1)
divided as to the degree in which it is true. James Ward
for example writes it down as "psychologically and biologically
absurd". Quite recently it has been wholeheartedly accepted
(2)
by an experimental investigator of emotional states. Its 
essence is the contention that an emotional state is the 
experienced result of all the somatic and visceral changes 
caused by the exciting stimulus and nothing more. James 
writes: Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the
exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they 
occur 3^ the emotion ...... Without the bodily states follow­
ing on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in 
form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth". On 
this theory, taken literally, the difference between the various 
qualities of emotion becomes simply a matter of the different 
intensities and relations of the organic sensations involved.
Both James and Lange rejected the current view that the various 
emotions which it was customary to list possessed definite and 
persistent characters. "They present," says Lange, "an infinity 
of imperceptible transitions." James said that "they are 
regarded too much as absolutely individual things".
In order to determine whether this theory covers all 
the facts of emotional experience it will be necessary to refer 
to the investigations into the physiology of the emotions which 
have been made since James wrote. Changes in respiration and 
circulation were long recognised as physiological.accompaniments 
of emotion. More recently very subtle and complex glandular
changes have been found to be,involved. The best known work
(4)
in this connection is that of Gannon. The most striking of
(1) "Psychological Principles."
(2) W. Whately Smith, "The Measurement of Emotion".
(3) "Principles", Vol. II, p. 449.
(4) "Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage."
the glandular activities which he has discovered is that of 
the supra-renal glands which, during emotional excitement, 
secrete into the blood a substance termed adrenin which results 
in increased effectiveness in the whole of the muscular system. 
Cannon believes that all the changes which he has found to 
occur are of the nature of preparations for heightened activity. 
Here is his own summary of his results. "Every one of the
visceral changes that have been noted - the cessation of pro­
cesses in the alimentary canal (thus freeing the energy supply 
for other parts), the shifting of blood from the abdominal 
organs, whose activities are deferable, to the organs immediately 
essential to muscular exertion (the lungs, the heart, the 
central nervous system), the increased vigour of contraction 
of the heart; the quick abolition of the effects of muscular 
fatigue; the mobilizing of energy-giving sugar in the circula­
tion - every one of these visceral changes is directly service­
able in making the organism more effective in the violent
(1)
display of energy which fesr, or rage, or pain may involve."
It has been further discovered that it is the autonomic nervous 
system, which is to a certain degree independent of the cerebro­
spinal system,that is involved in these changes. The impor­
tance of this system in the causation of emotions has been 
emphasized by B. J. Kempf in his "Autonomic Functions and the 
Personality". Kempf is a supporter of James’s theory of the 
emotions. Cannon on the other hand does not conclude in favour 
of it. Cannon’s chief difficulty is with the differentiation 
of the emotions. He can find nothing specific in the physio­
logical accompaniment of the different emotions and so concludes 
that other factors are involved in their constitution. He says: 
"I am inclined to urge that the visceral changes merely contri­
bute to an emotional complex more or less indefinite, but still
(1) p. 215.
pertinent, feelings of disturbance in organs of which we are
(1)
not usually conscious . He believes that the differentiating
features of the emotions are of a psychological nature. C.S.
(2)
Sherrington comes to much the same conclusion. He maintains 
that the visceral functions do not produce the emotional state, 
but simply reinforce it. "We are forced back toward the like­
lihood that the visceral expression of the emotion is secondary
to the cerebral action occurring with the psychical state  ....
We may with James accept Visceral and organic sensations and 
the memories and associations of them as contributory to primi­
tive emotion, but we must regard them as reinforcing rather than 
as initiating the psychosis." Sherrington’s experiments demon­
strate the important fact that once these visceral accompani­
ments have been experienced their reoccurrence is not necessary
(3)
for the full emctional experience to occur. E. Prideaux, 
another investigator, also argues that the organic sensations, 
though giving intensity and duration to emotion are not respon­
sible for the whole of its content. His experiments show a 
latent period between the subjective experience of the emotion 
and the occurrence of the bodily changes. He offers as a 
definition of emotion the following: "a subjective feeling con­
sisting of central excitement and consciousness of peripheral
sensations, occasioned by situations which powerfully oppose or
(4)
facilitate the aim of any instinctive impulse".
(1) p. 280. For a discussion of the bearing of recent 
physiological investigations on this theory of J.R. Angell, "A 
Reconsideration of James’s Theory of Emotions in the Light of 
Recent Criticism". Psychological Review, 1916. McDougall (Out­
line, pp. 323 & 350) claims that the primary emotions owe their 
specific qualities to the specific nature of the organic changes 
in each case. This does not appear to be borne out by the 
physiological work done so far: though of course differences 
may yet be discovered.
(2) See Proceedings R. Socy. 1910.
(3) "Expression of Emotion in Gases of Mental Disorder",
British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, October 1921.
(4) Of. also Carver (op.cit.): "The visceral and somatic
concomitants of emotion are not responsible for originating the
affective state,but are anticipating.physical adjustments which 
enable the organism to put lortn all'its energy effectively ro 
satisfy the instinctive process stimulated".
It seems that James’s theory is, at any rate, partly 
confirmed. No one has denied that the organic disturbance 
does play an important part in "making the emotion emotional", 
but undoubtedly there are other factors in the v/hole experience.
IV.
Viewed psychologically the complex state which is the
emotion seems to involve 1. sensations from organic disturbances,
2. a conscious impulse to action, o. an element of an affective
nature. Drever believes that it is to this last factor that
we must look for the source of the qualitative differences
between emotions. The main psychological function of feeling
appears to be regulative and viewed qualitatively, from the
point of view of the type of affective experience by v/hich they
are characterised, the emotion seems to have a regulative or
directive function. As McDougall points out, "the emotional
quality serves to indicate, to the subject himself, the nature
of his excitement and the kind of action to v/hich he is
impelled. This last we may fairly suppose to be the essential
fundtion of the emotional qualities in our emotional life.
They enable us to regulate, direct and in some degree control
(2)
the impulses by which we are moved".
The impulsive aspect of emotion is of considerable 
importance and it is one of the chief defects of the theory of 
James that it tends to overlook ité James’s paradoxical state­
ment: "We are angry because we strike", includes the experience 
of striking in the preparatory bodily changes, the whole as 
experienced being the emotion. This seems certainly untrue.
(1) "Instinct in Man", Ch. VI: "The qualitative differences 
between the different emotions cannot be explained in terms of 
the organic resonance, though this will undoubtedly accentuate 
the differences, nor can they ... be explained in terras of the 
experienced impulse, the conation, but only in terms of the 
qualitative difference in affection".
(2) Outline, p. 328.
Being angry means experiencing an impulsive tendency to strike.
It is of the essence of emotion that there is experienced an
impulse towards a consummatory reaction. Every emotion is a
"wanting to do something". McDougall lays f^^M^«4^on this
impulsive aspect of emotion and says that, "if the conative
factor could be subtracted from an emotional experience, without
other change, that experience would seem to be radically altered.
We might still think of the object, and our thinking v/ould still
be coloured by the emotional quality: but the v/hole experience
would be profoundly different; it would seem to lack its very
essence, to be empty and unreal. It would be like the simula-
(1)
tion of emotion".
An emotional experience then is impulsive, and the
impulsion is towards a reaction for which the body is prepared.
Viewed physiologically the emotional state is, as Cannon has
shown, a state of internal preparedness for some type of overt
action. The whole organism is keyed up ready for discharging
(2)
itself in some way. Viewed psychologically it is in essence 
a conscious impulse towards activity.
In view of various phenomena which make their appear­
ance in the course of the organisation of the emotional life 
(to be discussed later) it is important here to point out that 
there is much evidence to show that the effect of emotion 
which does not pass into action of some sort is injurious.
If strong emotion is often aroused and action.is persistently 
thwarted, so that no outlet is obtained, then conditions of 
mental disorder of a more or less serious nature are likely to
(1) Op.cit. p. 322.
(2) Cf. 0. Frink, "Morbid Fears and Compulsions": "An 
emotion, one might say, is an undischarged action, a deed yet 
retained within the organism. Perhaps it would be more accurate 
to say that an emotion is a state of preparedness for action, 
which, however, in many ways is almost the action itself. The 
involuntary nervous system is exerted in the same way as an 
action....... A state of tonus is produced in the same volun­
tary muscles that would be innervated to produce the action 
itself".
arise. There is a well-known passage in James’s ’Principles’
where he points out the importance of emotional excitement
(1)
receiving some discharge in action.
There is another characteristic of emotion which
should also be mentioned here; one which is exhibited most
clearly when the emotion is strong. This is the narrowing or
specializing of consciousness, tending to actual dissociation,
which always characterizes violent emotion. It is well
described by Drever:.* "when under the influence of a strong
emotion we may become blind and deaf to everything which is
not relevant to the end determined by the emotion; we may
forget principles and resolutions; we may even temporarily
break away from what might be described as characteristically
the whole trend of our life activity ......... In extreme
cases an individual may lose control of fundamental muscular
and sensory mechanisms. Speech may be lost, and the control
of still earlier and more primitive functions and co-ordinations
may disappear. Usually this dissociation is merely temporary,
(2)
and normal conditions are restored as the emotion passes away".
The pathology of this type of experience has been investigated
(3)
by Morton Prince. It may become so heightened that the dis­
sociation becomes a more or less permanent condition.
V.
As v/as pointed out^James, in his theory, endeavoured 
to break away from the barren classifications and descriptions 
of the emotions and to open up a new method of investigating 
them. "So long," he said, "as they are set down as so many
(1) Vol. II, p. 123.
(2) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 35.
(5) "The Unconscious."
eternal and sacred psychic entities, like the old Immutable
species in natural history, so long all that can be done with
them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters,
(1)
points and effects . Undoubtedly the emotions have been
thought of too much as individual entities, and they still
are. Prom the time of Descartes down to the present there is
a succession of classifications and of theories as to how a
few primary emotions become combined into complex emotions and
so give rise to all the phenomena of the emotional life. Much
the same has happened as in the case of instinct. The names
of the distinguishable emotions have been hypostasized into so
many unique qualities of mind. Terms are taken as standing
(2 )
for self-existent entities. In recent times McDougall’s 
scheme of the primary emotions and their elaboration has cer­
tainly tended to encourage this way of regarding the emotional 
life. In his most recent book, however, he deprecates this 
usage. He writes: "The poets legitimately personify these 
emotional experiences and speak of them as personal powers or
agents ......  It results from this usage that psychologists
commonly speak of ’the emotions’ or of an ’emotion’ just as
i
they speak of ’sensations’ or ’an idea’. And, as in these
cases, the usage is misleading and confusing, though perhaps
not so seriously misleading. Some psychologists, indulging our
natural tendency to reify whatever we name, seem to assume that
we recognize ’an emotion’ of distinctive quality corresponding
to every name used in popular and literary description of
(3)
emotional experience". The truth is that in fact there are 
no such things as ’emotions’. We should speak rather of 
different qualities of emotional experience. But the substantive
(1) Op.cit.. II, 449.
(2) On this point cf. two articles by J.R. Kantor: "An 
Attempt Towards a Naturalistic Description of Emotion", 
Psychological Review, 1921.
(3) Outline, p. 314.
mode of speech is very difficult to avoid. What experience 
shows is not occasional pure ’emotions’ to he distinguished 
as cut and dried states. It shows variations in the quality 
and intensity of emotional experience which latter is always 
present in some degree. Mental states or behaviour which 
contain no emotional content are entirely mythical. This is 
well pointed out by Kempf. "There has been a strange tendency 
among many psychologists to consider that an emotional state 
exists only when the individual shows some perturbation of his 
habitual composure. It is fundamentally essential to recog­
nise that during consciousness an emotional or affective state 
continuously exists....... We are always, when conscious,
aware of a state of feeling, of an emotional status, even
(1)
during states of rest, reverie, and general indifference."
He goes on to point out that it is fallacious to imagine that
any single emotional quality ever possesses an individual
completely. This is far too simple an account of actual mental
life and behaviour. "There is no evidence that we are ever
possessed by one pure emotion, such as love, anger, fear,
sorrow, shame, disgust, etc. We may feel that an affective
status such as love#,anger, fear, etc. completely dominates
us, but if one will trouble to analyze himself while he is
dominated by a strong effective disturbance he can usually
recognize the symptoms of other affective tendencies at work
in the background,of consciousness. Frequently they are quite
opposite in nature, and one’s behaviour is the resultant or
compromise of the various affective tendencies inhibiting or
(2)
reinforcing one another."
An interesting suggestion has recently been put forward
(3)
by Burt. It is that we should distinguish in inherited make-up
(1) Op.cit., p. 68.
(2) Ibid.
(3) "The Mental Differences between Individuals". Presiden- 
tial Address, Psychology Section, British Association.
a factor which he terms ’general emotionality’: a central 
factor underlying all distinguishable emotional qualities.
The conception is analogous to that of ’general intelligence’ 
as used by those psychologists who have investigated the 
problem of the measurement of intelligence. Burt has noted 
that all emotional tendencies, say in a child, appear to be 
correlated: "the child most prone to sorrow, is often exception­
ally prone to joy. The coward who bullies the weak is often 
the first to quake and quail before the strong". Considerable 
differences exist between individuals in respect of this 
’general emotionality’. There have been other attempts to
distinguish various types of emotional dispositions. The best
(1)
known classification is that of Jung. He distinguishes an 
’introverted’ and an ’extroverted’ type. In the former 
emotional stirrings and their impulses do not easily find 
expression in action. In the latter type the emotion and its 
impulse are freely expressed.
The important point for a theory of conduct is to 
understand how this original emotional endowment becomes compli­
cated into the multiplicity of emotional qualities which adult 
life shows: and how the emotional tendencies become organised; 
and what is the nature of the control which is exercised over 
them.
VI.
Important work on this latter aspect of the emotional
' ( 2 ) ' .
life has been done by J. B. Watson. He has studied carefully
the early manifestations of emotion in many hundreds of children.
His work confirms the conclusion of the psychopathologists that
(1) "Psychological Types."
(2) See "Studies in Infant Psychology", Scientific Monthly, 
Dec. , 1921. Also: "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviour- 
ist" and contribution to "Suggestions of Modern Science concern- 
ing Education".
'the early emotional life is of fundamental importance for the 
whole of later development, "The question," he says, "as to 
whether the child will possess a stable or unstable personality, 
whether it is going to be timid and beset with many fears‘and 
subject to rages and tantrums, whether it will exhibit tendencies 
of general over- or under-emotionalism and the like, has been 
answered already by the end of the two year period." His 
observations have led him to the belief that, contrary to 
general opinion, the number of inherited emotional responses 
is small, and that the stimuli which bring them about are also 
few in number. He believes that the ’emotional patterns’, as 
he terms them, are really quite simple and that the later com­
plexity seen in the adult is brought about by training and 
environmental influence. "Our latest observations showed
that from birth three fundamental inherited emotional patterns 
could be observed. Without assuming that our observations are
complete, we feel reasonably sure that fear, rage and love are
(1)
original and fundamental," He gives an account of these
responses and of the objects and situations which excite them.
If this original simplicity is a fact the question arises, how 
is the later complexity brought about. "How can objects which 
at first do not call out emotions come later to call them out 
and thus enormously increase the richness as well as the dangers 
of our emotional life." By means of a series of experiments 
Watson shows how this comes about. He shows new emotional
(1) Watson has small opinion of lists of emotions or 
instincts which are not based upon experimental investigations: 
"Modern psychology catalogues most elaborate lists,of instincts 
and emotions in human beings. These catalogues are not based 
upon experimental work but upon the preconceived opinions of 
the men making up the lists. At present we simply have not the 
data for the enumeration of man’s original tendencies and it 
will be impossible to obtain such data until we have followed 
through the development of the activity of many infants from
birth to advanced childhood  ..... a workable psychology of
human instincts can never be attained by merely observing the 
behaviour of the adult".
attachments in the making. He uses a method similar to the 
well-known one of building up ’conditioned reflexes’. He 
actually creates ’conditioned fears’ in the subject, that is 
fears evoked by objects which originally caused no emotional 
response but which can be made, by association, to do so. And 
he shows that these conditioned emotional responses are being 
constantly set up in the growing child, not only in the case of 
fear, but also.in the case of other emotional qualities.
"Many thousands of objects and situations which originally 
had no intrinsic value for the arousing, of our major emotions 
come finally to possess that power." Through faulty nurture 
many wrong emotional attachments may be formed and the whole 
emotional life may be warped and twisted. Watson’s conclusions 
seem to be of great educational significance. He says: "If 
we do possess, as is usually supposed, many hundreds of emotions, 
all of which are instinctively grounded, we might very well 
despair of attempting to regulate or control them and to eradi­
cate the wrong ones. But according to the view I have advanced 
it is due to environmental causes, that is to habit formation, 
that so many objects come to call out emotional reactions. If 
habit thus plays the most important rôle in the attachment of 
the emotion, it lies easily within our control to perfect and 
to regulate and reshape and use practically the emotional life 
of the individual."
It is interesting to compare Watson’s opinions with
(1)
those of Shand. For Shand the inherited make-up is very
complex from the emotional point of view. Certain primary 
emotions are inherited which are complex systems and may have 
several instincts organized within them. Originally there
(1) "Foundations of Character." It should be remembered 
that v/hile Watson’s views are based on the experimental investi­
gations of infants, Shand’s are based on the introspective 
records of the adult consciousness.
exists a balance of sensational stimuli and of emotional 
response. They are innately connected. But very soon this 
balance is lost. The life of memory and ideas upsets it and 
there result acquired connections of ideas and emotions. And 
while, from a biological point of view, the original connections 
possessed utility, the acquired connections may, from the point 
of view of conduct, possess actual disutility. Vfhile one may 
doubt the accuracy of Shand’s account of the inherited emotional 
make-up his observations on the results which the life of 
ideas brings about in man’s emotionality are very valuable.
"The result of the modification which the systems of the emotions 
undergo in man, and especially the multiplication of the causes 
which excite and sustain them is (1) to make man the most 
emotional of animals, and (2) to render possible the debasement 
of his character. For that which is a condition of his pro­
gress is also a condition of his decline, - the acquired power 
of ideas over emotions, and the subsequent power of each 
indefinitely to sustain the other. Hence the existence cf 
the emotions constitutes a serious danger for him, though not 
for the animals, and the balance which is lost v/hen the emotions 
are no longer exclusively under the control of those causes 
which originally excite them can only be replaced by the higher 
control of the sentiments." The exact nature of this ’higher 
control’ of which Shand speaks, and the means by which it is 
brought about constitute very important problems, which it will 
be our business to endeavour to investigate.
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The process of biological evolution, it has often 
been pointed out, is characterised throughout hy the creation 
of ever more complex units. Organisms become more and more 
complicated in their structure and in their modes of reaction. 
There is increased efficiency in the separate parts or organs 
which constitute them; there is also increase in the co-ordina­
tion of parts and in general harmony. The direction observable 
in evolution seems to be towards increased independence and 
also towards increased control. This is true of the evolu­
tion of the bodily organism, of the evolution of mind in the 
race and it seems to be true also of the development of mind 
in the individual. In every case there is increase in the 
complexity of organs and activities and increase also in the 
organisation which obtains between them. The analogy between 
the development of mind in the individual, on its active side, 
and the development of the bodily organism is well pointed 
out by Julian Huxley: "We come into the world," he says,
"with a set of instinctive and emotional reactions only 
waiting their proper stimuli to be fired off, and a capacity 
for learning, for amassing experience, and a capacity for 
modifying our instincts and our behaviour according to our 
experience. We incorporate experience in ourselves, and in 
doing so we alter the original basis of our reactions; a 
strongly emotional experience colours all that is closely 
associated with it; and so after birth we are continually 
making our mental microcosm not only larger but qualitatively 
more complex, in exactly the same way as before birth our 
body grew not only in size, but also in complexity of 
organization".
(1) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 289.
At the present time there is a widespread tendency 
to explain the more complex forms of organization and activity 
which arise in the course of development simply by reference 
to the original elements. But it is a mistake to think that 
such an explanation is adequate. Tûiile analysis and the 
attempt to understand origins are important they are not all.
If we are really to understand them we must study the later 
and more complex phenomena in and for themselves.
II.
In traditional psychology the principle of "association 
of ideas" was held to account for all the complexities of 
mental life. More recently new and more adequate conceptions 
have been developed. Very important among these, so far as 
the active side of mind is concerned, is the conception of 
the sentiment as a complex mental system determining thought 
and conduct. This conception is one of the most valuable of 
the recent acquisitions of psychology and we will give some 
account of its development in modern psychological theory.
The term * sentiment’ was rescued from its vague and.popular 
significance and made into a scientific concept by A.F. Shand. 
Its advent has made possible in modern psychology the profit­
able discussion of the organisation of the affective and 
active aspects of the mind. As McDougall says, "the concept 
of the sentiment as defined by Mr, Shand, enables us at once 
to reduce to order many of the facts of the life of impulse
and emotion, a province of psychology which hitherto has been
(1)
chaotic and obscure"*
It was first set out by Shand in an article on
(2)
"Character and the Emotions". v He pointed-out that "the /.q- rw/
( 1) "Introduction to Social Psychology/" p. 122;.;
::(2) : "Mind*y\N,3.<y.:.^,/
attempt to put order into the chaos of our feelings, to group 
or classify them under any intelligible principle not barren 
or useless, has not so far been attended with much success".
To remedy this he endeavoured to demonstrate the organisation 
of the emotions in the system of the sentiments. Since it 
was first put forward the concept has been considerably 
developed; but in some form it is now accepted by most psycho­
logists. Neither in his original article nor in his subse­
quent "Foundations of Character" was Shand primarily interested 
in the psychical origin or development of the sentiments.
He was concerned with distinguishing them from the emotions.
He says that his theory "is not chiefly concerned with the 
meaning to be given to the term sentiment, but essentially 
concerns the nature of love and hate (the main sentiments) 
and their distinction from the class of emotions to which they 
had hitherto been supposed to belong". In his latest contri­
bution to the discussion of this subject he offers this defini­
tion of a sentiment. It is "a system of several emotional
dispositions, having different conative tendencies, connected
(1)
with a common object and subordinated to a common end .
It is McDougall, Drever and Myers who have worked out 
the problem of the origin and development of the sentiments. 
McDougall’s account of the instincts and emotions in his 
’Introduction to Social Psychology’ is simply the propaedeutic 
to an account of the development of character through the 
organisation of these instinctive bases into a hierarchy of 
sentiments. This,is usually overlooked. McDougall defines 
a sentiment as "an organised system of emotional dispositions 
centred about the idea of some object". He differs from Shand
(1) "The Relations of Complex and Sentiment", British Jour­
nal of Psychology, Oct., 1922. Cf. also: "The sentiment is a 
mental system which is capable of adapting itself emotionally 
to the changing situations of its object, and of persisting 
indefinitely in correspondence with the duration of its object 
without becoming morbid: the emotion is a mental system which 
is capable of adapting itself to only one kind of situation, 
and when it persists beyond this system tends to become morbid".
/Où,
in regarding the sentiments as organised in the developing ■ 
mind in the course of experience. Shand believes some of 
them to be innately organised but there seems to be no good 
ground for this belief. Their development can be traced in 
the course of experience. McDougall shows that "each has a 
life-history, like any other vital organisation. It is 
gradually built up, increasing in complexity and thought, 
and may continue to grow indefinitely, or may enter upon a 
period of decline, and may decay slowly or rapidly, partially 
or completely". He distinguishes four main types of senti­
ments, love and hate, respect and contempt. But besides 
these he says, "we must recognise the existence of sentiments 
of all degrees of development, from the most rudimentary 
upwards; these may be regarded as stages in the formation 
of fully grown sentiments although many of them never attain 
any great degree of complexity or strength. These we have 
to name according to the principal emotional disposition 
entering into their composition........ The number of senti­
ments a man may acquire, reckoned according to the number of 
objects in which they are centred, may of course be very large; 
but almost every man has a small number of sentiments - perhaps 
one only - that greatly surpass the rest in strength and as 
regards the proportion of his conduct that springs from them".
In his treatment of the sentiments McDougall stresses 
the distinction which he insisted upon in his treatment of 
instinct, viz. that between facts of mental structure and facts 
of mental functioning. For him sentiments are facts of 
structure. "The emotion," he says, "is a mode of experience, 
a way of functioning and a fact of activity; the sentiment is 
a fact of structure, ah organized system of dispositions which 
endures. In a more or less quiescent condition, between the
( 1 )
occasions upon which i t  is  brought into a c t i v i t y .  McDougall
is  fo llo w e d  here by D rever who says: "The sentim ent is  no t an
experience or conscious process, b u t a d e te rm in an t of conscious
processes and of the e x te rn a l behav iour which r e s u lts .  When
a sentim ent is  part o f the mental structure functioning by way
of conscious process , what is  experienced is  a f e e l in g  or
emotion relative to  a certain o b je c t , and an im pulse to  a c t
in  a c e r ta in  way. The fe e l in g  and im pulse may va ry  according
to the circum stances w h ile  the sentim ent, as such, rem ains
relatively unchanged. We may be c le a r ly  conscious th a t  we
possess a certain sentiment, as we are conscious th a t  we
possess a pancreas or a d ren a l g la n d s , but the sentiment i t s e l f
is  never in  consciousness , Th is v ie w , th a t  the sentiment
does not in v o lv e  any s p e c if ic  conscious experience but is
m erely the l i a b i l i t y  to  experience a gamut o f emotional
fe e lin g s  accord ing  to  c ircum stances, has been v ig o ro u s ly
c r i t ic is e d  by C. S. M yers. In  an a r t i c l e  on "The Nature
(3 )
and Development of the Sentiments", he works out a view of
the sentim ents which differs a good d e a l from th a t  o f  
M cDougall. He aims a t  showing th a t  the sentim ent is  not 
sim ply a f a c t  o f disposition but th a t  i t  in vo lv es  when 
aroused s p e c if ic  feelings o f i t s  own, i . e .  * sentiment fe e lin g s *  .
(1 ) See * O u t lin e s * , Ch. X V I I ,  "Growth o f M enta l S tru c tu re " .  
I t  is  in te r e s t in g  to  observe th a t  a somewhat s im ila r  conception 
is  to  be found in  L o tze *s  "O u tlin es  o f Psychology" (1 8 8 1 ).
Lotze w r ite s :  " In  l i k e  manner must we distinguish the senti­
ments ( Gesinnungen) -  th a t  is  to say permanent species o f  
m ental c o n s t itu t io n ,  which proceed from t h is ,  th a t  a definite 
va lue is  once fo r  a l l  p laced  upon certain contents o f ideas; 
they are  therefore -  fo r  example p ie ty  or patriotism -  not 
themselves sim ple definite feelings, but causes from which
the d i f f e r e n t  species o f fe e lin g s  can originate according to  
the n a tu re  o f the circumstances . O f. a lso  G.P. S tottt 
("Groundwork o f Psychology"): "A sentim ent as we have d e fin ed  
i t  cannot be actually f e l t  a t  any one moment as emotions can be 
f e l t  . . . . .  They are complex m ental d is p o s it io n s , and may, as 
d iv e rs  occasions a r is e ,  give b i r t h  to  the whole gamut o f the  
em otions".
(2 )  " In tro d u c tio n  to  the Psychology o f E d u ca tio n " , p . 23.
(3 ) "Psyche", January , 1922.
The sentiment is more than its organised emotions. Those 
who hold that the sentiment is dependent entirely on its 
organised emotions, and that they alone are experienced,
Myers likens to those who maintain that the emotion is 
entirely dependent upon its expression. Just as there is 
also an affective element in the emotional consciousness so, 
in the case of the sentiment, there is a distinct sentiment 
feeling. Further Myers does not believe that the sentiments 
take their rise only at the ideational level of the mind.
He looks for their beginnings much earlier. "The rudimentary 
sentiments of love and hate are not mere dispositions to the 
feelings of joy, distress, anger, fear, etc. centred about an 
ideaj they involve specific sentiment feelings which are based 
on certain feelings of interest which are related to the 
appetition or aversion of the individual in regard to objects. 
These sentiment feelings and feelings of interest may 
unquestionably be innate." So far as their relation to the 
emotions is concerned in Myers* view the sentiment feelings 
are affective experiences distinct from those associated with 
the emotions butftha^ they may evoke "the various emotional 
and other feelings", which are organised within the sentiment 
as a whole. "All grades of sentiment feeling are recognisable, 
and it seems impossible to draw any clear line of separation 
between man*s love of God or of truth, the love of a cov/ whose 
calf has just been removed and the (scarcely more than) 
interest of the bird that has just hatched out its young.
For the essential nucleus of the sentiment is an interest in 
the Object *qua* object; and its consequence, its very *raison 
d’etre*, is to invoke a variety of simpler emotional and other 
feelings according to the various situations in which the 
subject finds itself in relation to that object."
The sentiment feeling begins as a vague interest in 
the object but "with the clearer conception of subject and 
object and of concrete and abstract ideas, this feeling,
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qualified by later affective expression, is largely responsible 
for the experience of values. At the same time, by its 
increasing and systematic control of Various emotional and 
other feelings, it develops an ever-growing strength, 
stability and complexity of form and organisation, and it 
gains fuller expression by the aid of such feelings",
Myers seems to make good his point that sentiment 
covers more than mere disposition. V'/hen a well-developed 
sentiment exists something *sui generis’ seems to be experienced; 
though we may not agree with Myers’s account of the origin of 
the affective experiences which characterise the sentiments.
Still something more than one or another of simple emotional 
quality seems to be felt. Just as Instinctive activities 
have their own feeling accompaniments, and emotional qualities 
have theirs, so too there are specific feelings accompanying 
the sentiments.
III.
We may now endeavour to see more closely how sentiments 
are formed and what their place and function in mental life is.
We have already seen that as the result of experience emotions 
tend to become associated with an increasing range of objects 
and later of ideas. Once an emotion has been strongly or 
repeatedly aroused in connection with any object or idea so 
that whenever the idea is in consciousness it is coloured by 
the emotional excitement, there exists the nucleus of a sentiment. 
If it is not to be called a sentiment - and Shand& protests 
that it is to obliterate the point of principal importance to
(1) Of. a later article by Myers: "The Evolution of 
Feeling" (Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy,
Mch., 1923). He summarises his views in this connection as 
follows: "Instincts are integrated from different higher and 
lower reflexes, emotions from different instincts, sentiments 
from different emotions organised within progressively higher 
systems and subjected to control and inhibition, which are
important determinants of the accompanying feelings ......
Instincts, emotions, and sentiments are accompanied by their 
special feelings depending on the integration of dispositions 
to lower feelings".
call the fu s io n  o f ideas w ith  a s in g le  em otional d is p o s it io n
(1)
a sentim ent -  i t  is  a t  le a s t  a sentim ent in  the making. Once
such a rud im entary  sentim ent is  form ed, i f  i t  is  fre q u e n tly
a c t iv e ,  i t  tends to  g a in  in  s tre n g th  and co m p lex ity . I t  may
become more complex in  either or both  o f two ways. In  the
f i r s t  p lace  the e m o tio n a lly  tin g e d  idea may have as s o c ia tio n s
w ith  other id e a s , and i t  tends to  c a rry  over i t s  affect with
i t ,  so th a t  i t  becomes a ttac h ed  to  the whole system of id e as .
There is  c o m p le x ity , in  th is  case on the id ea  s id e . On the
o th er hand fre q u e n t a ro u sa l o f a s in g le  em otional tendency
creates a c o n d itio n  in  which other emotions are  e a s ily  aroused.
Thus a s itu a t io n  which gave r is e  a t  f i r s t  on ly  to  the em otional
q u a l i t y  o f f e a r ,  may come to  evoke a lso  the emotion o f anger.
(2)
Thus a system o f em otional tendencies is  form ed. As Myers 
says, "there seems to  be no reason to  make any d is t in c t io n  
between the organisation o f ideas about an emotion, and the  
o rg a n is a tio n  o f emotions about an id e a " .
As the sentiment is  e la b o ra te d  i t  p revents the d is ­
o rd e r ly  a ro u sa l o f em otional ten d en c ies . The sentiment is  not 
merely organised but i t s e l f  organises the vario u s  emotions 
which make i t  up. When i t  e x is ts  i t  provides a s e tt in g  which 
l im i t s  the a c t iv i t y  o f em otional im pulses. I t  has an in h ib i t ­
in g  and a controlling effect on the im pu ls ive  promptings which 
crude emotion arouses. Vdiere no sentiment e x is ts  the emotional 
tendencies are independent and u n c o n tro lle d  in  their a c t iv i t y .  
The sentim ent in tro du ces  s t a b i l i t y .  The emotions are no 
longer l ia b le  to constant e x c ita t io n  by p r im it iv e  s t im u li .
But i t  is  im po rtan t to  note that the c o n tro l which the s e n t i­
ments in tro d u c e  is  not a control ’ ab e x t r a ’ but re s u lts  from 
a h ig h e r o rg a n is a tio n  o f the l i f e  o f feeling i t s e l f  and from
(1) Morton Prince ("The Unconscious") d e fin e s  a sentim ent 
(much too sim ply) as "an id ea  lin k e d  w ith  an in s t in c t " .
f (2) McDougall, "Outline", Ch. XVII, gives some good 
examples o f s e n tim e n t-fo rm a tio n .
its co-ordination with the life of ideas. The sentiments
c o n tro l the flo w  o f ideas and in flu e n c e  the fo rm atio n  o f
(1)
op in io n  and b e l ie f s .  They determ ine what we s h a ll a tte n d  
to ,  what we s h a ll  th in k ,  and what we s h a ll do. They are  o f  
a l l  degrees o f s tre n g th  and c o m p lex ity . They do not e x is t  
in  is o la t io n .  They are  r e la te d  to  each o th er in  va rio u s  ways. 
Some are caught up in  the systems o f o th e rs . In  th is  way, 
as has been suggested, they may form a s o rt o f h ie ra rc h y  
under the dominance o f some one m as te r-s e n tim en t. I t  has 
been sa id  th a t  the s tre n g th  and com plex ity  o f a sentiment, and 
the in te n s ity  o f the emotions which i t  organises may be 
gauged by the e x te n t to  which i t  ’ p o la r iz e s ’ words. The 
s tre n g th  and pervasiveness o f the religious sentiment or the  
sentiment o f patriotism could be shown by the number o f words, 
express ive  o f ideas in  t h e i r  system, which c a rry  an em otional 
s ig n if ic a n c e . Some sentim ents pass w ith  the growth o f the 
mind and w ith  a change o f o u tlo o k . Others may deepen and 
streng then  throughout l i f e .
I t  is  im po rtan t to  note th a t  ideas which are  not 
organised w ith in  any sentim ent are  impotent and without any 
in flu e n c e  upon conduct. I t  is  on ly  as they are asso c ia ted  
in  the system o f the sentim ents w ith  em otional tendencies 
th a t  they  possess co n ative  fo rc e . Thus Morton Prince says:
"The impulsive fo rc e  o f the em otional dispositions or linked 
in s t in c ts  becomes the co native  fo rc e  o f the idea and i t  is  
th is  fa c to n  which c a r r ie s  the id ea  to  i t s  f r u i t io n  . . . . .
(1) C f. R iv e rs , "instinct and the Unconscious", p. 88 , on 
"the ’something’ in  our mental c o n s t itu t io n  which determ ines  
th a t  when we read in  the paper o f a c e r ta in  event, v/e experience 
the special k in d  o f a f fe c t  and s p e c ia l tendency to behaviour, 
which determ ine the r e la t io n  o f th a t  event to our p o l i t i c a l  
conduct, which help, fo r  in s ta n c e , to  determ ine how we s h a ll  
vote a t the next election. Th is  ’ som ething’ which thus 
determ ines our fe e lin g s  and conduct is  what the orthodox 
p s ych o lo g is t knows as a sentiment".
Without the inipu3.se of a linked emotion ideas would be life-
(1)
less, dead, inert, incapable of determining conduct , The 
importance of the sentiments in organising the emotional life 
may be very well seen when, through disillusionment, death, 
or any other cause, some important and dominant sentiment 
is broken up. Emotional disintegration, often with disastrous 
effects on character and conduct may follow. In such a case 
a man may "go to pieces". The sum of it is that the organisa­
tion of the emotional tendencies with ideas to form sentiments 
is essential for the regulation of conduct and the formation 
of what is termed character. This is well put by McDougall. 
"The growth of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for 
the character and conduct of individuals and of societies; it 
is the organisation of the affective and conative life. In 
the absence of sentiments our emotional life would be a mere 
chaos, without order, consistency, or continuity of any kind; 
and all our social relations and conduct, being based on the 
emotions and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, 
unpredictable, and unstable. It is only through the systematic 
organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that 
the volitional control of the immediate promptings of the 
emotions is rendered possible. Again, our judgments of value 
and of merit are rooted in our sentiments; and our moral 
principles have the same sources, for they are formed by our(5)judgments of moral value."
As McDougall says it is the existence of sentiments 
which gives ’value’ to ideas and to objects and what are 
termed ’ideals’ may be regarded as sentiments consciously 
adopted, or raised to the self-conscious level,
(1) Op. cit.3 pp. 449-50.
(2) Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 159-60.
IV.
We must now endeavour to  r e la t e  the concept o f the  
sentim ent to  another conception which has been e la b o ra te d  in  
re c e n t y e a rs . Th is  is  the ’ complex’ . Th is  l a t t e r  term  has 
caught the popu lar fancy  and i t s  meaning has ’ worked lo o s e ’ 
somewhat. I t  f ig u re s  v e ry  la r g e ly  in  the l i t e r a t u r e  o f the  
’ new’ psychology. The two n o tio ns  o f sentim ent and complex 
have grown up contemporaneously; th a t  o f the sen tim en t, as i t  
has been p u t, in  the calm f ie ld s  o f normal psychology; th a t  
o f the complex in  th e  ju n g le  o f psychopathology. D if f e r e n t  
l in e s  o f in v e s t ig a t io n  have le d  to  the two conceptions which  
nov7 o v erla p  so th a t  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  f in d  a s a t is fa c to r y  
l in e  o f dem arcation between them..
The r e la t io n  between the two conceptions was re c e n t ly
(1)
the su b je c t o f a Symposium in  which s ix  psych o lo g is ts  took  
p a r t .  U n fo rtu n a te ly  the symposiasts d id  not succeed in  
reach in g  agreement though they  d id  make c le a re r  th e  ways in. 
which t h e i r  views d i f fe r e d .
The term ’ complex’ was o r ig in a l ly  in tro du ced  in to  
psychopathology by N e isser and Jung and used by the l a t t e r  to  
in d ic a te  any group o f ideas c a rry in g  a s p e c if ic  a f f e c t  
(g e fu h ls b e to n te  Kom plex), and not n e c e s s a r ily  o f a p a th o lo g ic a l  
n a tu re . He found th a t  fa c to rs  o f th is  s o rt were a t  the ro o ts  
o f c e r ta in  types o f m ental d is o rd e rs , bu t he a ls o  i l lu s t r a t e d  
t h e i r  o p e ra tio n  in  the normal m ind. L a te r ,  p s y c h o -a n a ly tic a l 
w r ite r s  r e s t r ic te d  the  term  to  groups o f e m o tio n a lly  toned  
id e a s , w hich, through re p re s s io n , had become d is s o c ia te d  from  
the r e s t  o f the  mind, Bernard H a r t ,  in  h is  w ell-know n  
"Psychology o f In s a n ity " ,  p o p u la rised  the terra in  the wide
(1 ) "The R e la tio n s  o f Sentim ent and Complex" by W. H. 
R iv e rs , A. G. T a n s le y , A. F . Shand, T . H. P ear, B. H a rt and 
C .P . M yers, B r i t is h  Journa l o f Psychology, Oc t . ,  1922.
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sense in which Jung used it. By it he denoted "a system of 
connected ideas, with a strong emotional tone and a tendency 
to produce actions of a certain definite character". He 
held that "complexes may he of all sorts and kinds, the 
component ideas may be of every variety and the accompanying 
emotional tone pleasant or painful, very intense or compara­
tively weak". As Illustrations of complexes in this sense 
he gave the hobby and political bias. In the case of the man 
with the hobby he would be aware of the existence and opera­
tion of the complex. In the case of political bias the 
politician is not aware of the existence of the complex and 
we have an instance of what is termed the unconscious origin 
of beliefs and opinions. In his contribution to the Symposium 
Hart writes: "if we seek to discover the causes determining 
the direction of flow of our thought and conduct, we find 
amongst the causes systems of mental elements to which, 
following Jung, I gave the name complexes. The essential 
feature of each of these systems is that the constituent 
mental elements are linked together to form a ’higher psychic 
unit’, which has a more or less definite conative trend, and 
which therefore tends to influence the flow of thought and 
conduct in a definite direction". In Hart’s opinion the 
distinction of complexes and sentiments should be made on the 
basis of degree of organisation. The term complex should be 
the wider one covering all the less well-organised systems of 
ideas and tendencies. The term sentiment would be limited 
"to a comparatively small class of functional units distin­
guished by a high degree of integration and organisation with 
the whole structure of the mind".
A. G. Tansley insists on retaining the wide usage of 
the term complex and uses it as equivalent to sentiment as 
understood by McDougall. "The whole mental life and conse­
quently behaviour," he writes, "depends primarily on the 
character and power of the complexes in which the structure of
(1)
the mind is organized". His ’ego-complex’ is equivalent 
to McDougall’s ’self-regarding sentiment’. Tansley declines 
to use the terra sentiment to denote mental constellations of 
this kind, holding that it has an exclusively affective sig­
nificance and should not be used to refer to any mental system 
which includes Cognitive elements. "A particular sentiment 
is the specific affect belonging to a specific complex; it is 
not the complex itself,"
The way out of this confusion seems to be indicated 
by Rivers. He proposed to make the term complex refer to 
those mental systems which are in some degree morbid and which,
by reason of their lack of harmony with the rest of the mind,
(2)
are characterised by what he terras suppression. Suppression
is the keynote of the complex; fusion, on the other hand, is
the essence of the process upon which depends the formation of
(3)
a sentiment. Having come into being in these different ways 
the two types of mental system are marked by other characteris­
tic features. They differ greatly, for example, in the 
degree in which they can be modified. "The complex, once 
having come into being through the process of suppression, is
(1) "The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life", p. 69.
(2) Cf. "instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. XI. "According 
to this usage the concept of ’complex’ is closely linked with 
that of the unconscious. The term is appropriate to those 
cases in which experience shut off from direct access to con­
sciousness is nevertheless capable of influencing conduct or
of producing changes in consciousness, the underlying condi­
tions of which cannot be reached by the ordinary process of 
introspection. Characteristic examples of a complex would be 
found in the suppressed experience upon the activity of which 
depends a phobia or the compulsive act or thought of a compul­
sion neurosis. The complex is usually of a relatively simple 
kind and may consist only of some body of experience which has 
been suppressed, though more usually the suppressed experience 
takes with it into the unconscious experience of other kinds 
with which it has been associated."
(3) Cf. also McDougall, ’Outline’, p. 418. Also W.Whately 
Smith: "The Measurement of Emotion": A complex is essentially 
a system of ideas or constellation, of a nature incompatible 
with other systems and whose presence in consciousness is 
productive of conflict, which leads to its repression".
//g
h ig h ly  co n s tan t. I t  may p e rs is t  fo r  y e a rs , or even fo r  
l i f e ,  unchanged and unchanging." I f  i t  is  brought in to  
f n i l  consciousness i t  may d isap p ea r. But i t  is  not capable  
o f v a r ia t io n  as the r e s u lt  o f fu r th e r  ex p erie n ce . The s e n t i­
m ent, on the o th e r hand, the product o f fu s io n , is  always 
changing under the in flu e n c e  o f new exp erien ce s . I t  is  more 
o f a f lu id  product su b jec t to  m o d if ic a tio n  throughout l i f e .  
A nother d is t in c t io n ,  and perhaps the most im po rtan t is  th a t  
the sentim ent is  a necessary and constant fe a tu re  o f the normal 
m ental l i f e .  "Most o f our s e n tim e n ts ,"  says R iv e rs , "come 
in to  a c tio n  d a i ly  and in flu e n c e  the behaviour o f every moment 
o f the l i f e  o f every d a y ."  On the o th er hand the complex 
"may be dormant fo r  long p erio ds  o f tim e and is  in  no way 
necessary to  the harmony and f itn e s s  o f the m ental life.
Indeed i t  is  a q u estion  whether i t s  a c t iv i t y  does not always 
involve a la c k  o f harmony and a f a i lu r e  o f a d a p ta tio n  to  the  
circum stances w ith  which the organism is  c a lle d  upon to  d e a l" .
I t  seems d e s ira b le , then, to  use the term  complex to  
denote those m ental systems which are  to  a g re a te r  o r less 
degree m orbid , w h ile  the sentim ent covers those which are  
recognised  as normal and necessary . I t  is  o f course tru e  
th a t  no sharp l in e  can be drawn between them. I t  is  one o f 
the most im p o rtan t conclusions o f modern psychopathology th a t  
no sharp l in e  e x is ts  between the  normal and the abnormal and 
p a th o lo g ic a l.  The one shades o f f  in s e n s ib ly  in to  the o th e r . 
But even i f  we cannot draw l in e s ,  i t  is  im p o rtan t th a t  we 
should make d is t in c t io n s .  Nothing bu t confusion can r e s u lt  
from the use 'of the same term  fo r  d e f in i t e ly  p a th o lo g ic a l 
and d e f in i t e ly  normal s ta te s .
Complexes, l ik e  sen tim en ts , may be o f a l l  degrees o f 
c o m p lex ity . T h e ir  c h ie f  mark, as we have seen, is  th a t  
they a re  not o rg a n ic a lly  r e la te d  to  the main p e rs o n a lity ,  but 
are  a t  war w ith  i t .  Some p r im it iv e  tendency may never be
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co-ordinated with the rest of mental life but may gather
to itself compatible ideas and impulses and so form a system,
which because it is out of harmony with the rest of mental
life is more or less completely repressed. It could hardly
be denied that no mind is free from the operation of such 
(1)
complexes. And they influence thought and conduct in
indirect ways. Several of the more characteristic ways
have been distinguished. "Repressed complexes," says 
( 2 )
Drever, inevitably give rise to ’reaction formations’ or 
’compromise formations’ or both."
Of the first of these Bernard Hart gives the illus­
tration of a man who had been addicted in boyhood to the 
thieving of small sums of money. In later life the memory 
of this became painful and he strove to repress it. It 
became a complex and resulted in an exaggerated honesty 
so that the man "would devote endless time and trouble to the 
payment of some trifling excess fare, and an undischarged debt 
was a source of unceasing worry and self-reproach". In the 
case of what is termed ’compromise formation’, the repressed 
complex finds expression in some disguised type of activity 
which does not involve conflict with conscious life. There 
exists also what is termed ’projection’. This is the 
ascribing to others of the tendencies and ideas which have 
been repressed in the person himself. The mind refuses to 
acknowledge ownership of part of its own content and attaches 
it to some external individual or object. Those who possess
(1) Havelock Ellis says somewhere that "we do not know 
how great a part is played in the lives of men and women by 
some little concealed form'of abnormality". For examples
of complexes of more or less developed nature cf. J.A, Hadfield: 
"Psychology and Morals", Ch. IV and V.
(2) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 116.
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some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are 
notoriously intolérant of it in others.
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MENTAL CONFLICT. REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION.
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I.
The foregoing account of the organisation of the 
emotional and active life might give the impression that it 
is a smoothly working process, inevitable and uninterrupted 
in its development. Most of the accounts of the development 
of the self do give this impression. But it is now seen to 
be, in fact, very far from true. The organisation and control 
of the emotional and impulsive life is something which is only 
very gradually achieved and its course is in almost every case 
a che#quered one, characterised by more or less acute stresses 
and strains. Many of the processes and facts which mark its 
course are being demonstrated in present-day psychology, and 
some of them we are now to discuss. In recent psychology there 
have been developed three conceptions, all closely related, 
which seem to have an important bearing on the problem of 
conduct. These are the conceptions of mental conflict, of 
repression and of dissociation. They appear to throw new 
ligb-t on much that has hitherto been inexplicable in the 
development of conduct and of character. Like all new theories, 
in the hands of some they have been extravagantly exploited.
But this should not prevent us from recognising their real 
importance. Each of them covers a wide range of psychological 
facts which it will be possible to survey only very briefly.
These conceptions have been developed largely as the 
result of investigations into disordered states of mind. The 
large body of pathological facts which they embrace has called 
attention to their significance for mental life generally.
The extreme danger of inferring from the abnormal to the normal 
is well-known and evidence of its dangers are not wanting.
But it cannot be denied that the study of abnormal processes 
has ÿnown considerable light on the normal. It is a fundam ental 
tenet of modern psycho-pathology that the same processes are a t
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work in the abnormal as in the normal# There is no qualitative
(1)
difference between them. "In all cases," says Morton Prince, 
"these various pathological conditions are functional derange­
ment of the fundamental factors of a given human personality - 
expressions of the same mechanisms which the organism normally 
makes use of to adapt itself harmoniously to its own past and 
present experiences and to its environment." In abnormal 
states mental processes show themselves in a heightened, 
exaggerated and often isolated form. In this way disordered 
conditions supply in psychology what is provided in other 
sciences by experiment. If this is kept clearly in mind and 
also the fact already mentioned that the normal and the abnormal 
shade imperceptibly into each other, there is little danger in 
looking to the facts of psycho-pathology for light upon mind 
and conduct in general.
II.
The notion of mental conflict is, of course, no new one. 
It cannot be said to have originated with modern dynamic 
psychology. Plato’s psychology of the moral life is based 
wholly on the idea of conflict. It also plays a part in the 
system of Aristotle - and to a greater or less extent in the 
whole range of moral theories right dovm to the present day.
But if the conception itself is not new, what is new is the 
laying bare of some of the factors which are involved in mental 
conflict, of the manner in which it occurs and the recognition 
of the hitherto unsuspected ways in which it influences mental
(1) "The Unconscious", p. 642.
(1)
development. It cannot be claimed that its nature is as yet 
at all fully understood. "The determination of its precise 
significance," says Bernard Hart, "is a problem of prime impor­
tance for psychology and for science. There,can be no doubt 
that this problem will provide one of the most fruitful fields 
for the scientific work of the near future. At present, 
however, the significance of conflict is very imperfectly
understood and but little definite knowledge concerning it has
(2)
SO far been established. Acute mental conflict of an 
emotional nature is now believed to be an important causal 
factor in many forms of mental disorder. It is also believed 
to be responsible for many otherwise inexplicable phenomena of 
conduct. Criminal psychologists, for example, have discovered 
that delinquency and crime are often the results, perhaps 
indirectly, of mental conflict, though this may be far from 
obvious on the surface. "Mental conflict," says Hamblin 
Smith, "and the resulting repression are among the main causative 
factors which produce delinquent conduct. The hypothesis
has recently been put forward that the puzzling phenomena of 
dreams are explicable as attempts to solve conflict which are 
occupying the mind. Rivers, in his posthumously published
(1) Cf. Rivers ("Instinct and the Unconscious", App. I).
"a favourite statement concerning Freud’s theory is that its 
fundamental idea is mental conflict. Standing out prominently 
in the system of Freud is the idea of conflict between the 
mental tendencies of the individual and the traditional code of 
conduct presented by the society to which the individual belongs. 
This conflict, however, was fully recognised by psychologists 
long before Freud. If the idea were the chief characteristic# 
of his theory, no great claim for novelty or originality could 
be advanced  The feature which makes Freud’s theory note­
worthy is his scheme of the nature of the opponents in the con­
flict, and of the mechanism by which the conflict is conducted".
(2) "The Psychology of Insanity", p. 164.
(3) "The Psychology of the Criminal." Cf. also W. Healy, 
"Mental Conflicts and Misconduct", where this subject is very 
fully treated: also C. Burt, "The Causal Factors of Juvenile 
Crime", British Journal of Medical Psychology, Jan., 1923.
in
"Conflict and Dream" challenges the well-known Freudian hypo­
thesis that dreams are simply wish fulfilments. "l regard 
the dream," he says, "as the expression of a conflict and as 
an attempt to solve the conflict by such means as are available 
duning sleep."
It has often been pointed out that, viewed broadly, 
conflict is a characteristic of all life. It does not occur 
only at the^psychological level, but is a universal aspect of 
all nature. "Conflict is at the very root and source of 
life, it is the very stuff out of which life is made." But 
it is at the psychological level of life that it becomes most 
obvious and important. Man comes to his problems of organic 
adjustment with the effective solutions reached during long 
ages of evolution laid down in his bodily and nervous struc­
ture. There is comparatively little chance of defects of 
adjustment developing and little occasion for conflict. But 
mentally it is all very different. Here certain factors are 
laid down in structure, but as we have seen in discussing the 
nature of instinct in man, not in the form of effective solu­
tions to the problems which have to be faced; but as very 
general ends to be sought, and to be adjusted to one another 
and to the environment. Further, the problems vfhich have to 
be met are infinitely more subtle and complex. Adjustment 
has to be made to a social environment which makes very definite 
demands in the v/ay of standards of conduct. Thus the chances 
of maladjustment and the occasions of conflict are very greatly 
multiplied. Viewed very widely mental conflict is the out­
come of the necessity of adapting original human nature to the 
requirements of the social environment - in the case of our­
selves to the highly-developed civilised social environment.
(1) Cf. W. A. White: "The Mechanisms of Character Formation", 
Ch. IV,.also "Foundations of Psychiatry", p. 39 ff.
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Conflict arises, as it has been well put, "between what is
racially established for the furtherance of life, as such, and
what is socially established, far later in the evolutionary
order, at the reflective level of that which we call our
morality". It is in the process of the socialization and the
moralization of original impulses and emotions that conflict
occurs. The notion that the conditions of modern civilized
life impose on the natural man a strain which is often intoler-
(1)
able is now widely expressed. It is pointed out that while 
biological heritage has not changed, social heritage has 
changed very greatly. The modern man, it is claimed, inherits 
precisely the same mental characteristics as his savage
(2) r ,
ancestors, but jthat' he must adapt himself to a vastly different
social order which makes high demands upon him for the ordering
and control of his innate tendencies. Compared with their
almost limitless past, this need for the control of the great
instincts is very recent indeed. Hence it is little wonder if
there is in many cases partial and in some cases total failure
of adaptation. "We should try and realise," says one writer,
"how complicated a system our conventional civilization is. We
require every person born into that society to adapt himself
to it ...... We cannot be surprised that there are some cases
(3)
of failure to attain this. But this point of view, while
(1) Of. Bertrand Russell, "The Prospects of Industrial 
Civilization", p. 170. "With the advance of what is called 
civilization our social and material environment has changed 
faster than our instincts, so that there has been an increasing 
discrepancy between the acts to which we are impelled by instinct, 
and those to which we are constrained by prudence."
(2) Cf. Franz Boas, "The Mind of Primitive Man".
(3) Hamblin Smith op. cit. For an account of the process of 
social adaptation from the psycho-analytic point of view, cf. S.
I Freud, "Reflections" (New York. 1922), cf. also Ernest Jones 
B (Papers on Psycho-analysis). "Behind the veneer of civilization 
I there remains throughout life a buried mass of crude, primitive 
tendencies always struggling for expression and toward v/hich the 
I person tends to relapse whenever suitable opportunity is offered, 
r an illuminating example of which is a state of war, when men will 
I permit themselves to commit the most unthinkable acts." After 
|. all this is scarcely new doctrine, cf. Plato, "The Republic",
• Book IX. "t/hat we want to be sure of is this, that a terrible,^
? fierce and lawless class of desires exists in every man, even in 
K those of us whe have every appearance of being decent people.
Its existence is revealed in dreams.
/ / f
it must be recognised, must not be pushed too far. It is 
possible to overdo the idea that civilized man is so far 
removed from natural man that "his hold on normality of 
development is in the last degree precarious". After all, 
it is human nature which has brought civilization about.
What we must recognize is that in the process of social 
adjustment many stresses and strains do occur, and that many 
of the difficulties of mental life arise in this way. Some of 
the factors involved in the process of adaptation have now 
been said bare. At the very beginning of life conflict is set 
up between the two forces of original impulse and social pres­
sure. "The life of a child," says Rivers, "is a long conflict 
between instinctive tendencies and forces brought to bear upon 
these tendencies by its elders, and many are coming to believe
that character is largely determined by the strategy and
(1)
.tactics of this conflict. This conflict between original
nature and the ideals which are derived from the social tradi­
tion is prolonged throughout life, and takes all manner of 
forms and is of all degrees of acuteness. It is now widely 
acknowledged that many types of mental disorder represent the 
more or less complete failure of mental life to meet social 
demands. Sanity and mental health appears as a successful 
insanity or an unsuccessful attempt to adjust life to social 
reality. Disorders of mind are the outcome of ineffective 
attempts to solve the conflicts which arise for everyone between 
native tendencies and controlling forces. "It has become
(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 258. The recognition 
of this fact is very encouraging for the educator as Rivers 
points out elsewhere. "We are no longer content to adopt the 
pessimistic attitude of those who. were fed on the old views of 
heredity, but we are coming to.see to how great an extent the 
disorders and faulty trends of mental life are the result of 
wrong methods of treatment in the years v/hen the individual is 
painfully learning to control the instinctive impulses which he 
has brought into the world with him so as to make them compatible 
with the tradition of the society of which he is a member." 
(Psychology and Politics, p. 100.)
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evident that the psycho-neuroses are essentially attempts to
solve in various ways the conflict between instinctive
tendencies and controlling forces, the special form of the
psycho-neurosis depending on the nature of the solution
attempted, on the relative strength of the warring forces,
on the nature of the instinctive tendencies involved, and on
the outcome of a struggle between different forms of activity
(1)
by which the cruder instinctive tendencies are controlled."
The symptoms which appear in mental disorder represent the 
re-entrance into activity of tendencies which in the normal 
healthy person have been brought under control and integrated 
into the personality. Rivers points out that in savage 
communities the psycho-neuroses are almost entirely absent, 
though the cruder forms of mental disorder are present. In 
such communities there has been reached a stable adjustment 
between original nature and social tradition, leaving no room 
for conflict. "The perfect social organization is one in 
which instinctive tendencies out of harmony with social ideals 
have so come under control that they no longer form the ground 
of conflict, or give occasion for it only in the presence of 
exceptional stress and strain." As is well-known, the psycho­
analytic school have claimed that It is conflict connected with 
the sexual instincts which alone give rise to the psycho-neuroses. 
But this seems to have been definitely disproved. In the case 
of the very large number of war-neuroses the mental conflicts 
and disharmonies which gave rise to them were connected with
(1) Op. cit. Cf. also W. A. White ("Foundations of Psychia­
try"). ^Mental disease is disease at the level of integration 
to the individual and society. It is not a disease of society, 
as such, nor yet of man as an individual solely; it is a disease 
of man as a social animal; it touches him in his social inte­
grations". In other words mental disorders are social mal­
adjustments.
the instinct of self-preservation and the emotion of fear.
This was abundantly demonstrated by the work of Rivers, Brown,
Myers and others. To quote Rivers once again: "The first
result of the dispassionate study of the psycho-neuroses of
warfare .... was to show that in the vast majority of cases
there is no reason to suppose that factors derived from the
sexual life played any essential part in causation, but that
these disorders became explicable as the result of disturbance
of another instinct, even more fundamental than that of sex -
the instinct of self-preservation, especially those forms of it
(1)
which are adapted to protect the animal from danger". There
is of course little in normal civilized life to set up conflicts
of this sort. Psycho-pathologists all recognise that in the
disorders which arise in civil life sex factors do play a great
part. " ....... In those greater failures of adaptation of
conduct to the circumstances it has to meet which we call
disease, it is the sexual instinct which, in times of peace,
provides the most potent agent in the mental conflicts upon
(2)
which disorders of the mind depend." This is because of the 
original strength and complexity of the instinct and the strong 
repression to which it is necessarily subjected. Here is a quo­
tation from Dewey pointing this out: "Current clinical psychology 
has undoubtedly overworked the influence of sexual impulse in 
this connection, refusing, at the hands of some writers, to 
recognize the operation of any other modes of disturbance. There 
are explanations of this one-sidedness. The intensity of the 
sexual instinct and its organic ramifications produce many of 
the cases that are so noticeable as to demand the attention of 
physicians. And social taboos and the tradition of secrecy
(1) Op. cit., p. 5.
(2) Ibid., App. VII.
0%
have put this impulse under greater strain than has been 
imposed upon others. If a society existed in which the 
existence of impulses towards food were socially disavowed until 
it was compelled to live an illicit, covert life, alienists 
would have plenty of cases of mental and moral disturbance to
(p
relate in connection with hunger . It seems probable that 
conflict can arise in connection with any of the elemental 
instinctive forces of sufficient emotional intensity to result 
in serious mental disturbance, What modern psycho-pathology 
has shown is that mental health depends upon an equilibrium 
between the controlled and controlling fore es of the mind.
Coming now closer to the question of the exact nature
of mental conflict. Hart says that in such conflict "we find
a struggle taking place in which one of the primary instincts
(2)
is pitted against another"; and Trotter says that "the essence 
of mental conflict is the antagonism of two impulses which 
both have instinct behind them . But this hardly seems to 
describe the real nature of mental conflict. It is rather too 
simple a statement of it. Nor can it now, of course, be 
described in the old terms as between "appetites" and "interests" 
or "desire" and "reason". Conflict occurs between different 
levels of mental life. This seems to be its real nature. 
Impulses arising from a higher and more recently developed 
level of the mind conflict with those which are more primitive. 
Thus the typical form of conflict is that between motives 
prompted by a permanent and developed mental system such as a 
sentiment and those which arise from the excitement of a simple 
instinctive tendency. As we have already seen the existence of
(1) "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 165.
(2) Op. cit., p. 165.
(3) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", p. 82.
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a sentiment means a setting in which instinctive tendencies, 
if they are evoked, are limited and inhibited. And from time 
to time, they are bound to be evoked. The type of conflict 
which produced the psycho-neuroses of war provides a good 
instance. In the case of the soldier under fire the powerful 
emotion of fear, with its prompting to flight, conflicted with 
the developed sentiment of duty according to which fear and 
its expression are regarded as reprehensible. It is this 
conflict in the mind which, under the conditions of prolonged 
strain and fatigue occasioned by warfare, resulted in break­
down and neurosis. In the case of conflict between sexual 
impulses and developed moral sentiments the mechanism is the 
same. But conflicts may also occur between the great systems 
of the sentiments themselves, for they, as has been pointed out, 
form some sort of a hierarchy in which there are different 
levels. Such a major conflict would be one between the senti­
ments of religion and patriotism. Conflicts between the 
great sentiments have been the themes of the dramatists and 
writers of all ages. There can be no denying the influence of 
unresolved conflict of long duration in influencing thought 
and behaviour. Some of its consequences will be pointed out. 
Often conflicts occur and persist of which the individual is not 
fully conscious. They exert their influence indirectly from 
below the conscious level and give rise to a vague sense of 
inner disharmony.
But while acute and chronic mental conflict may have 
harmful and in some cases disastrous results, and at any rate 
he wasteful of mental energy, there is also another side to 
the picture and it should be put. It opens very wide issues. 
The normal mind, while it is really living, can never be free 
from conflict and never raised above it. It rather proceeds 
from one conflict to another. If it be true that not complete 
adaptation but rather growth itself is the moral end, then it
fZlf-.
is important to recognize that conflict, in the broad sense,
(1)
appears as the condition of growth and development. In this 
sense, conflict is ultimate. And it has a further significance. 
In the concluding passages of his "Instinct and the Unconscious", 
Rivers discusses the source of the energy which finds expression 
in creative work. There are, he says, two chief possibilities. 
One is that it is derived from instincts which fail, owing to 
control, to find their normal outlet and are, in current termin­
ology, sublimated. The other possibility is that this instinc­
tive energy "is increased in amount through the conflict 
between controlled and controlling forces. Many facts .... 
point to the truth of the second alternative". And of the 
energy derived in this way from conflict. Rivers says that "it 
is not easy to place any limit to its activity. We do not
i
know how high the goal that it may reach".
III.
Returning/again^to the question of mental conflict in 
the narrow sense - conflict between an impulse to action 
arising from one level of mental life and one belonging to 
another and more developed level. All such conflicts have 
one very important aspect in common. They are all characterized 
by emotional tension, by indecision and paralysis of action.
These are highly unpleasant and the mind seeks a way of escape 
from this tension - some resolution of the conflict. And we 
- have come upon the important process of repression. One of 
the most frequent, and as we shall see, the most faulty methods 
of dealing with mental conflict is by repression, that is the 
excluding from consciousness of one of the emotionally changed 
impulses concerned. To quote Bernard Hart: "The solution of 
a mental conflict by the mechanism of repression is one of the
(1) Cf. M. Harrison, "Mental Instability as a Factor in 
Progress", "Monist", Apl., 1922,
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commonest refuges . of the human mind ...... it not only
explains the occurrence of phenomena frequently seen in every­
day life, but it also enables us to understand the genesis
(1)
of many abnormal mental symptoms .
Psychology owes the conception of repression and the 
elucidation of its significance for conduct largely to the 
psycho-analytic school: though few psychologists now accept 
the Freudian view of repression without considerable modifica­
tion. The conception is control in the psycho-analytical
scheme. "The theory of repression," says Freud, "is the main
(2)
pillar on which rests the edifice of psycho-analysis." It was 
first regarded purely as a pathological conception, but now 
that its nature is more fully understood, it is seen to be a 
process which in some degree necessarily characterises all 
mental life. "Repression," says Hart, "is neither normal nor 
pathological, and it may lead to results which are either 
desirable or noxious according to the total setting of the
(3 )picture of which it forms a part. It is, in fact, now being
very widely conceived and its naturalness and necessity is seen, 
as well as the unfortunate results which may follow from its 
faulty exercise.
Freud*s doctrine of repression is very closely bound up 
with this whole rather picturesque scheme of the unconscious, 
of censorship and of the pleasure and reality principles of
the mind. It is hot at all easy to get a clear idea of what
(4)
he actually means by it. But he believes that there is a 
universal tendency in the mind to avoid or forget whatever is
(1) Op. cit., p. 102.
(2) "History of the Psycho-analytic Movement."
(3) "The Relations of Complex and Sentiment."
(4) Of. J. T. MacCurdy: "Problems in Dynamic Psychology",
Ch. V, "Repression and Ego-Libido".
unpleasant, and that from the first there are tendencies at 
work which shield the mind, as far as possible, from disagree­
able experiences. This process whereby painful or disharmonious 
ideas or impulses are expelled from consciousness or prevented 
from entering it, Freud terms repression. He appears also to 
identify repression with another process termed * censorship*, 
and the * censor* would be the personification of the sum total 
of the repressing forces of the mind. When an idea or an 
impulse is repressed, it becomes, on this view, unconscious. 
Everything that is really repressed is, unconscious and the 
censorship prevents the rising into consciousness of these 
unpleasant and disharmonious elements. The action of repres­
sion may extend over from the original elements to other mental 
processes which may be associated with it. There may be what 
is termed * displacement of affect*. During sleep the activity 
of the censorship is somewhat relaxed, though even then 
repressed tendencies express themselves in dreams only in an 
indirect and symbolic form. An important point about repression 
as understood by Freud is that it cannot bring about the 
destruction of the emotionally toned impulses and their con­
nected ideas which are repressed. . They remain as complexes 
in the unconscious, which latter is essentially made up of such 
repressed material. There they continue to exert a powerful, 
though unrecognized influence upon mental, life and behaviour. 
Often they succeed in obtaining expression in some indirect 
way. ; If they do not, their original energy remains, and they 
"exercise a continuous pressure in the direction of conscious­
ness" so that their existence involves "a continuous expenditure 
of force". Freud does not regard repression resulting from 
conscious mental conflict as the most important type. He 
believes that there are certain repressions which occur in the 
first few years of childhood of tendencies which never become 
conscious at all, and that these early, repressions are of very
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great importance, remaining the condition of all later
repressions. This appears to be a particularly doubtful part
of the scheme, Freud backs up his theory of repression with
his doctrine of the active nature of forgetting. It was very
long held that forgetting was simply a passive process which
presented no special problem to the psychologist, and needed
no special explanation. It now seems however that it may be
to some extent an active and purposive process. Freud regards
the whole problem of memory as primarily an affective one.
Vdiile formerly it was held that what is forgotten is forgotten
because it lacked interest it is now claimed that it is not
what lacks interest that is forgotten, but that which carries
a powerful interest of an unpleasant nature. In other words
repression is at work. Past experiences and present duties
which are unpleasant and give rise to conflict are repressed
and apparently forgotten. Some of the instances given to
support this doctrine seem very far-fetched, and Ernest Jones
seems certainly to go far when he claims that all forgetting
is due to repression; but there appear to be some grounds for
the notion, and so far as memory is concerned the centre of
interest for psychologists has shifted from the problem of
(1)
remembering to that of forgetting.
The conception of repression has been considerably 
clarified and developed by Rivers. He makes a valuable 
distinction between repression and what he terms suppression. 
Freud*s terra covered both processes. For Rivers repression 
is the * witting* endeavour ,to banish some.conflicting tendency. 
By suppression he means a much wider process, namely the 
*unwitting* process by which experience becomes inaccessible 
to consciousness. "Experience which is thus suppressed is
(1) Gf. T. H. Pear, "Remembering and Forgetting".
closely associated with instinctive tendencies, the suppression 
becoming necessary through the incompatibility of these tenden­
cies with acquired standards of thought and conduct." Suppres­
sion is a spontaneous process and occurs without the intervention 
of volition. Rivers relates it to the process of forgetting 
and accepts the view that the latter is an active process. He 
shows that the hypothesis of suppression will account for the 
amnesias or pathological forgettings which characterize some of 
the neuroses - what is forgotten in these cases being distressing 
memories which would arouse the most painful feelings. And 
there is no difference. Rivers says, between these examples of 
complete and perhaps life-long suppression and the forgetting 
of the unpleasant and disharmonious experiences of everyday 
life. The most interesting and important part of Rivers’s 
theory of suppression is his relating it to the process of inhi­
bition in neurology, and his demonstration that it is only a 
special variety of a process common to every phase of animal 
activity and possessing considerable biological utility.
Rivers effects this relation by means of the famous experiments 
which he made with Head demonstrating the protopathic and epi- 
critic sensibility of the skin. These experiments showed that 
an earlier and cruder mode of reaction is inhibited and overlaid 
by a later, more discriminative and refined one, whose operation 
is incompatible with it. .Rivers aims at showing that there is 
the same process of inhibition and control of earlier by later 
forms of activity at work at all levels of organic life, 
reflex, sensori-motor and conscious. "In all cases," he says, 
"we have to do with the means by which behaviour, whether of 
human being or animal, is adjusted to the needs with which man 
or animal is confronted. The suppression of conscious experi­
ence is only one example of a process which applies throughout 
the whole of the animal kingdom, and is essential to the proper
(1)
regulation of every form of animal and human activity."
Prom this point of view Rivers offers a valuable criticism of 
Freud’s conception of the endopsychic ’censorship’, and puts 
forward another hypothesis to account for the facts which this 
conception covers. He is dissatisfied with a picturesque 
analogy drawn from a highly specialized social institution.
But some hypothesis is necessary to account for the controlling 
and selective activities of the mind which go on outside the 
realm of conscious awareness. He draws an analogy from 
current theory concerning the nature of the nervous system.
In its functional aspects it is regarded as consisting of a 
number of levels forming a hierarchy in which the lower at any 
stage is controlled by the higher. Rivers assumes a similar 
series of levels of acquired experience each tending to pre­
serve a mode of action characteristic of its origin, yet each 
controlled by those above it and of later development. Rivers 
discusses the whole range of phenomena for the explanation of 
which Freud has recourse to the conception of the censorship, 
and believes that they can be accounted for in this way, 
namely, "as the result of an arrangement of mental levels
(1) "Instinct and the Unconscious", p. 31. Here is another 
passage which gives the key to Rivers’s thought not only on this 
subject, but on the whole problem of mental development and 
behaviour. "The great problem which had to be solved in the 
process of mental development was how mental processes and 
activities should be treated when, being adapted to one kind
of existence or one phase of evolution, fcey had to be modified 
to meet circumstances of a different kind. Two main alternatives 
were open. The earlier activity, with its products, could be 
suppressed and treated so as to make them inaccessible to con­
sciousness when incompatible with later developments; or they 
could be utilised by fusing them, or parts of them, with the 
products of later development. In the first case the suppressed 
activity will maintain its individuality in so far as it con­
tinues to exist; in the second case it loses its individuality 
and becomes merged in the product of the process of fusion, so 
that its nature can only be revealed by a special process of 
analysis." ("The Relation of Complex and Sentiment.")
(2) Ibid. Appi V.
exactly comparable with that now generally recognized to
exist in the nervous system, an arrangement by which more
(1)
recently acquired systems control the more ancient". This 
certainly fits in very well with all that we have seen of the 
nature of mental development.
While Rivers has demonstrated the naturalness and 
necessity of the unwitting process of suppression at all 
levels of mental life he also points out that it is especially 
characteristic of early years and less effective in more 
developed mental life. The^e open conflicts occur and he 
shows that in solving them witting repression is a failure.
To quote him once again: "One of the most striking lessons of 
the new psychiatry teaches us the evil effect of repression, 
meaning by this term the process of putting unpleasant experience 
aside so that it may be forgotten, instead of facing the situa­
tion and tracing it to its sources so that it may be understood 
and suitable measures taken to put the situation right. There 
is an overwhelming mass of evidence to the effect that repression 
does not remove the evil, but that at the best the repressed 
experience remains in existence, always liable to flare up 
into activity later in life, while in the less favourable cases
it leads directly to a whole series of morbid symptoms which
(2)
greatly lower vitality and efficiency". Repression is not 
the way in which emotional impulses out of harmony with the 
rest of the personality and causing conflict can best be met. 
Driven from consciousness they do not simply die out. They 
had to form complexes and to lead a surreptitious life resulting
(1) For a somewhat similar explanation of the facts of 
censorship, cf. J. B. Watson, "The Psychology of Wish-Fulfilment", 
Scientific Monthly, 1916.
(2) "Psychology and Politics", p. 66,
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in all kinds and degrees of intellectual and moral pathology. 
They are kept in restraint only by an exhausting expenditure 
of energy. This is a faulty and uneconomical way of organizing 
the mind. It is in fact a misuse of the. mind, and its further 
consequences will now be pointed out.
IV.
Dissociation is the third of the conceptions which form 
the subject of this chapter. It is often quite wrongly assumed 
to be identical with repression. It is rather a possible con­
sequence of it. Just as conflict may lead to repression so 
repression in its turn tends to bring about the condition 
known as dissociation. This condition involves essentially 
some degree of splitting of the mind and the acquiring of a 
more or less completely independent existence by the split off 
portion. The homogeneity and integrity which should charac­
terize the mind is to a certain extent lost. Repressed 
emotional tendencies and associated experiences do not as we 
have seen, die out. It is these which tend to become dissocia­
ted and independently active. William Brown says of dissocia­
tion that "it is the result of mental conflict and involves 
the repression of emotional states. The repression of any 
emotion involves the danger of dissociation, the ideas accom­
panying the emotion being the more ready to split off from the
(1)
rest of the mind and pursue a subconscious life of their own". 
The study of dissociation in all its forms reveals the existence 
of deep-seated emotional conflict.
The conception is one which has long occupied an impor­
tant place in psycho-pathology. It did so in pre-Freudian 
days, though Freud and his followers have thrown much nev/ light 
on its causation. It covers a wide range of pathological and
(1) "Psychology and Psychotherapy", p. 125,
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semi-pathologioal facts, e.g. somnambulism, hallucinations,
etc. One of the most typical of the pathological phenomena
which illustrate it is that termed the fugue. The patient
passes from time to time into states of which at normal times
he is quite unaware, and while in the fugue state he may perform
complicated behaviour of which there is afterwards no conscious
memory. "The fugue," says Rivers, "usually comes into being
owing to the fact that some unpleasant experience has become
unconscious by the unwitting process of suppression, or is
tending to pass into the unconscious through the agency of
(1)
the witting process of repression." Morton Prince has con­
ducted a famous series of investigations into the more complete 
forms of dissociation and has coined the term ’co-consciousness’
for the independent consciousness which exists in those cases
(2)
of complete dissociation which amount to multiple personality.
In such cases dissociation seems to be an escape from the
stress of conflict which cannot be solved by any other means.
Dissociation has been shown to exist in all degrees and
to play a part in every mind. "Even the normal mind," says
Hart, "does not present that undivided field of consciousness
(3)
which we might be tempted at first sight to ascribe to it."
There is a tendency to dissociation in everyone, because of 
the universal existence of emotional conflicts. No one is a 
complete mental unity. A very familiar phenomenon of the 
normal mind which constitutes a degree of dissociation is the 
functioning of our various interests and systems of sentiments 
in ’logic-tight’ or more strictly ’emotion-tight’, compartments.
(1) Op. cit., p. 73.
(2) See "The Unconscious", cf. also "Awareness, Conscious­
ness, Co-Consciousness and Animal Intelligence". Paper read at 
the International Congress of Psychology, 1923.
(3) Op. cit., p. 42.
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Systems of sentiments which are really incompatible are pre­
served in the mind but are never allowed to meet face to face. 
There is thus lack of complete emotional integrity. To bring 
competing tendencies into a unity is not easy. It requires 
thought and effort. So the mind builds up barriers between 
them. The emotional stress which their conflict would 
occasion is avoided by keeping them apart. It is only in 
the mind however that they can be kept apart. In action the 
lack of integrity is clear enough. In the well-integrated 
mind there are no barriers of this sort.
Throughout this chapter we have been concerned with 
mental processes which may lead to faulty forms of organiza­
tion of the mind with unfortunate reactions on conduct. We 
will endeavour later to indicate what, in the light of all that 
is now known concerning mental make-up,, appears to be the right 
way of organizing the mind.
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^In a paper recently read before the Aristotelian 
Society, C. D* Broad called attention to the looseness with 
which the term ’unconscious’ is at present being used, and 
characterized it as ’a psychological scandal of the first 
magnitude’. He went on to distinguish some six senses in 
which the terra was currently employed, holding that while there 
?/as "no theoretical impossibility in the existence of the 
unconscious or of unconscious states in any of the senses 
defined" it was desirable, for the sake of clearness, to make 
distinctions and to employ different terminology for the 
different senses. And he suggested a new set of terms.
Some such attempt is certainly highly desirable. No 
one can read current psychological literature without feeling 
that on this subject confusion on the grandest scale reigns 
supreme. On every hand one reads of ’unconscious wishes’, 
’unconscious motives', ’unconscious memories’, ’unconscious 
ideas’, and so on; while far-reaching claims of a large and 
general sort are made concerning the influence of these uncon­
scious factors in determining conduct. Much of conduct, it is 
said, is motivated by processes which remain hidden from personal 
consciousness. What is the meaning of all this? Is it 
possible to give it any meaning? Whatever view we may take 
of this subject we cannot simply neglect it in any account of 
the psychological factors involved in conduct. We must
endeavour to determine in what sense, if any, it appears to be
admissable to speak of unconscious mental processes, and whether, 
if such exist, they are of the same or of a different order from 
conscious processes. We must try to decide if there are, as
(1) "Various Meanings of the Term ’Unconscious’."
/3^
is claimed, unconscious determinants of conduct.
Though the current popularity of the conception of
the unconscious is due largely to recent developments in
clinical psychology it did not originate there, or with
psychology at all* The conception is an old one. Before
the days of modern psychology it was put forward in various
forms as a speculative hypothesis by philosophers. It played
an important part in the philosophies of LeibnSz, Schopenhauer,
(1)
Von Hartmann, Pechner and others. It is now claimed that
as a result of the wide range of empirical facts which modern 
investigation hafe brought to light the 'a priori’ speculations 
of these philosophers have received ’a posteriori’ justifica­
tion. There can be no denying the facts. The question is 
whether, in many cases, they are not falsely conceptualized 
in the light of a theory which is open to question, or given a
metaphorical and misleading interpretation. The writings of
(2)
P.W.H. Myers did much to popularize the conception of the uncon­
scious. He termed it the ’subliminal’. He compared the human 
mind to a spectrum, consciousness being the visible part of 
the spectrum and unconscious processes being like the invisible 
infra-red part of it. William James, in his "Varieties of 
Religious Experience", also adopted the hypothesis of the 
unconscious. There is a passage which indicates the wide 
view which he took of it. "It is an inexhaustible fountain- 
head, ever pouring out fresh conceptions as from some unseen 
laboratory, the abode of everything that is latent, the reservoir 
of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. It con- 
tains, for example, such things as all ev w  momentarily inactive 
memories, and it harbours the springs of all our obscurely 
motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices;
(1) For a brief account of the unconscious as conceived by 




our intentions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, 
convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations 
come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and apparently 
they may return to it. In it arise v/hatever mystical experi­
ences we may have, and our automatism, sensory and motor; 
our life in hypnotic or hypnoid conditions, if we are subject
to such conditions; our delusions, fancies, ideas and hysteri-
(1)
cal accidents, if we are hysteric subjects."
It is the clinical psychology which has developed out 
of the work of Freud and Jung which has made this conception 
so very prominent. As the result of his investigations Freud 
has formulated an elaborate scheme of the organization of the 
unconscious and of its relation to the conscious mind. It is 
claimed to be strictly scientific and in sharp contrast to the 
vague and speculative doctrines of the philosophers. Unfor­
tunately when Freudian writings are closely examined it is 
found that investigations have been carried on and conclusion? 
established with very little regard for scientific caution and 
precision. This school have repudiated the traditional 
terminology of psychology but have neglected to define their 
own terms by careful analysis so that the large unanalysed 
conceptions with which they operate tend to become anthropo­
morphic agencies and their whole psychology takes a mythological 
turn. The unconscious, spelt with a capital letter, tends 
to be regarded as standing for some mystical, all-powerful 
entity. As McDougall very well puts it, Freudians "have 
tended to confuse together in one unanalysed mass whatever 
contents and operations of the mind are not clearly conscious 
at each moment, and to make of this an anthropomorphic entity,
a demon, a god in the machine, whose nature and power remain
(2)
entirely unlimited and incomprehensible . Freudian writers,
(1) p. 483.
(2) "The Present Position in Clinical Psychology", Proc.
Roy. 8oc. Med. 1918, cf. also Bertrand Russell: "The Analysis 
oi Mind (pp. 37-8). "Freud and Liie followers, though they
(Gontd.)
though they repudiate the notion of the unconscious as a second 
consciousness, do in fact often write as if it were a second 
self of exactly the same kind as the conscious personality 
which we know. Theoretical difficulties are got over by the 
copious use of metaphor, and it often seems to be forgotten that 
it is metaphor. Spatial metaphors of the unconscious ’region’ 
of the mind ’lying below’ the conscious level and of the uncon­
scious or a ’receptacle’ in which experience is ’stored up’, 
are very inadequate to describe the real nature of the mental. 
Such pictorial views of the mind are very simple and attractive. 
But whatever deficiencies may be discovered in the Freudian 
view of the unconscious, and it will be examined in more detail 
presently, some hypothesis of mental processes outside the 
field of conscious awareness now seems to be necessary for 
psychology.
The question is whether we are to take the terms ’mind’
and ’consciousness’ as being coextensive. Most psychologists
now answer that we must not. As Drever says, "Modern psychology
has realised that the conception of the psychical must be
widened so as to include processes and phenomena other than
(1)
conscious processes". There are of course difficulties 
involved in such a conception; but there are far more diffi­
culties to be met without it. It does not seem possible to 
make sense of all the known facts of mind without some such
(Note Gontd.)
have demonstrated beyond dispute the immense importance of 
’unconscious’ desires in determining our actions and beliefs have 
not attempted the task of telling us what an ’unconscious’ 
desire actually is, and have thus invested their doctrine with 
an air of mystery and mythology which forms a large part of its
popular attractiveness ....... The ’unconscious’ becomes a
sort of underground prisoner, living in a dungeon, breaking in 
at long intervals upon our daylight respectability with dark 
groans and maledictions and strange atavistic lusts. The 
ordinary reader almost inevitably thinks of the underground 
person as another consciousness, prevented by what Freud calls 
the ’censor’ fromimklng his voice heard in company, except on 
rare and dreadful occasions when he shouts so loud that everyone 
hears him and there is a scandal."
(1) "Introduction to the Psychology of Education"
/3f.
hypothesis. Philosophers may find it difficult to make it
fit in with preconceived views of the nature of mind and may
reject it, but psychologists, though they may differ as to its
exact nature, are agreed that, to give a complete account of
(1)
mental life, it is necessary in some sense. Munsterberg’s 
( 2 )
statement made some years ago that "the story of the subconscious 
mind may be told in three words: there is none" will certainly 
not now do. Conscious processes now appear as part of a 
larger whole and consciousness does not seem to be the only 
mode in which the psychical is manifested. The data of con­
sciousness appear in themselves as very incomplete, and uncon­
scious processes are assumed as an hypothesis in order to 
complete the chain of mental causation. To quote Freud, "Con­
scious activities remain disconnected and unintelligible if 
we persist in the claim that everything psychical in us must 
be consciously experienced; whereas they fit into a demonstrated
coherent system if we introduce the unconscious activities
(3)
that are revealed behind".
The only other hypothesis is to regard this whole as 
part psychical and part physiological and to lookwto physiologi­
cal processes for an explanation of anything in consciousness 
which cannot be accounted for by previous events in conscious­
ness. This involves heterogeneous interpretation. It is the 
giving up of the attempt at continuity of psychological explana­
tion and psychologists decline to do this. They prefer, as 
Lloyd Morgan puts it, to adopt the hypothesis that "consciousness 
is based on and in touch with the unconscious which is psychical 
in its nature, and not with physiological processes as such",
(1) For an account of the various psychological theories of 
the unconscious, cf. J. S. Moore: "The Foundations of Psychology", 
Chs. VII and VIII.
(2) See "Subconscious Phenomena" by Munsterberg, Ribot,
Janet, Jastrow, Hart and Morton Prince.
(o) Samralung Kleiner Schriften, Vierte Folge, p. 295.
!Uf>
Before we go on to discuss various theories of the uncon­
scious we will quote a few passages in order to indicate the 
way in which this subject is now being regarded by representa­
tive psychologists* Here are two passages from McDougall:- 
"The reality, the richness and the importance of the subconscious 
operations of the mind have been brought home to many of us 
with a new force by our experience of the functional disorders 
of warfare; for no one working amongst these cases can have 
failed to come across many instances in which the symptoms,
both bodily and mental ....  have been undeniably traceable to
emotional conflicts and repressed tendencies and ideas which
have operated wholly or partly beneath, or without the clear
(1)
consciousness of the patient".
"The difficulty that most men find in accepting the notion 
of unconscious mental processes may be softened for the reader 
if he will reflect that much of his normal mental life is only 
very partially expressed in consciousness; that he often is 
unaware of the motives of his own deliberate actions, and can 
recollect nothing of many past experiences which have contri­
buted to shape his tastes, his moral and intellectual principles, 
his ideals, his character and his motives. And he must recog­
nize that when we use for the description of unconscious mental 
processes, the terras in which we are accustomed to describe
our conscious mental life, we take a certain liberty justified
(2)
by the lack of any other terminology.
From C. S. Myers we may quote the following: "At first 
sight the critical psychologist may hesitate to regard the 
’unconscious’ as ’mental’, preferring to consider it in terms 
of physiological traces or dispositions, left behind in central
(1) Op. cit.
(2) "Functional Nerve Disease", by various authors, p. 185.
/Z//
nervous tissue, which, can only be termed ’mental’ in the 
presence of consciousness. But the result of investigations 
by psycho-analysis and under hypnosis, of studies of disordered, 
alternating and multiple personality, automatic writing, etc, 
must finally force the impartial psychologist to endow the 
unconscious, like the conscious, with a mental aspect. They 
convince him of the necessity of displacing consciousness 
from the pinnacle it has hitherto occupied in psychology. 
Unconsciousness is no longer a mere ’fringe’ around the field 
of consciousness. It becomes the basis, the foundation on 
which consciousness depends, the nourishment from which it 
draws its very existence. We begin to see the ’superficiality’ 
of consciousness, and to recognize that almost any mental event 
may happen with or without the accompaniment of personal 
consciousness. Such consciousness has been evolved to facili­
tate choice between alternative reactions - to bring the entire
unity or personality of the organism into more complete
(1)
relation to its environment .
(2)
A final quotation is from T. P. Nunn. Recent investi­
gations, he says, ...... have shown on the one hand hov/ large
a part is played in our conscious behaviour by hormic factors 
of which we may be, at the time, utterly unconscious - that is, 
that our conative processes are rarely purely conative, but 
almost always embrace important componen^fbelonging to the 
lower strata of our bafflingly complex organism. On the other 
hand, they have illuminated in a striking way the continuity 
of our conative development, showing that the adult mind is, 
so to speak, but the visible surface of a living structure whose 
deeper layers are hormic elements dating from infancy or even 
beyond, and liable, in certain circumstances, still to break 
free from the systems into which they have become merged and to 
claim unfettered expression".
(1) "The Independence of Psychology", "Discovery", Nov. 1920.
(2) "Education; Its Data and First Principles", p. 31.
II.
Freud claims that his doctrine of the unconscious has
been arrived at by purely inductive means, from the amassing
(1)
of facts in various spheres of psychological inquiry. The 
cnief of these sources are: 1, Dreams. "The interpretation
of dreams," says Freud, "is the ’via regia’ to a knowledge of 
tne unconscious." 2, Errors. "The psycho-pathology of everyday 
life. 3. Wit, 4. The Neuroses. As a result of the evidence 
froiii these sources he has been led to a scheme of the unconscious 
and of mind generally somewhat as follows.
He divides those mental processes which are not accom­
panied by consciousness into two groups: those constituting 
the pre- or fore-consciousness (as Vor-bewusste), and those 
constituting the unconscious ’proper’ (das Unbewusste). The 
pre-conscious corresponds somewhat to the subliminal of the 
older psychologists. These two systems differ considerably 
in origin and in characteristics. Of the two it is the uncon­
scious proper, which, resulting from repression, is of funda­
mental importance in the Freudian scheme. The contents of the 
pre-conscious are simply latent and are capable of entering 
consciousness if their psychic energy is sufficient. But the 
contents of the unconscious, though strong and active cannot, 
because of the censorship, normally enter consciousness, and 
can only be discovered by the use of some special method.
This difference is explained by a consideration of the origin 
of the two systems. This is a somewhat obscure part of the 
Freudian psychology and it is difficult to give a brief account 
of it. Apparently the two systems have their origin in two 
types of psychical processes - what Freud terms the ’primary’
(1) Gf. "The Interpretation of Dreams", last chapter: 
"Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis"; also for an exposi­
tion of Freud’s views which has his approval, I. Levine: "The 
Unconscious", cf. also William Brown: "Freud’s Theory of the 
Unconscious". British Journal of Psychology, Vol. VI.
process and the ’secondary’ process. These two types of 
processes are the precursors of the unconscious and the pre- 
conscious systems respectively. The primary process, actuated 
oy what is termed the ’pleasure principles’ is primitive and 
infantile; it aims at the procuring of immediately pleasurable 
satisfaction and at the avoidance of pain. In early years 
it automatically regulates mental life and strives to satisfy 
desires as they arise by regressing to previous satisfactions. 
But nhis gives no permanent satisfaction and very soon the 
fundamental tendency towards pleasure-seeking receives a check 
from the facts of the real world. It is found to be inadequate 
Thus arises the secondary process, actuated by the ’reality 
principle’, whose purpose it is to adapt the individual to the 
demands of the real world. It is regarded hardly as a separate 
process, but rather as genetically related to the primary 
process and as a complication of it. The secondary process 
also aims at satisfaction, but at securing a more permanent 
satisfaction. "The ego learns," says Freud, "that it must go 
without immediate satisfaction, learn to endure a degree of 
pain, and altogether forego certain sources of pleasure. It 
becomes reasonable, is no longer controlled by the pleasure 
principle but follows the reality principle." The secondary 
process "without intending to renounce the ultimate attainment 
of pleasure, demands and carries through the postponement of 
satisfaction as a long detour towards pleasure". The secondary 
process thus exercises an inhibitory function, controlling and 
guiding the primitive and infantile tendencies and endeavouring 
to adapt them to social and moral standards. And as develop- 
ment proceeds it inevitably conflicts with the tendencies of 
the primary process. The ’wishes’ of the two types of process 
do not coincide; what is pleasurable to the one gradually 
becomes painful to the other. As a result of this affective 
conflict there arises the mechanism of repression and so the 
formation of the unconscious and the preconscious systems of the
AfJ
mind. The unconscious system retains all the characteristics 
of the primary process, is guided solely by the pleasure principle 
and can do nothing but ’wish’. The preconscious system, in 
touch with reality, retains the characteristics of the secondary 
process. It is the source of the repressing forces. The 
unconscious comprises essentially infantile tendencies, and 
wishes which comprise its nucleus throughout life. They are 
later reinforced by memories and desires which are out of 
harmony with conscious life. All are regarded as retaining 
their activity. The unconscious is closely related to the 
instinbts. "If," says Freud, "there are inherited psychical 
formations in human beings anything analogous to the instincts 
of animals, this constitutes the nucleus of the unconscious.
Later there is added to this that which has been put aside as 
useless during the development of childhood." The content of 
consciousness at any time is, for Freud, really part of the pre­
conscious system. Between the preconscious and the unconscious 
there is continual conflict. The conflict between them is 
paraphrased as a conflict between the animal and the human in 
man, between the primitive and the civilized, the infantile 
and the adult. The term unconscious as used by Freud stands 
not only for the sùm of repressed experience but also for "a 
regular, inevitable phase in the processes constituting psychic 
activity". And so we reach the conclusion that, "mental pro­
cesses are essentially unconscious, and those which are conscious 
are merely isolated acts and parts of the whole psychic entity". 
Consciousness thus becomes a sort of sense organ perceiving 
certain processes set up outside it.
"The unconscious is the larger circle which includes 
within itself the smaller circle of the conscious; everything 
conscious has its preliminary step in the unconscious, whereas 
the unconscious may stop with this step and still, claim full 
reality as a psychic activity. Properly speaking the unconscious
is  bhe r e a l  psychic; i t s  inner nature  is  ju s t  as unknown to  
us as the r e a l i t y  o f the e x te rn a l w o rld , and i t  is  f i r s t  as 
im p e r fe c tly  repo rted  to  us through the data of consciousness 
as is  the e x te rn a l world through the in d ic a tio n s  o f our 
sensory organs".
Before we go on to make any comments on Freud ’ s theory
we may look a t  the th e o ries  o f the unconscious developed by
(1)
Jung and by R iv e rs . Jung de fin es  the unconscious, not very  
h e lp f u l ly ,  as "the t o t a l i t y  o f a l l  psychic phenomena th a t  lack 
the q u a l i t y  o f consciousness". For him th ere  is  an im portan t 
d is t in c t io n  between the ’ p e rs o n a l’ and the ’ c o l le c t iv e ’ uncon­
sc io u s . The personal unconscious is  the r e s u lt  o f the l i f e  
experience o f the in d iv id u a l and is  unique in  each person.
The c o l le c t iv e  unconscious is  the r e s u lt  o f the experience  
o f the ra c e , is  in h e r ite d  by the in d iv id u a l and is  common to  
a l l .  The personal unconscious is  "the re c e p ta c le  o f a l l  
lo s t  memories and o f a l l  contents as y e t too fe e b le  to  become 
conscious". There is  a ls o , fo llo w in g  Freud, rep res s io n  o f 
p a in fu l  thoughts and fe e lin g s . New products can o r ig in a te  
from the a s so c ia tio n  and combination o f these unconscious 
contents  -  dreams are examples. The personal unconscious is  
thus made up o f "bhe fo rg o tte n , the repressed , the s u b lira in a lly  
p e rc e iv e d , thought and f e l t " .  But more im portant in  Jung’ s 
scheme is  the c o lle c t iv e  unconscious -  the r a c ia l  background 
o f the mind. I t  consists  o f the in s t in c ts  and the "archetypes  
o f apprehension", i . e .  the p r im o rd ia l forms o f thought and 
fe e l in g  common to  a l l .  These l a t t e r  are the source o f a l l  the 
m yths, legends and re lig io n s  o f hum anity. In  normal l i f e  they  
are  more or less  d isgu ised  but appear in  dreams and more mani­
f e s t ly  in  d isordered  s ta te s . Jung a lso  appears to  regard  the
(1 ) " In s t in c t  and the Unconscious." C o n trib u tio n  to  
Symposium, B r i t is h  Jo urna l o f Psychology, V o l. X.
c o lle c b îv e  unconscious as an in e x h a u s tib le  re s e rv o ir  from which 
m a te r ia l can be drawn fo r  mental development throughout l i f e .  
Here h is  views shade o f f  in to  a vague m ysticism .
R ivers  has taken much from Freud, but has a lso  re je c te d  
much. And he has endeavoured to  give to  the d o c tr in e  o f the 
unconscious a basis in  b io log y  as w e ll as in  psychology.
R ive rs  begins h is  account by in d ic a t in g  the senses in  which  
he does not use the term unconscious. He does not use i t  to  
r e f e r  to  m arg inal awareness or to the la rg e  body o f experience 
which is  not in  consciousness a t  the moment but is  capable o f  
becoming conscious under ap p ro p ria te  circum stances. " In  so 
f a r  as the terra unconscious a p p lie s  to experience , i t  will be 
l im ite d  to  such as is  not capable o f being brought in to  the  
f i e l d  o f consciousness by any o f the o rd in a ry  processes o f 
memory or a s s o c ia tio n , but can on ly  be revea led  under c e r ta in  
s p e c ia l co nd ition s  such as s leep , hypnosis, the method of f re e  
a s s o c ia tio n  and c e r ta in  fu r th e r  s ta te s ,"  As an example of 
such experience R ivers gives the case o f a c laustro ph ob ic  
p a t ie n t ,  an example which has become very  w e ll known. I t  
i l lu s t r a t e s  the ex istence o f experience shut o f f  from conscious­
ness y e t r e ta in in g  i t s  a c t iv i t y  and being capable o f a f fe c t in g  
consciousness pro found ly . The question  is  how and v/hy does 
experience become unconscious in  th is  way. The answer i^  by 
suppression and because i t  is  p a in fu l and would in te r fe r e  w ith  
the com fort and happiness o f conscious l i f e .  O ften experience  
o r ig in a l ly  n e u tra l may, because o f i t s  a s s o c ia tio n  w ith  th is  
p a in f u l ly  toned experience , be a lso  suppressed and become 
in a c c e s s ib le  to  consciousness. The content o f the unconscious 
th e n , accord ing to R iv e rs , is  "made up o f a f fe c t iv e  elements 
and co n ative  tendencies and in t e l le c t u a l  experiences associated  
th e re w ith " . And since there is  so close a relation oetv/eoii
(1 )  " In s t in c t  and the Unconscious."
/l^ L
a f fe c t  and in s t in c t  R ivers  says fu r th e r  th a t "the sp e c ia l 
fu n c tio n  o f the unconscious is  to a c t as a storehouse o f 
in s t in c t iv e  re a c tio n s  and tendencies to g e th er w ith  the e x p e r i­
ences assoc ia ted  w ith  them, when they are but o f harmony w ith  
the p r e v a il in g  content o f consciousness, so th a t ,  when p re s e n t, 
they produce pa in  and d is co m fo rt" . As was in d ic a te d  in  d is ­
cussing R iv e rs ’ s views on suppression, he g e n e ra lises  w id e ly  
as to  the cause o f i t .  In  a l l  forms o f l i f e  experience  
asso c ia ted  w ith  e a r l i e r  modes o f fu n c tio n in g  becomes uncon­
scious when la t e r  modes develop. " In  many forms o f anim al 
l i f e  the p e rs is te n c e  in  conscious form o f experience gained  
in  one phase when the anim al has passed in to  another would be 
so d is tu rb in g  as to  render ex is ten ce  im p o ss ib le ,"  The same 
p r in c ip le  a p p lie s  to the in f a n t i le  and a d u lt  experiences o f  
man, "There is  d e f in i t e  reason why the conscious s ta te s  con­
nected w ith  in f a n t i le  re a c tio n s  should become unconscious."
They do th is  when they are  in com patib le  w ith  conscious l i f e  
in  i t s  la t e r  phases,
I I I .
There seem to  be some grounds fo r  the d is t in c t io n  which 
Freud makes between the ’p leasure  p r in c ip le ’ and the ’ r e a l i t y  
p r in c ip le ’ , which are  h e ld  to  be so im portan t in  b r in g in g  the  
unconscious and preconscious systems o f the mind in to  b e in g .
A somewhat s im ila r  d is t in c t io n  is  made in  d i f f e r e n t  terms by 
o th er p s yc h o lo g is ts . But in  the Freud ian  scheme they rem ain  
a b s tra c t ’ p r in c ip le s ’ and e x p la in  l i t t l e .  As in  the case o f  
so many Freudian conceptions no attem pt is  made to  analyse  
them fu r th e r .  The d iv is io n  o f mind in to  consciousness, the  
preconscious and the unconscious is  c e r ta in ly  open to  c r i t ic is m .  
In  p a r t ic u la r  i t  does not seem p o s s ib le  to  m a in ta in  the sharp 
d is t in c t io n  between the unconscious and the preconscious.
Under fu r th e r  in v e s t ig a t io n  i t  tends to  break down.
fui
(1)
Varendonck, fo r  example, in  concluding h is  study o f day­
dreams, says; "This in v e s t ig a t io n  tends to  establish that the 
unconscious, fo re -consc ious and conscious thought processes  
are th re e  m a n ife s ta tio n s , v a ry in g  on ly  in  degree, o f the same 
fu n c t io n " . Others have p o in ted  out th a t the ’ mechanisms’ 
which are supposed to  c h a ra c te r iz e  the unconscious only and to  
be observable, fo r  example, in  the dream, a re  not confined to 
the unconscious, but that in  some degree they are  characteristic 
of a l l  mental processes.
But the fundamental error o f the Freud ian  psychology, 
and the cause o f a l l  the confusion is  the interpretation of the  
unconscious in  terms o f consciousness and i t s  processes, 
th in k in g  o f i t ,  in  f a c t ,  as a second consciousness w ith  processes  
o f the same order as conscious ones. We read o f unconscious 
id e a s , memories, thoughts , em otions. These a re , in  f a c t ,  two 
m ental systems each w ith  i t s  ovm thoughts and wishes. No 
distinction is  made as to e s s e n tia l n a tu re  between conscious  
s ta te s  and unconscious states. May i t  not be, as a m a tte r o f  
f a c t ,  th a t  what are  termed unconscious processes are n e c e s s a r ily  
r a d ic a l ly  different from conscious ones; Freud speaks o f  
unconscious ’ideas’ and unconscious th in k in g , and appears to  
regard  them as^the same sort as corresponding conscious processes. 
He w r ite s : "An unconscious idea is  one which vm do not perceive, 
the ex is tence  o f which we are  n e verth e le ss  ready to  concede on 
the ground o f indications and proofs from other sources". And 
again  he says th a t  the unconscious denotes "not m erely la te n t  
thoughts in  g e n e ra l, but is  confined  to  ideas o f a d e f in i te  
dynamic c h a ra c te r , which do not reach consciousness in  s p ite  
o f t h e ir  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  and in te n s ity " .  E rn est Jones in  an
(1 ) "The Psychology o f Day Dreams."
(1)
article writes of the difficult question of determining the
d iffe re n c e s  between unconscious ideas and conscious ideas and
o f what happens to the form er when i t  is  converted in to  the
l a t t e r .  I t  is  c le a r ly  assumed throughout th a t  ideas which
have been in  consciousness may be banished to  the unconscious
and th e re  continue to  e x is t  as ideas, or th a t  ideas which
have never been in  consciousness can take t h e ir  r is e  and
(2)
e x is t  in  the unconscious. This n o tio n  that ideas can thus 
e x is t  in  two c o n d itio n s , now conscious and now unconscious, 
seems to be fundam enta lly  erroneous. I t  is  a r e l i c  o f the 
psychology o f H e rb e rt. Ideas are no t e n t i t ie s  capable o f 
being s to red  away in  the mind in  this way and brought out 
again  some tim e l a t e r .  As W illia m  James po in ted  out: "a p e r­
m anently e x is t in g  idea or *V o rs te llu n g ’ which makes i t s  appear­
ance befo re  the fo o t l ig h ts  o f consciousness at p e r io d ic a l
(3 )
in te r v a ls  is  as m yth o lo g ica l an e n t i t y  as the Jack o f Spades". 
M ental processes, conscious and unconscious, are  processes and 
not enduring s tru c tu re s ; they take their r is e  and disappear 
and are succeeded by o th e rs . The qu estion  whether the uncon­
scious conta ins ideas and images and whether unconscious id e a ­
t io n  e x is ts  has been w e ll discussed by Lloyd Morgan. He asks; 
"Does th a t  which we c a l l  the unconscious depend on the presence
(1 ) B r i t is h  Journal o f Psychology, M edica l S e c t .,  V o l. I .
(2.) . Many psycho log is ts  are g u i l t y  o f w r it in g  as i f  this were 
so: c f .  G. S. Myers ( op. c i t . ):  " In to  the  unconscious we are  
p e rp e tu a lly , more or less  unconsciously, banishing percepts  
and ideas which are in com patib le  and d isco rd an t with ou|f 
general m ental l i f e .  From the unconscious emerge not on ly  
complexes or parts o f complexes which have been th e re  repressed, 
but a lso  new fo rm atio n s " . O f. a lso  W illia m  Brown (Psychology  
and Psychotherapy, p. 26): "Memories, impulses and m otives when 
not a c tu a l ly  be fo re  the mind, i . e .  conscious may s t i l l  retain 
a l l  th e i r  o th er m ental characteristics, and from t h e ir  p lace  
o u ts id e  consciousness may continue to  e x e rt in flu e n c e s  upon 
consciousness. They form part of the unconscious but are s t i l l  
p sych ica l in  n a tu re " .
(3 ) "Principles", V o l. I ,  p . 236. O f. a lso  J . Dunlap, 
"M ystic ism , Freudianism  and S c ie n t i f ic  Psychology": "The Freudian  
doctrine o f consciousness as a stuff which a f t e r  i t  has functioned 
is  sto red  away somewhere l i k e  the p r in t e r ’ s type which is  rerAwned 
to its case after it has been used, has no more e m p ir ic a l b as is  
than has an e x a c tly  corresponding conception o f f in g e r  movements 
which a f t e r  having occurred are  somewhere s to red  up^as m otion- 
l e 8s movements" ,
o f images and ideas; or are images and ideas the c o g n itiv e
ra im en t which the unconscious puts on a t  the emergent le v e ls
o f p e rc e p tiv e  and r e f le c t iv e  consciousness. The qu estion  in
b r ie f  r e a l l y  comes to  th is ;  are th e re  what we may com prehensively
speak o f as memories in  the unconscious? In  much p resen t-d ay
re s u s c ita t io n  o f H e rb a rtia n  notions (which some o f us thought
were l i t t l e  b e tte r  than p ictu resque mythology long ago d iscarded
as o b so le te ) the unconscious is  peopled w ith  such memories,
w ith  images, id eas , wishes and thoughts , l iv in g  to g e th e r , as
P ro fessor James Ward puts i t ,  " l ik e  shades on the banks o f the
S ty x " . Is  th is  so? I t  is  a g a in s t th is  s o rt o f th in g  th a t
the b e h a v io u ris t r is e s  in  vigorous p ro te s t;  and swinging h is
pendulum too fa r  ( in  some cases drops psychology overboard and
proceeds on h is  course on the b io lo g ic a l sh ip . For those who
cannot go to th is  extreme, the a l te r n a t iv e  view is  th a t
memories have being on ly  in  s u p ra lim in a l consciousness and
th a t  the unconscious is  in  no wise im a g in a i. I t  is  no t y e t
c o g n it iv e . Only through c o g n itio n  a t the h ig h e r le v e l  o f
r e f le c t iv e  or p e rc ep tiv e  consciousness does i t  begin to  put on
the ra im ent o f images, ideas and the r e s t ,  and thus f in d  expres-
(1)
sion in  the s u p ra lim in a l f i e l d  . He says elsew here: "There
are  ....................unconscious p s y ch ica l processes which in  la rg e
measure (and perhaps e s p e c ia lly  in  dreams) serve to  determ ine
the na tu re  and course o f conscious id e as , but th e re  a re  in  the
unconscious no id e as , no re p re s e n ta tio n s , no memory images
such as are  developed in  consciousness and th e re  on ly  ............
ideas and memory-images are  no more p reserved , as such, in  the
m ind, than sounds, as such, are preserved in  the gramophone 
(2) 
re co rd .
Th is  same l in e  o f c r i t ic is m  may be brought a g a in s t R ivers  
fo r  he speaks o f the unconscious as a * storehouse* o f experience .
(1 ) "Consciousness and the Unconscious", P re s id e n t ia l  
Address to  S ection  o f Psychology, B r i t is h  A ssn ., 1921.
(2) A r t .  "Psychology and the M edica l C u rricu lu m ", Journal 
o f Neurology and Psychopathology, N o v ., 1920.
Now it is perfectly true, as he says, that every one of us 
has been the subject o f a va s t body o f experience o f which we 
have no m an ifes t memory and which does not enter manifest 
consciousness. I t  is  also obvious th a t  th is  influences our 
thoughts and a c tio n s , fe e lin g s  and sentim ents. But i t  seems 
to be sim ply confusing to  speak o f th is  as ’ unconscious e x p e r i­
ence’. In  the case o f the c laus tro ph ob ic  p a t ie n t  which R ivers  
quotes is  i t  necessary to  believe that the thought o f the
enclosed space persisted in  order to  explain the existence of 
(1)
the fear. I t  is  not n e c e s s a r ily  true th a t  because an e f fe c t
p e rs is ts  and develops i t s  cause a lso  p e rs is ts .  Something
c e r ta in ly  p e rs is ts ;  the question is  what? This is  a very
difficult question and opens up the whole problem o f retention.
In  th is  particular case i t  may be said  th a t  not the exp erien ce ,
but some tra c e  which i t  leaves p e rs is ts .  Of the intrinsic
nature o f such traces noth ing  is  known, but they  are probably
q u ite  u n lik e  the experience i t s e l f .  They are not what are
(2)
meant by unconscious m ental processes. Broad has suggested 
th a t  such tra c e s  be termed ’ mnemic continuants’, such continuant; 
being fa c ts  o f mental structure,not o f experience. Of the  
total ’ mnemic mass’ he recognises that some p a rts  are more 
ac ces s ib le  than o th ers ; some are in a c c e s s ib le  fo r  the reason 
which Freud and R ivers  give, namely th a t  i f  they were re v iv e d  
and present in  consciousness, they would give rise to  p a in fu l  
feelings. The im portan t point about such factors is  not th a t  
they ijvere unpleasant once but that now, i f  aroused, they would 
be experienced as u n p leasan t.
'!
(1) A recent reviewer points out how easily psycho-patholo­
gists, in observing their cases, s l ip  from the statement, "It 
was as i f  he thought", to "he must have thought unconsciously".
(2 ) Op. c i t .
IV .
I t  is  much e a s ie r  to  f in d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  c u rre n t 
conceptions o f the unconscious than to  d iscover a s a t is fa c to ry  
way o f reg a rd in g  i t  and i t s  processes. As we have seen Lloyd  
Morgan c r i t ic is e s  the view th a t  the unconscious consists of 
ideas and images which have been conscious and are  now ’ s to red  
away’. He a ls o  suggests a p o s it iv e  way o f reg a rd in g  i t .  He 
d is tin g u is h e s , as we s h a ll see later, d i f f e r e n t  levels of 
p s yc h ic a l in te g ra t io n . One o f these le v e ls  o f integration, 
ly in g  below the perceptual level, is  ours by in h e r ita n c e ,
and i t  is  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by what is  termed ’ unconscious en jo y -
(1)
m ent’ . I t  contains the instincts. " I t s  in te g ra te d  form is 
in h e r ite d  and not acq u ire d , though i t  may be s w i f t ly  r e - in t e ­
grated a t the p e rc e p tiv e  or ( l a t e r )  a t  the r e f le c t iv e  le v e l .
As such aid in  i t s  p rim ary form as i n i t i a l l y  given, i t  is  an 
a n c e s tra l bequest tra n s m itte d  as p s yc h ica l legacy through the  
p a re n ts . Of i t  the individual is the unconscious heir." A 
g en era tio n  ago th is  would have been regarded as p h y s io lo g ic a l 
in  n a tu re . Now i t  is  regarded as the psychical basis  fo r  
conscious m ental l i f e .  Of the unconscious ’enjoyment’ by 
which i t  is  c h a ra c te r iz e d  "much is  and may rem ain the su b lim in a l 
basis  fo r  a s u p ra -lim in a l su p ers tru c tu re  a t  the le v e ls  o f con­
scious in te g ra t io n " . But i t  does not n e c e s s a rily  remain sub­
liminal. I t  may surge up into consciousness w ith  a strongly 
a f fe c t iv e  tone and may th e re  c o n f l ic t  w ith  what is  p e rc e p tu a lly  
or r e f le c t iv e ly  in te g ra te d  or i t  may be woven in to  i t s  s tru c tu re .  
And th e re  is  in  the mind not on ly  ascending integration o f th is  
s o r t , but descending integration as w e l l .  "W e ll-e s ta b lis h e d
(1 ) The term ’enjoyment’ in  th is  connection is  borrowed 
from A lexander. I t  is  used to  designate  that which charac­
te r iz e s  a l l  p sych ica l events and which is  q u a l i f ie d  by the 
adjectives ’conscious’ or ’unconscious’.
fil
r e f le c t iv e  in te g ra t io n  may assume the s ta tu s  o f u n re f le c t iv e
in te g r a t io n ,  and w e ll-e s ta b lis h e d  u n re f le c t iv e  in te g ra t io n
th a t  o f the unconscious." Lloyd Morgan i l lu s t r a t e s  the
in flu e n c e  o f th is  unconscious in te g ra t io n  in  conscious l i f e
by means o f the c re a tiv e  a r t i s t .  His r e a l  work is  done, not
a t  the conscious le v e l ,  but "unconscious in te g ra t io n  o f the
em otional order precedes the imagery in  which i t  is  expressed
  ...........  the c lo th in g  in  imagery depends on the p r io r  a f fe c t iv e
in te g ra t io n ,  as y e t unconscious". Ideas and images are the
c o g n itiv e  ra im ent which unconscious products o f an a f fe c t iv e
s o rt put on. On th is  view then th e re  are  no unconscious
thoughts , but unconscious fa c to rs  a f fe c t  thoughts; no unconscious
w ishes, but unconscious tendencies fo r  the conscious fo rm u la-
(1)
t io n  o f them.
One fe e ls  th a t on th is  su b jec t the d i f f i c u l t y  is  very  
la r g e ly  one o f the la c k  o f s u ita b le  terms in  which to  describe  
unconscious processes. The use o f the terms used to  describe
conscious l i f e  sim ply r e s u lts ,  as we have seen, in  confusion .
(2)
As L a ird  puts i t  in  the course o f  a re ce n t a r t ic le ," w e  may 
speak thoroughly  i n t e l l i g i b l y  (a ltho ug h  b a rb aro u s ly ) o f uncon­
scious ’ tre n d s ’ and ’ im pu ls ion s ’ and ’ u rg es ’ as w e ll as o f
unconscious complexes o f these  .............. i t  may very  w e ll happen
however th a t  th e re  is  no i n t e l l i g i b l e  meaning in  speaking o f
unconscious w ishes, or d e s ire s , or memories, or ex p e c ta tio n s , 
or emotions or reso lves  or id e a s " .
Perhaps the c le a re s t conception o f the nature  o f the  
unconscious and its processes, in c lu d in g  as w e ll a suggestion
(1 ) A re c e n t w r i t e r ,  H. T. L o v e ll ( "Dreams") p ro te s ts  
ag a in s t the conscious f la v o u r  o f the Freudian term ’ w ish ’ and
suggests re p la c in g  i t  by ’ a p la y  o f v a lu e s ’ . By ’ p la y  o f values’
he means "those u n c o n tro lle d  changes in  fe e lin g  which are never 
m atters  o f express v o l i t io n ,  but ra th e r  h in ts  a t  the vary in g  
courses taken by our p references and avoidances".
(2 ) " Is  the Conception o f the Unconscious o f any Value in  
Psychology"? C o n tr ib u tio n  to  a Symposium, "M in d " ,"d u ly  1922.
(1)
towards the use o f a, new term , is  th a t put forw ard by Dr ever.
He thinlcs th a t  the most prom ising way o f reg a rd in g  the uncon­
scious is  to  use the term  to  cover those p s ych ica l determ inants  
o f experience or conscious process, which from th e ir  nature  
can never become conscious. He proposes, th en , to d is t in g u is h  
two types o f m ental f a c t ,  v iz .  conscious process, and uncon­
scious determ inants o f conscious process. So regarded the  
unconscious i t s e l f  includes two types o f f a c t .  The f i r s t  
type are  fa c ts  o f m ental s tru c tu re , which though determ inants  
o f conscious process and conduct are  no t themselves conscious.
The most im portant o f these s t ru c tu ra l fa c ts  are  the in h e r ite d  
in s t in c ts .  They form the basis  fo r  the development o f o th er  
s t ru c tu ra l d is p o s itio n s  such as the sentim ents. "From a 
c e r ta in  p o in t o f v ie w ,"  says D rever, "we m ight even id e n t i f y  
the in s t in c ts  w ith  th is  s t ru c tu ra l unconscious and regard  a l l  
the o ther m ental s tru c tu re s  -  sentim ents, h a b its , p re ju d ic e s , 
customs -  as m o d ific a tio n s  o f these prim ary  m ental s tru c tu re s  
w ith  which the human being s ta r ts  in  l i f e ,  th a t  i s ,  o f the  
o r ig in a l  unconscious." But th e re  is  another s e t o f fa c ts  
which goes to  make up the unconscious. These m ental s tru c tu re s ,  
as p a rts  o f a l iv in g  organism, can never be e n t i r e ly  in a c t iv e  
or in e r t .  So f a r  as they are a c tiv e  in  r e la t io n  to  en v iro n ­
m ental co n d itio n s  they are  d ir e c t  determ inants o f conscious 
process. But they may a lso  be a c t iv e  in  r e la t io n  to  one 
another and in  th is  way give r is e  to processes which Drever  
proposes to  term ’ endopsychic’ . Such endopsychic processes 
may never become conscious, y e t may in d ir e c t ly  e xerc ise  a 
profound in flu e n c e  on m ental l i f e .  " i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to  bear 
in  mind," D rever says, " th a t the mere ex is tence  o f a strong  
sentim ent can determ ine the in h ib i t io n  or the g re a t ly  m od ified
a c t iv i t y ,  even o f n a tu ra l tendencies , by e x e rc is in g  a force or
(1 ) " In tro d u c tio n  to  the Psychology o f F d u c a tio n ", Ch. I I .
’ te n s io n ’ -  i f  we may so designate i t  -  which cannot fo r  a 
moment be confused w ith  the psych ica l in te g ra t io n  th a t  is  con­
sciousness. Such a c t iv i t y  o f the vario us  m ental elements 
in  the unconscious r e la t iv e ly  to  one another we s h a ll speak 
o f throughout as ’ endopsychic p ro c e s s e s '."  As examples o f 
such endopsychic processes th ere  m ight be c ite d  the phenomena 
o f ’ re a c tio n  fo rm a tio n ’ , ’ compromise fo rm a tio n ’ , and ’ p ro je c ­
t io n ’ mentioned a t  the end o f the la s t  ch ap te r. D rever 
b e lie v e s  th a t the phenomena o f ’ censorsh ip ’ can a lso  f in d  
e x p la n a tio n  in  terms o f endopsychic process.
Thus where psychologists used to recognise on ly  one 
type o f m ental f a c t ,  namely conscious process, we now have 
to  recognise th re e . There a re : 1 . conscious processes, 2 . 
s tru c tu ra l m ental elem ents, 3 . the processes in vo lved  in  
t h e i r  in te ra c t io n  -  endopsychic processes. Just as i t  is  
the m e r it  o f Shand and McDougall and o thers th a t  they have 
c a lle d  a t te n t io n  to the second type o f  m ental f a c t ,  so, i t  
is  s a id , i t  is  the m e rit o f Freud and Jung and th e ir  fo llo w e rs  
th a t  they have c a lle d  a t te n t io n  to  the th ir d  type -  endopsychic 
processes.
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There is at the present moment no lack of insistence on 
the fact that the place of intelligence in conduct is small, 
a good deal smaller, we are told, than used to be imagined; 
but there are few attempts to determine what precisely its 
place and function is. It may quite well turn out that it 
is no less important than used to be maintained, but simply 
of a somewhat different nature and more complexly related to 
other mental functions than was supposed.
When we come to consider what intelligence is and what 
its effect in mind and conduct we find ourselves faced with the 
long controversy concerning its relation to instinct. While 
this controversy can hardly be said to be settled, it does 
show signs of clearing up. It has passed through several 
phases. As was pointed out in discussing the nature of 
instinct, it is not so long since instinct was regarded as 
characteristic of animal life and behaviour and peculiar to 
it, while intelligence was regarded as being equally charac­
teristic of man. The two stood in sharp contrast. Later, 
with the coming of the doctrine of the continuity of animal 
and human development, it was admitted that there were certain 
instinctive factors in human activity and that there was a degree 
of intelligence in some of the activities of animals. The 
problem was thus raised of the relation between the two and 
attempts were made at their definition and demarcation. This
problem was fully discussed some years ago in a well-known
(1)
symposium on "Instinct and Intelligence". Of this Symposium
(2)
E. L. Thorndike has written, "The eminent psychologists ....
(1) By 0.8. Myers, G.P. Stout, W. McDougall, C. Lloyd Morgan 
and Wildon Carr. British Journal of Psychology, Vol. III.
(2) "The Original Nature of Man", p. 12.
again and again speak of instinct as if it were something 
like a heart or a thyroid gland or a ’memory’ or an ’imagina­
tion’ which did this and that for a man’. They regarded it, 
he says, as some sort of a mystical faculty. This has been 
the trouble right through the whole discussion, not only with 
regard to instinct, but also with regard to intelligence.
They have been abstractly conceived as two separate faculties, 
different in nature, and this way of looking at them has 
obscured the whole problem. Fortunately this method of
regarding them is now disappearing and the problem is assuming a
(1)
new and more promising form. The ’false disjunction and
opposition’, as McDougall calls it, of instinct and Intelligence, 
is now breaking down. In the Symposium just referred to 
Myers had advanced the view that instinct and intelligence 
are inseparable, that there is but one psychological function, 
namely *instinct^intelligence’. Since he wrote, this point of 
view has been increasingly widely accepted. Drever, for 
example, in his ’Instinct in Man’, comes to a conclusion similar 
to that of Myers, though his argument is different. He con­
cludes; 1. that there is no instinctive behaviour without an 
intelligent factor, and 2. that there is no Intelligent 
behaviour without an instinctive factor. He further agrees 
with Myers that there is only one psychological function which
(1) According to a recent writer this ’faculty’ way of 
looking at the mind still persists as widely as ever. Spearman 
says in his ’’The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of 
Cognition", (p. 25); "Just the same actual doctrine is still 
freely accepted under very numerous synonyms as ’powers’, 
’capacities’, ’abilities’, ’properties’, and so forth.
Despite all protests to the contrary this ancient doctrine 
has in good truth not even yet been abandoned. Modern authors 
seem rather to have been incapable of abandoning it - for they
have discovered nothing acceptable to take its place .....
There has been preserved in unabated, nay enhanced degree, the 
most harmful fallacy it ever engendered, namely that formal 
powers function unitarily. The intelligence itself is an 
arch-faculty".
he prefers to Call ’experience** The only outstanding 
exception to this point of view in regard to instinct and 
intelligence is the view of Bergson* He has maintained that 
they represent two divergent paths in the evolution of mind. 
Instinct reaches its highest point of development in the 
insect world, intelligence in man. They are radically 
different in nature and there is no continuity between them.
It now seems clear that Bergson v/as misled by faulty observa­
tion of insect behaviour which has since been corrected.
The contrast which he asserted can now no longer be maintained, 
at least not on the basis of the same set of facts. In any 
case Bergson’s treatment of this problem is not really a 
psychological one at all. It is a philosophical argument 
which compels him to oppose instinct and intelligence. As 
Drever points out Bergson "is really opposing instinct and 
intelligence on an apperceptive background of philosophy, not 
of psychology, and of a peculiar philosophy, which requires
him to use terras, which are used in psychology, but with a
(2)
different and specialized or ’polarized’ meaning".
Graham Wallas in his "The Great Society" presents a 
view of the relation of instinct to intelligence which does 
not appear to be satisfactory. He is concerned to rescue 
the intellectual apparatus of man from the sway of his instinc­
tive impulses and to show that instincts are not, as McDougall 
claims, the moving forces in all our activities, intellectual 
and otherwise. He maintains that there are springs of thought 
and action which are independent of the instincts and of 
another order. "We are born," he says, "with a tendency,
(1) Cf. especially E. L. Bouyier: "The Psychic Life of 
Insects", also McDougall; "Outline of Psychology", Ch. III.
(2) "Instinct in Man", p. 109.
under appropriate conditions, to think, which is as original
and independent as our tendency, under appropriate conditions,
to run away." Alongside the instinctive dispositions which
McDougall postulates he sets up four intelligent dispositions
which are independent causes of human action. These are:
thought, language, trial-and-error and curiosity. He speaks
also of dispositions of habit, memory and perception. As
(2)
McDougall says, he "seems to be on the high-road to a newi
faculty psychology of the very loosest kind; a psychology which
will take every named function or peculiarity of our mental
life and ’explain* it by attributing it to a special disposition
or faculty". This is certainly not the way to clearness on
the problem of the relation of instinct to intelligence.
Rivers, in an article on "Why is the Unconscious Uncon-
scious? tended to revive the distinction between instinct
and intelligence by connecting them definitely withthe two
rather sharply distinguished systems of nervous mechanism which
he believed to underlie protopathic and epicritic sensibility.
(4)
Later, however, he modified this view and admitted the extreme 
difficulty of distinguishing instinctive from intelligent be­
haviour. He discussed the various attempts at such a distinc­
tion and concluded that from the purely psychological point of
(6)
view it is impossible to make one. Still later, he wrote that 
it seemed likely that we shomld "be driven to give up the whole 
attempt to distinguish between instinct and intelligence and 
shall adopt a new classification with a new nomenclature". And
(1) p. 47.
(2) "Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion", "Mind",
July 1920.
(3) "British Journal of Psychology", Vol. IX.
(4) "Instinct and the Unconscious", Ch. VI.
(5) "Psychology and Politics", pp. 30-1.
lie himself made an attempt at such a new classification of 
action with his distinction of ungraded activity of the proto­
pathic "all or none" type, action showing no proportion between 
the response and the conditions which called it forth, and epi­
critic activity characterized by gradation and discrimination.
The best recent discussion of the instinct-intelligence 
question is undoubtedly that of McDougall in his "Outline".
He first surveys the behaviour of insects and finds instinct 
and intelligence co-operating throughout. There is variation 
of modes of action in the face of difficulties, adaptation to 
unusual circumstances, and persistence of effort in the case 
of failure to achieve immediate success. The notion of the 
fixity and inevitability of response in the case of instinct 
in insects seems to be definitely exploded. McDougall con­
cludes that "instinct and intelligence are not two diverse 
principles of action or of guidance of action ..... Instinct 
requires and implies the co-operation of intelligence, and 
without its aid can achieve nothing of value to the creature 
or the species. And intelligence operates only and always 
in the service of the instinctive impulses to action. This, 
then, is the relation of instinct and intelligence among the
insects, which by common consent display instinct in its purest
( 1 )
and most typical forms". He then discusses the same problem 
in relation to the behaviour of the vertebrates, including 
man. He finds that there also this relation holds, though 
the interdependence is even more marked. Innate organisation 
is not so precise, it is general and non-specific and in pro­
portion as it takes on these characteristics the importance of
(1) pp. 92-3.
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intelligent guidance and control increases. There is an 
increasingly long period of youth in which experience is 
accumulated. "We find that the longer the period of youth 
the higher is the development of intelligence, and the more 
obscured by intelligence is the operation of instinct. And 
in man, in whom youth is prolonged for so many years, the 
generality of instincts and their dependence upon and over­
laying by intelligence reach such a point as to obscure the 
existence of the instincts from the eyes of man himself, 
especially those of sophisticated man." But, according to 
McDougall, though concealed they are still there, and intelli­
gence operates only in the pursuit of goals which they prescribe. 
McDougall’s last word on the relation of instinct and intelli­
gence is that they "represent neither two divergent lines of 
evolution, nor two stages of evolution, but rather always only
two aspects of all mental life which we distinguish by an
(1)
effort of abstraction".
It is thus clear that the discussion of the relation of 
instinct to intelligence in its old form is no longer profitable. 
With the passing of the notion that they stand for two separate 
faculties and the recognition of the fact that they are distin­
guishable, but interdependent aspects of all mental life, the 
problem passes into a new phase. From the point of view of 
conduct what we have now to discuss is not the relation of two 
hypothetical faculties but rather the relation of intelligence 
to impulses which may be instinctively grounded, and the nature 
of the intelligent guidance and control of impulse.
(1) p. 202. cf. also T. P. Nunn (Education: Its Data and 
First Principles", py/iîS®): "Intelligent behaviour is not a 
spécifia variety to be distinguished from instinctive, but is 
instinctive behaviour itself in its higher forms; no longer 
mechanical or fixed in form, but Indefinitely plastic and 
illuminated with purpose".
II.
Before, however, we can go on to this discussion there 
is a preliminary question: that of the nature of intelligence 
itself. Like ’instinct’ the term ’intelligence’ is at present 
freely and loosely used without any clear or generally 
accepted definition. Those who have been concerned in the 
widespread ’intelligence test* movement have not troubled 
to investigate the prior question of the nature of intelligence 
itself. They have been testing something, and have been content 
to regard intelligence simply as that * something* which their 
tests measure. It is a very difficult question. Someone 
has doubted if we will ever produce "an intelligent definition 
of intelligence". But if it is impossible to define intelli­
gence we should at least endeavour to have definite ideas 
about it. After surveying the current usage of the term 
both as contrasted with instinct and in connection with mental 
tests, Spearman comes to the conclusion that the reason is now 
evident why all search for the meaning of * intelligence * has, 
even with the greatest of modern psychologists, always ended 
in failure. It is simply that, in point of fact, the word,
(1)
in its present-day usage does not possess any definite meaning". 
As a terra it has so degenerated as to be scientifically 
unusable and if its use is to be continued the question is not 
what it does mean, but rather what it is to be made to mean.
It is doubtful however if the case is quite so desperate as 
Spearman makes out. An examination of current literature 
seems to show that a new concept of intelligence is in process 
of forming and there are numerous signs of agreement as to 
what constitutes intelligence in action. In contrast to the 
older concept which involved the idea of mental comprehension,
(1) See "The Nature of Intelligence", Ch. I, "Intelligence 
in Modern Psychology".
the new concept of intelligence carries with it, as its
essential feature, the implication of activity# To adopt
the current Jargon it is *behaviouristlc * rather than 
(1)
mentalistic • Briefly,intelligence is now being generally 
conceived of as consisting in the power of adaptation to new 
situations or new demands, or as the ability to solve a new 
problem. According to MsDougall, for example, intelligence 
"is essentially the capacity for making new adaptations", or 
again "the capacity to improve on native tendency in the light 
of past experience". An intelligent action is "generally 
defined as one which seems to show that the creature has pro­
fited by prior experience of similar situations and that it
somehow brings to bear its previous experience in the guidance
(2)
of its present action". Intelligence is a matter of effecting 
correlation between past experience and future activities, and 
the whole evolution cf mind may be regarded as nothing more 
than an increase in the possibility of effecting this correla­
tion.
This *behaviouristlc* way of regarding intelligence is of
(3)
all degrees of extremeness. It is all of a piece with the 
widespread current tendency to regard all thinking as a form 
of behaviour - as * trial and error by proxy*, as someone has
(1) Cf. A. A. Roback, "intelligence and Behaviour", 
"Psychological Review", i922, also L. Witmer, "iVhat is Intelli­
gence?", "Scientific Monthly", 1922.
(2) Of. also H. R. Marshall, "Mind and Conduct", Ch. II, 
where intelligence is equated with adaptive behaviour, cf. also 
J. Dewey, "Intelligence and Morals" in "The Influence of Darwin­
ism on Philosophy": "The progress of biology has accustomed
our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside 
power presiding supremely but statically over the desires and 
efforts of man, but that it is a method of adjustment of 
capacities and conditions within specific situations". It is 
"properly an organ of adjustment".
(3) For a somewhat extreme form of it, cf. W.A. Vifhite, 
"Foundations of Psychiatry", Ch. VII.
termed it. Intelligent action is regarded as continuous
with, and a developed form of, the trial and error process,
which characterises so much animal behaviour. An excellent
illustration of this usage of the concept of intelligence is
(1)
provided in a recent paper by L. L. Thurstone. This writer 
endeavours to show that the degree of intelligence in action 
is "the degree of incompleteness of the alternatives in the 
trial and error life of the actor and that the higher cognitive 
categories constitute incomplete conduct in the process of being 
formed". He takes overt trial and error in which there is no 
foresight as being the most unintelligent form of action. In 
this type all impulses pass directly into action and a success­
ful reaction is achieved only by chance. Higher than this is 
what is termed perceptual intelligence. As a result of per­
ceiving the situation and its possibilties the trial and error 
process is moved back in time and takes place at the stage where 
impulses are only partly formulated. "By perceptual intelli­
gence we move the trial and error process from among overt 
alternatives to the realm of the incomplete and approximate 
alternatives which constitute perception." But it can be 
moved still further back and may deal with alternatives which 
are still more incomplete. It may take place at the stage 
where alternatives are ideational. From this point of view 
ideas are "loosely formulated, approximate conduct". There is 
a final stage. The highest type of intelligence, conceptual 
intelligence, consists in the capacity to carry on the trial 
and error process among concepts which are furthest removed from 
overt action. The progress from unintelligent to intelligent 
action thus means the transfer of the trial and error process 
"from overt alternatives to percepts, from percepts to still
(1) "The Nature of General Intelligence and Ability." 
Paper read before the International Congress of Psychology, 
1923.
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more tentative ideas, and from ideas to the still more approxi­
mate actions that are known as concepts. Thurstone even 
takes in the unconscious. It is "the realm of impulses that 
are not yet sufficiently defined to he cognitive and focal".
The degree of intelligence is thus the degree of abstraction 
from overt conduct at which the trial and error process between 
alternative impulses or conative tendencies is carried on.
A somewhat similar argument, though not worked out in such
(1)
detail, is advanced by J. T. MacCurdy, who regards intelligent 
conduct as being distinguished from reflex or instinctive 
behaviour by its utilization of images. "Intelligent conduct," 
he says, "is the comparison of images with perceptions which 
makes planning possible."
III.
Turning now to the question of impulse and intelligence 
in conduct, it is in keeping with this current usage of the 
concept of intelligence that so far as conduct is concerned 
it is now being regarded as in some sense * instrumental*, that 
is as something which is not itself a cause of action but which 
operates in the service of impulses to action. In popular 
discussion, at the present time these impulses are indiscrimi­
nately described as * instinctive*. Intelligence, it is said, 
discovers means for attaining the ends prescribed by instinc­
tive impulses. This explanation is no doubt tending in the 
right direction but it is often stated far too simply. Thus 
Trotter writes: "Intelligence .... leaves its possessor no
less impelled by instinct than his simpler ancestor, but endows
( 2 )
him with the capacity to respond in a larger variety of ways .
(1) "Instincts and Images", paper read before the Inter­
national Congress of Psychology", 1925.
(2) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", p. 97.
Drever says of intelligence and instinct in conduct that "the
relation of the two to one another may be best expressed even
in the case of the human being by saying that instinct prescribes
the end to be attained, whereas intelligence finds the means
for attaining that end". Statements of this kind are true only
in the most general way. These statements, and much current
writing on this topic, are reminiscent of the well-known views
of Hume represented in his familiar statement that "Reason is
and oug^t to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend
to any other office than to serve and obey". Current views
do in fact seem to represent in some respects a revival of
those held on this topic by writers of the Scottish school of
philosophers. Hutcheson, for example, held that "though we
have instincts determining us to desire ends without supposing
any previous reasoning, yet *tis by the use of our reason that
(2)
we find out the means of attaining our ends". Hume in 
another place says that the function of reason is simply to 
direct "the impulses received from appetites and inclination".
Let us endeavour to see what the facts really are.
There can be no denying the truth of the statement that 
intellectual processes are never themselves the motives to 
action. Aristotle has said, once and for all, that pure 
thought moves nothing. And since he said it others have said 
it after him again and again; it is not 'pure thou^t* but 
thought based upon emotional impulse which moves to action.
The latest to say this and to put it very well is McDougall.
On this point and on the general question of motives, he 
writes : "Reasoning, like all other forms of intellectual
process, is but the servant of the instinctive impulses; it does
(1) "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. 21.
(2) Quoted by Drever, "Instinct in Man", p. 40.
not prompt or impel us to action. By reasoning v/e discover
new means for the attainment of our goals; and by its aid we
envisage more clearly the nature and the further consequences
of the goals we seek. But, unless we seek or desire some
goal because it is our nature to do so, no reasoning can make
us seek or desire it; it can at most reveal to us some probable
consequence of action as of the kind which is a natural goal
for us, that is to say, of a kind in the attainment of which
(1)
some instinctive impulse of our nature will find satisfaction".
And again "It is the paradox of intelligence that it 
directs, forces our energies without being itself a force or 
energy . There can be no denying the fact that intelligence 
operates in the service of impulse but - and this is the 
fundamentally important point - impulses differ so. It is 
all very simple, but at the same time very misleading to dub 
all impulses * instinctive * or to describe them all by the 
somewhat meaningless adjective 'primitive*. In actual conduct 
they may be nothing of the kind. It may be perfectly true 
that, in the case of any impulse to action, if we analyse it 
fully we will come upon some factor of the innate order, but 
the enormous complications which are effected in instinctive 
emotional dispositions can scarcely be forgotten. It hardly 
needs pointing out that there is all the difference in the world 
between an instinctive impulse, say to flight, prompted by the 
crude emotion of fear, and an impulse to action arising out of 
a well-ordered sentiment like love of country. In both these 
cases, as in every case, the impulses to action are backed by 
feeling, but in the one case it is feeling of a crude and in 
the other case of a highly-developed order. In each case
(1) "Outline", p. 215.
(2) Ibid., p. 440 n.
not prompt or impel us to action. By reasoning we discover
new means for the attainment of our goals; and by its aid we
envisage more clearly the nature and the further consequences
of the goals we seek. But, unless we seek or desire some
goal because it is our nature to do so, no reasoning can make
us seek or desire it; it can at most reveal to us some probable
consequence of action as of the kind which is a natural goal
for us, that is to say, of a kind in the attainment of which
(1)
some instinctive impulse of our nature will find satisfaction".
And again "It is the paradox of Intelligence that it
directs, forces our energies without being itself a force or 
(2 )
energy . There can be no denying the fact that intelligence 
operates in the service of impulse but - and this is the 
fundamentally important point - impulses differ so. It is 
all very simple, but at the same time very misleading to dub 
all impulses ’instinctive* or to describe them all by the 
somewhat meaningless adjective ’primitive*. In actual conduct 
they may be nothing of the kind. It may be perfectly true 
that, in the case of any impulse to action, if we analyse it 
fully we will come upon some factor of the innate order, but 
the enormous complications which are effected in instinctive 
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needs, pointing out that there is all the difference in the world 
between an instinctive impulse, say to flight, prompted by the
crude emotion of fear, and an impulse to action arising out of
a well-ordered sentiment like love of country. In both these 
cases, as in every case, the impulses to action are backed by 
feeling, but in the one case it is feeling of a crude and in 
the other case of a hl#»ly-developed order. In each case
(1) "Outline", p. 215.
(2) Ibid.. p. 440 n.
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intelligence may direct the course of action but the impulses 
and the ends are vastly different. In the psychological 
sense man always acts on impulse but this may mean very 
different things in different cases. So that when we meet 
with statements like this; that man’s mind is "actuated by 
instincts, but instrumental with reason" we must try to realise 
all the complications that are involved.
In endeavouring to understand how exactly intelligence 
operates in relation to impulses we cannot do better than 
follow and endeavour to elaborate the admirable discussion of 
this discussion given by Davey in his "Human Nature and 
Conduct". Here is a quotation which gives the essence of 
his argument. "Impulse is primary and intelligence is second­
ary and in some sense derivative. There should be no blinking 
of this fact. But the recognition of it as a fact exalts 
intelligence. For thought is not the slave of impulse to do 
its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after; it 
cannot give orders, not even if it wants to. It rushes 
blindly into any opening it chances to find. Anything that 
expends it, satisfies it. One outlet is like another to it.
It is indiscriminate. Its vagaries and excesses are the stock 
theme of classical moralists; and while they point the wrong 
moral in urging the abdication of impulse in favour of reason, 
their characterization of impulse is not wholly wrong. What
intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act, not
(2)
as its obedient servant, but as its clarifier and liberator."
In this last sentence we have what seems to be the key to the 
solution of the whole problem. Secondary as intelligence may 
be in one sense, its importance, as Dewey shows, is primary.




conflict and so give rise to a blocking of overt action.
It is at this point that thought and deliberation has its
place. Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal, in imagination,
of the various competing impulses to action. "Thou^t runs
ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to wait
the instruction of actual failure and disaster ...... Each
conflicting habit and impulse takes its turn in projecting
itself upon the screen of imagination ........ Activity does
not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is
turned from execution into Intra-organic channels, resulting
in dramatic rehearsal." Choice between conflicting impulses is
"simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes
an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action ......
Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed,
(1)
unified." In this process of deliberation "to every shade 
of imagined circumstance there is a vibrating response". We 
find ourselves in imagination, in the completed situation, and 
choice is intelligently guided when that course is taken whose 
emotional response is most completely unifying and harmonizing. 
There is not a calculation #f future pleasures and pains. 
Deliberation is not calculation. The basis of choice is the 
present satisfyingness of the emotional response which the 
thought of the completed situation arouses. The indirect 
nature of the control which intelligence exercises is thus 
clear. "We do not act from reasoning, but reasoning puts 
before us objects which are not directly or sensibly present so
(1) pp. 190-2, cf. a recent work by E. Rignano: "The Psychol­
ogy of Reasoning", where all reasoning is asserted to be of the 
type of imaginative expérimentation. "Reasoning, he says, "is 
nothing else in substance than a succession or a combination of 
merely imagined operations or experiments which put the individual 
in the very same state of mental awareness in which he would 
ultimately have fourid himself if these operations or experiments 
had been performed not merely in imagination but actually."
(p. f  )
that we may react directly to these objects with aversion,
attraction, indifference or attachment precisely as we would
(1)
to the same objects if they were physically present."
The function of intelligence is thus "to discover the object 
that will best operate as a releasing and unifying stimulus 
in the existing situation". In this way conflicting impulses 
are harmonized and action is set free. The value and necessity 
of conflict in this sense becomes clear. "Conflict is the 
gadfly of thought", it is "a ’sine qua non’ of reflection and 
ingenuity". In Dewey’s view there is no necessary antagonism 
between intelligence and the life of impulse. He says, "the 
man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, 
not narrow, his life of strong impulse, while aiming at their 
happy coincidence in operation".
This view of the relation of impulse and intelligence has 
a sound basis in comparative psychology. Current psychology 
tends to regard thought as having come into being in the service 
of action and clear conscious awareness of activity to have 
developed in the individual only where there were alternatives 
or when adjustment to new conditions was required. This is 
well pointed out by C. S. Myers.
"Consciousness has been evolved to facilitate choice 
between alternative reactions, to bring the entire unity or 
personality of the organism into more complete relation with its 
environment. Where only one reaction is possible, the action 
remains a reflex, and no sensation or impulse need be felt.
(1) This point is well put by William James (Principles, . 
Vol. II 393). "Reason, ’per se’, can inhibit no impulses; 
the*only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the 
other way. Reason may however make an inference which will 
excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse the other 
wav* and thus though the animal richest in reason might be 
also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he would 
never seem the fatal automaton which a merely instinctive 
animal would be."
!#iere the reaction is to some extent modifiable, the action 
becomes instinctive - emotional activity, impulsive tendencies, 
and crude, blurred sensations being experienced. Where alter­
native responses are desirable discrimination becomes acute 
and a larger and more dominating self develops; a dominating
apical system which endeavours to permit of action only after
(1)
it has given its consent or sanction." This is the manner
in which intelligence has evolved in the race, and in the
individual intellectual processes make their appearance only
at moments of conflict and obstruction or checking of action.
Choice has to be made. Different lines of behaviour open up
and competing impulses are felt. At other times action is
automatic, the result of habit. New and unusual conditions
and alternative reactions result in fuller consciousness.
So far as the working of intelligence is concerned the
important point is the delay which occurs between stimulus and
response. As W. A. IVhite points out, "where action follows
stimulus instantly and without hesitation, there is the type
of action known as reflex, with which there is associated
little or no consciousness. When, however, for any reason,
there is a delay between the stimulus and the appropriate
(2)
action then there appears the phenomenon of consciousness".
If we include under the v/ord ’ stimulus’ impulses to action 
arising from within we may say that it is the function of 
intelligence in general to cause delay between stimulus and 
the resulting action. #ien this is done response is postponed, 
impulse is held up.and reflection and imagination take place
(1) "The Independence of Psychology", "Discovery", 1920.
Of. also W.A. White, "Mechanism of Character Formation", p. 31. 
"We must think of full, clear consciousness as only accompanying 
those mental states of adjustment to new and unusual conditions; 
conditions permitting of various reactions and involving there­
fore selective judgment, critique, choice, in short, reason."
(2) "Foundations of Psychiatry", p. 112.
(1)
with the result that impulse may be transformed and re-directed.
Finally,.there is a direct stimulus and response, reaction, but
of a very different sort from the one which would have occurred
had it been immediate. It is informed and directed. 1/Vhen
impulses compete reflection is stimulated and they are held
against each other in the light of a knowledge of their results.
That one is completed whose anticipated results arouse the most
satisfying present response. In this way an Impulse based on
a passing feeling may be overruled by one whose outcome will be
more in harmony with the organized life of feeling as a whole.
Intelligent action is thus characterized by a certain degree of
hesitancy. It is non-immediate, but because of this it is
discriminative and graded. Intelligence does not merely find
means for the ends sought by any or all of the impulses. It
also brings them into relation so that some are subordinated
to others. It is also interpretative. As has been said it
makes impulse understand itself.
It should be clear from the foregoing that intelligence
is nol^  as much current v^riting would lead one to suppose, an
artificial interference with the natural life of impulse.
Impulse and intelligence have been evolved together and the one
(2)
is no less natural than the other. When Head says that "the 
aim of human evolution is the domination of feeling and instinct 
by discriminative mental control", it should be remembered that 
increase in the richness of the life of feeling and impulse.
(1) It is possible to give a wide significance to this period 
of delay between stimulus and response.  ^ It may be regarded as 
making possible the richness of mental life as a whole. Jane 
Harrison ("Ancient Art and Ritual") says; "It is just in this 
Interval, this space between perception and reaction, this 
momentary halt, that our mental life, our images, our ideas, 
our consciousness, and assuredly our religion and all our art 
is built up". ^
(2) "Brain", XXXIV.
W-
and increase in the possibility of discriminative mental control 
have proceeded together.
Naturalistic theories which idealize raw impulse and its 
spontaneities and contrast it with factors of guidance and 
control are simply failing to take all the psychological facts 
into account. Often they are not really concerned with impulse 
in the psychological sense at all. Bertrand Russell for 
example, in his "Principles of Social Reconstruction", in 
glorifying impulse and demanding its liberation, is not really 
dealing with what the psychologist means by impulse. He is 
concerned with the fact that men*s lives are unduly thwarted 
and frustrated by the conditions of the social environment.
There is, of course, something to be said for a cult of impulse 
understanding by increased opportunity for the all-round 
expression of human nature.
(1) And following him C.E.;M. Joad in his "Common Sense 
Ethics".
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a ^ x .1
Perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole of
psychology arid ethics at the present time is that of determining
what is meant by reason in mind arid conduct* As was pointed
out in the Introduction there set in some time ago a strong and
widespread reaction against all forms of rationalism and intellec*
tualisra In psychological theory. The older science, it is said,
vastly exaggerated man*s rationality both in regard to his
beliefs and in regard to his behaviour, and the main purpose
(1)
of the 'new psychology' is to set right the balance. It is 
concerned to stress "the primacy of feeling, the sway of 
instinct, the prevalence of the irrational". The 'rationalistic 
fallacy', that man is primarily a reasonable being who arrives 
at his beliefs by a process of reasoning and pursues in his 
conduct certain rationally approved ends, is regarded as com­
pletely exploded.
Like most reactions it has swung too far and resulted in 
a good deal of exaggeration and, in some quarters, in a view of
mind which is as one-sided as that which is rejected.
L. T. Hobhouse has very well pointed this out. He says:
"Going behind the ordinary consciousness psychology is very 
largely concerned in distinguishing the forces operating in 
the twilight of semi-consciousness, if not in the dark of the 
unconscious, upon which our purposes depend, and, since new 
discoveries are very like new toys, it is not surprising if some 
psychologists, in their delight with the forces that they have 
laid bare, make of these the whole of mind, and, while elevating 
impulse and emotion to the highest place, regard reason and will 
as superficial conceptions".
(1) Walter Lippmann says somewhere that it is nowfthoroughly 
out of fashion to mention reason in connection with conduct as
for a scientist to declare that the earth is flat.
(2) "The Rational Good", p. 20.
/7A
1^/hat is clearly needed is a revised conception of 
reason, one which will take into account all the facts of 
mental life as psychology now discloses them and which will 
show the relation of reason to the other aspects of mental 
life* There is needed too a new statement of what is to be 
understood by rationality in conduct* At the present time 
the treatment of reason by those who uphold it in its tradi­
tional significance and by its popular opponents is equally 
unsatisfactory,
II*
We will first see what are the charges which are made
against reason. In the literature of the 'new psychology*
the operation of reason is explained as being apparent only
and the term 'rationalization' has been introduced, and become
widely current, to indicate the process whereby man persuades
himself that he is believing Or acting on rational grounds when,
(1)
in reality, he is not. Tansley defines this process as "the 
production of a 'reason' for, as distinct from the true cause 
or motive of an act or conation"; and he maintains that it is 
"so exceedingly common as to be practically universal". It is 
certainly a popular principle of explanation at the moment 
and it is important to examine it and to endeavour to see just 
what the facts are.
As in the case of other current conceptions, though the 
term is a new one the idea is not. It figures in the philo­
sophies of Schopenhauer and of Nietzsche who distinguished the 
motives which are actually operative in conduct from those which 
are consciously formulated; and Huxley long ago said that "what
(1) "The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life", p. 182.
m
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we call rational grounds for our beliefs are often extremely 
irrational attempts to justify our instincts". The terra
(1)
appears to have been introduced into psychology by Trotter, 
who applied it to the process whereby pseudo-rational grounds 
are given for the holding of opinions which are really the 
result of herd-suggestion. "It is of cardinal importance," 
he says, "to recognize that in the process of the rationaliza­
tion of instinctive belief, it is the belief which is the 
primary thing, while the explanation, although masquerading as 
the cause of the belief, as the chain of rational evidence on 
which the belief is founded, is entirely secondary, and but for 
the belief would never have been thought of. Such rationaliza­
tions are often, in the case of intelligent people, of extreme 
ingenuity, and may be very misleading unless the true instinc­
tive basis of the given opinion or action is thoroughly under­
stood." The conception figures largely in psycho-analytic 
literature. It is an important part of psycho-analytic doctrine 
that consciousness is largely concerned with masking or justi­
fying activities which are really the outcome of hidden and 
unacknowledged motives. To quote Ernest Jones, "Everyone feels 
that, as a rational creature, he must be able to give a con­
nected, logical and continuous account of himself, his conduct 
and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously 
manipulated and revised to that end. No one will admit that he 
ever deliberately performed an irrational act, and any act that 
might appear so is immediately justified by distorting the mental
processes concerned and providing a false explanation that has a
(2)
plausible ring of rationality". Bernard Hart has done much to
popularize this conception and to maintain that man is not.a
(1) "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War."
(2) "Papers on Psycho-Analysis", p. 12.
rational animal, but a would-be rational animal. He writes:
"That a man generally knows why he thinks in a certain way and 
why he dees certain things, is a widespread and cherished belief 
of the human race. It is, unfortunately, for the most part 
an erroneous one. We have an overwhelming need to believe that 
we are acting rationally and are loth to admit that we think and 
do things without being ourselves aware of the motive producing 
those thoughts and actions". He believes that this process 
of 'rationalization* is particularly obvious in the moral 
sphere where we endeavour to prove to ourselves, and to others 
if challenged, that our actions are the outcome of high ethical 
principles.
According, then, to this mode of explanation reasons are
produced 'ex post facto' to justify conduct the real motivation
of which is unacknowledged. The reasons, that is, are based
upon the impulses, of whatever kind, and not the impulses on the
(3)
reasons. This mode of explanation may be very widely applied.
(1) "The Psychology of Insanity", p. 66, cp. also P. L. Wells:
"Mental adjustments", p. 13 ff.
(2) Here is one of Hart's illustrations which shows very 
clearly the working of the process (p. 71). "One of my patients, 
a former Sunday School teacher, had become a convinced atheist.
He insisted that he had reached this standpoint after a long and 
careful study of the literature of the subject, and, as a matter 
of fact, he really had acquired a remarkably wide knowledge of 
religious apologetics. He discoursed at length upon the evidence 
of Genesis, marshalling his arguments with considerable skill, 
and producing a coherent and well-reasoned case. Subsequent 
psychological analysis, however, revealed the real complex 
responsible for his atheism; the girl to whom he had been
engaged had eloped with the most enthusiastic of his fellow
Sunday School teachers. We see that in this patient the
causal complex, resentment against his successful rival, had 
expressed itself by a repudiation of the beliefs which had 
formerly constituted the principal bond between them. The 
arguments, the study and the quotations were merely an elaborate 
rationalization."
(3) ,It has even been applied to philosophy. F.H. Bradley's 
well-known remark that metaphysics Is nothing hut the finding 
of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct has recently 
been confirmed by Bertrand Russell, who maintains that philosophy
It can be applied, not merely to individual behaviour, but also 
to social customs and institutions. These latter are often 
found, not to be actually based upon the reasons which are 
advanced to account for their existence, but rather on underlying 
motives of a less rational order. The explanations given 
are secondary. To take an illustration given by Hobhouse, 
it may be argued on these lines that the institution of punish­
ment is based not on an abstract theory of justice, but on 
fear. Criminals are punished because they are hated and 
feared. Legal theories are elaborate 'rationalizations* of 
these emotions. Franz Boas in his "The Mind of Primitive 
Man" gives numerous illustrations of this secondary explanation 
of customs, and says that its existence constitutes one of the 
most important of anthropological phenomena. He adds, further, 
that "it is hardly less common in our own society than in more
primitive societies". The whole outcome of this mode of
(2)
explanation of behaviour is well summed up by Hobhouse. "At 
bottom man is moved, not by ideas or principles, but by 
impulses and emotions, or to put them into a compound term - 
since they are so closely allied - by impulse-feeling. But he 
is influenced, not only directly, but in many subtle ways by 
the impulse-feeling of others, and he has to give and receive 
an account of what he does and what they do. Hence he formu­
lates his impulses into ends, and explains them by reasons which 
are mutually intelligible. This explanation has a use of its 
own. It serves intercommunication and mutual understanding.
(1) p. 226. Of this same process in individual behaviour 
Boas writes: "It is a common observation that we desire or act 
first and then try to justify our desires and our actions ... 
a candid examination of our own minds convinces us that the 
average man, in by far the majority of cases, does not determine 
his action^ by reasoning, but that he first acts, and then 
justifies and explains his acts by such secondary considerations 
as are current amongst us".
(2) Op. cit., p. 22.
But in the order of causation it arises 'ex post facto'. The 
real cause, whether of the personal act, or the social custom, 
or the ethical principle, lies in impulse-feeling. To treat
the alleged, reason as the true ground is the fallacy of
intelleotualism. *'
Now it can scarcely be denied that 'rationalization'
. (1) 
is a process which does occur on a large scale in normal life.
No one who is frank about his own conduct can fail to observe 
it in operation. We do, largely unwittingly, trump up reasons
which put à better face on our conduct than is actually
justified. To ourselves and to others we put order and purpose 
into our activities greater than actually exists. Further, so 
far as belief is concerned, few can claim that their views on 
religion, politics, or the relation of the sexes have an exclu­
sively rational basis. The demonstration of the widespread 
existence of this process is a useful contribution to the theory 
of conduct. But the question is not whether these facts of 
'rationalization' exist or not, for manifestly they do exist.
The question is whether the right conclusions are being drawn 
from them. Those who have drawn attention to them have, for 
the most part, assumed that they altogether invalidate reason 
and make of it an epiphenomenon to be dismissed as of little 
significance. Like some other current generalisations this is
(1) The familiar facts of post-hypnotic suggestion illustrate 
very clearly the working of this process, McDougall gives an 
instance ("Outline", p. 368). "A subject who passes into 
hypnosis and afterwards remembers nothing of the events of the 
hypnotic period, may be given some simple post-hypnotic sugges­
tion, for example, may be told that, at a certain signal after 
waking, he will perform some simple train of action, such as 
rising from his chair, opening the window, and looking up and down 
the street. At the prescribed signal, the subject gets up in 
the most natural way, performs the actions, and returns to his 
seat. You then ask him - Why did you look out of the window?
In all probability he will give a perfectly 'rational' explana­
tion of his action. For example he may say: "It occurred to me 
that so-and-so was likely to be calling for me here, and he 
might be unable to find the house". That is to say, not know­
ing the nature and source of the impulse by which he was moved
   he invents an explanation and puts forward a plausible
motive in place of the true one, in perfectly good faith".
all too simple and shows lack of careful analysis* What these 
facts show is the extreme complexity of motives and that we 
are far from being fully conscious of their actual nature. As 
McDougall points out, "Such instances illustrate vividly the 
fact that the motives of our actions and of our beliefs are 
apt to be very obscure to us, so that we easily fall into error 
when we seek, however honestly, to state our motives or the 
grounds of our belief. In doing so, we naturally seek a 
'rational* explanation of our action or belief, i.e. one which 
may seem reasonable or rationally defensible; we often act or 
believe from motives of which we have no understanding; but we 
always seek to explain our action or belief according to the 
principle of 'sufficient reason'. The fact that our motives 
are commonly so obscure to us gives plausibility to that kind
of psychology which explains everything by invoking 'the Uncon-
, ( 1)
scious'".
It may quite well turn out that, when facts such as these 
of 'rationalization' are fully analysed they show reason at 
work, but in a very faulty and imperfect fashion; and that 
there is no need to despair of rationality in conduct. The fact 
is that those who are denying the validity , of reason are miscon­
ceiving its nature and thinking of it in some traditional sense 
which has now become impossible. What we have to try to deter­
mine, therefore, is the actual nature of reason and rationality.
III.
Even before the claims of reason were so vigorously 
attacked by the psychologists it had been found increasingly 
difficult to state its exact nature. "We talk of man being the 
rational animal," says William James, "and the traditional
(1) "Outline", p. 369.
intellecbualist philosophy has always made a great point of 
treating the brutes as wholly irrational creatures. Neverthe­
less it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by 
«
reason. Of its use by moralists Bosanquet writes; "It is
most difficult to understand in many cases what is the meaning
of the term reason, or practical reason, as appealed to in
ethical treatises. It seems to be something which gives
necessary judgments on self-evident principles affecting 
( 2 )
practice . It is now becoming clear that the great stumbling- 
block throughout has been the separation of reason from experi­
ence so far as knowledge is concerned and the attempt to 
separate it from all the other factors of mental make-up so 
far as action is concerned. "In every age," says McDougall,
"philosophers have been inclined to set 'Reason* apart from all
(3)
other mental functions on a throne by itself." In the 
sphere of knowledge this separation of the rational from the 
empirical has how become impossible. A new conception of the 
relation of reason to experience has come into being. Logicians 
now speak, not so much of the relation of reason to experience, 
but rather of the place of reason jn experience. Dewey has 
very well pointed out that "' Reason' as a faculty separate from 
experience introducing us to a superior region of universal 
truths begins now to strike in as remote, uninteresting and 
unimportant. Reason as a Kantian faculty that introduces 
generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more and 
more as superfluous - the unnecessary creation of men addicted 
to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology. Concrete 
suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and
(1) "Principles of Psychology"j Vol. II, p. 325.
(2) "Some Suggestions in Ethics", p. 157.
(3) On. Git., p. 401.
matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the 
present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, 
and tested by succession failure in accomplishing this task of 
readjustment, suffice". This same transformation in the con­
ception of reason must be effected in the sphere of practice.
No reason outside experience and above it is needed either in 
knowledge or in conduct. The theory still exists that all 
human conduct is the expression of 'Reason', and like the 
theory which ascribes all conduct to the 'Will', it is a 
remnant of an outworn faculty psychology. It is against this 
type of theory that McDougall has so actively protested. He 
says, "There is a theory of human action beloved of some 
moralists. They tell us that our higher forms of Conduct are 
due to Reason, while they ascribe our simpler and more impulsive 
actions to what they call our passions, propensities or instincts, 
usually prefixing the adjective 'baser* or 'lower* to these words. 
They are not much interested in these simpler modes of action 
and do not much care how they are described or explained, so 
long as Reason is admitted to be a supreme principle of 
action".
The persistence of this theory is well illustrated in
Rashdall's "Is Conscience an Emotion?" which is an attack on
McDougall's theory of the development of moral judgment and
(3)
character. In this book Rashdall is concerned to show that
"the moral faculty is essentially Reason". He makes no 
attempt to analyse reason but writes as if it were something 
apart, something standing right above the rest of mental life - 
undefiled by emotion and impulse. Psychology has now
(1) "Reconstruction in Philosophy", pp. 95-6.
(2) Op. cit., p. 214.
0 (3) See also McDougall's reply, "Hibbert Journal", 1920.
demonstrated clearly enough the fallacy of making separations 
of this kind. They are wholly artificial. A moral or practi­
cal 'Reason* operating on a higher plane and independent of the 
rest of mental life save that it contrasts it from above, simply 
does not exist. It is in fact now quite impossible to conceive 
of the intellectual processes as in any sense functioning 
independently of the emotional-impulsive life. Emotion and 
thou^t cannot be separated from each other save by an effort 
of abstraction. In reality they appear as inextricably inter­
woven. This is a truth expounded very fully and convincingly 
by Rignano in his recent "The Psychology of Reasoning". In 
concluding a very complete survey and analysis of reasoning 
in all its forms, he writes; "The analysis of reasoning, the 
highest of our mental faculties, has led us to the view that 
it is constituted entirely by the reciprocal play of the two 
fundamental and primordial activities of our psyche, the
intellectual and the affective ..... Affective activity seems
to impregnate every manifestation of our thoughts". By 
'affective tendencies' which play a very important part in his 
theory of mind Rignano means impulses backed by feeling. A 
psychology which does not set out with a neat scheme of mental 
make-up but which analyses mental states as they actually exist 
shows how closely bound up all mental functions are. Though 
psychologists have always maintained that the familiar tliree- 
fold division of mental life into the cognitive, the affective 
and the conative was only a distinction of aspects which all 
mental processes showed, in actual practice these three have 
been regarded as distinct, and more or less independent types 
of processes. Distinctions of this kind made for purposes of 
analysis are again and again taken as marking things in them­
selves. In the concrete, as Graham Wallas very well says, "the 
mind of man is like a harp all of whose strings throb together, 
so that emotion, impulse, inference and the special kind of 
inference called reasoning, are often simultaneous and
(1 )
intermingled aspects of a single mental experience". This
truth is being emphasized by the recent investigations into
(2)
the psychology of day-dreaming. No view of reason and its 
place in conduct can now be regarded as satisfactory which 
does not take these facts into account.
IV.
L. T. Hobhouse, in his "The Rational Good", has put 
forward a view of the nature and function of reason which takes 
account of all the facts which psychology has brought to light, 
and yet shows it to be an effective factor in the control of 
conduct. "Much of the prejudice against reason," he says,
"is due to a misconception for which its friends are as much 
responsible as its enemies. By both alike reason is often 
taken as a thing apart. On the side of knowledge it is 
divorced from experience, on the side Of conduct, from feeling. 
In both cases the divorce is fatal to a true understanding.
In regard to conduct the 'practical reason' is not a faculty 
which sits aloft issuing impotent orders to a refractory 
multitude of impulses and emotions. It is not a faculty 
concerned with a system of abstract truths deducible, like so 
many mathematical formulae, from first principles that have 
nothing to do with human feeling. It is rather a general 
expression for something which careful analysis reveals in 
permanent operation within the emotional field.
This last sentence gives the essence of Hobhouse's view. 
He develops the parallel between the logical and the moral and 
finds the work of reason, both theoretically and practically, 
to be the bringing of order and harmony into experience. 
Theoretically the irrational is equivalent to the inconsistent.
(^L) Cf. J. Varendonck, "The Psychology of Day Dreams".
(2) p. 29.
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and the arbitrary while the rational shows "the principle of
interconnexion systematically applied". Prom a survey of the
reason of theory he concludes: "The conception of reason which
emerges is ‘not one of a faculty possessed, prior to and apart
from experience, of certain clear and indubitable universal
axioms with which it confronts a tangled experience proving and
explaining so much as can.be brought under these axioms and
leaving the rest unrationalized. It is the conception rather
of a principle operative within experience, the work of which is
always partial and incomplete, always extending itself while
(1)
at the same time pruning and sharpening its own methods".
The reason of practice resembles the reason of theory. It is
a principle of harmony and integration. It is "the endeavour
to establish harmony throughout its own world .... Its world is
the world of impulses, emotions, fixed purposes, passions, all
the vital activities of men, and it is within this turbulent
mass that it has to establish harmony. For this purpose it
must itself be charged with all the energy of profound feeling,
and its development is as much a development of feeling as of
(2)
thought". Reason then is not something which is separate from 
and opposed to the body of impulse-feeling. "It is useless to 
look for anything, call it practical reason, will or what we 
may, that stands outside the body of impulse-feeling and con­
trols it." Reason is something which is continually operative 
within that body. From the first there is, among the impulses, 
"a certain correlation which, in its simplest forms, makes for 
unitary control and, in its more rational form, for harmony.
This tendency we can speak of as a specific impulse towards 
harmony> but we must note that it is an impulse among impulses, 




our impulses become an organized body overcoming recalcitrant 
movements, however intensely felt, by the power of an organized 
mass. This organization, consistently and intelligently 
carried through, is the practical reason which is the mass of 
impulse-fee ling harmonized, or in process of finding harmony".
Prom this point of view reason is not something of
another order distinguished from feeling and impulses, rather
"it is clear that not only the intelligent, but the feelings,
impulses and emotions of human beings that make for harmony in
(2)
life as a whole may all be regarded as rational in character".
It is not that they are acquired or developed by ratiocination; 
they come into being as a result of the interaction of innate 
equipment with the conditions of life. "Reasoning cannot 
put into men feelings that they do not possess, but by directing
and co-ordinating and giving unity and stability of aim it may
most materially enhance the working energy of the feelings out 
of which it is itself engendered." Hobhouse is careful to 
point out that what he understands by harmony is something very 
different from order resting on repression. The impulse which 
is merely held down persists as a source of inner conflict.
But "there is a deep distinction between the expression of a 
fundamental impulse and the governance of the temporary desire 
in which such an impulse manifests itself". The all-embracing 
harmony which Hobhouse believes to be the ideal of the practical 
reason can never be completely realised. "Experience is 
unlimited, and the mind with its capacities for feeling is
always in process of 'becoming' if not of growth the
practical reason is the organizing principle in the actions of 
men. It is the impulse to develop harmony, on the one hand by
(1) p. 89. 
(È) p. 93.
extending the control of mind over the conditions of its life, 
on the other hand by establishing unity of aim within the 
world of consciousness itself. The measure of harmony so 
achieved at any given stage is not complete, and its rules 
are not necessarily final. But they are to be modified only 
in the interests of some fuller harmony to which such a change 
will demonstrably lead."
Reason then is the tendency of the mind towards harmony and 
integration, and the practical reason is the synthesis or har­
monized body of impulse-feelings made aware of its goal. This 
view of the nature of reason and of its function in mind and 
conduct may seem to differ somewhat radically from traditional
conceptions, but it is the only type of view which now seems 
( 2 )
possible. It is only to be regretted that Hobhouse does not 
show in more detail just how the life of feeling becomes har­
monized and relate his theory to the important conception of 
the sentiment.
A view of reason very similar in outcome to that of 
Hobhouse is presented by Dewey. As we have already seen he 
declines to regard reason as in any sense outside experience 
so far as knowing is concerned, and he applies the same principle 
in the practical realm. "Reasonableness," he says, "is a
quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than
(3)
a thing opposed to desire." When conflicts occur between
(1) p. 95.
(2) It cannot of course be claimed as wholly new. Aristotle 
appears to have regarded reason in practical life not as a 
separate principle in the soul standing above the other 
elements and imposing on them a law of its own - but rather as 
the organizing principle in life adapting the parts to the 
purpose of the whole.
(3) "Human Nature in Conduct", p. 194.
emotional impulses "the conclusion is not that the emotional,
passionate phase of action can be, or should be eliminated in
behalf of a bloodless reason# More 'passions* not fewer is
the answer ........ Rationality is not a force to invoke
against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working
(1)
harmony among diverse desires".
The rejection of the view that reason in practice is
something controlling 'ab extra' the life of feeling and impulse,
and the regarding it as the inner organization of that life
is really a return to what has always been the common sense
meaning of reasonableness. It is to reason in the bloodless,
abstract sense of a faculty apart that Chesterton is referring
when he says that "from reason itself nothing rational has
ever proceeded". Santayana in his "The Life of Reason" gives
the essence of this way of regarding it when he says that
"Reason, as such, represents, or rather constitutes a single
(2)
formal interest, the interest in harmony", and in entering on 
an account of the life of reason he takes it as his main 
guiding principle that "the progressive organization of 
irrational impulses makes up the rational life".
IV.
The essence of this view of reason is that it is the
tendency of the mind towards harmony and integration. diVhat
we may terra the 'rational impulse' is operative in mental life
from the first, and its presence has been recognized by psycho-
(3)
legists. A. P. Shand has recognized its importance and has 
expressed it in what he terms the "Law of Organization", which
(1) 'teuman Nature in Conduct", pp. 195-6; cf. also Bertrand 
Russell, "Can Men be Rational?" (R.P.A. Annual 1923). "Ration­
ality in practice may be defined as the habit of remembering all 
our relevant desires, and not only the one which happens at the 
moment to be strongest. Like rationality in opinion it is a 
matter of degree. Complete rationality is no doubt an unattain­
able ideal."
(2) Vol. I, p. 267.
(3) "Foundations of Character."
In his view plays a fundamental part in mental development.
He expresses it thus: "Mental activity tends, at first uncon­
sciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and sustain 
system and organization", Dre^or expresses the same idea 
more fully,
"It is obvious," he says, "that there is in psychical
life a co-ordinating factor, which becomes clearly manifest
at the higher levels where it has been identified with reason.
But this co-ordinating factor is found at all levels. Reason
is not a new force entering mental life from without at the
higher levels. At the lowest levels the life and behaviour
of the organism is co-ordinated, but the co-ordinating factor is
not conscious of itself. m e n  the ideational level emerges,
however, the possibility of a conscious, co-ordinating factor 
( ^  )
is present."
Viewing reason in this way, as the effort towards mental
harmony, let us return to the consideration of the facts of
'rationalization*. This process appears clearly enough as an
attempt at mental wholeness and harmony, but a false and
illegitimate attempt. The 'reasons* which we produced 'ex
post facto', and used to explain the behaviour, are attempts
to Introduce into the mind a degree of wholeness and consistency
greater than has actually been achieved. Some unknown, or
unacknowledged, motive has operated which is really not in
harmony with the dominating tendencies of the mind, and the
resulting action is falsely brought into relation with these
( 2 )
conscious motives. As Julian Huxley says, "Man displays dis­
harmonies of mental constitution, together with an innate 
hankering after harmony". And this 'hankering' after harmony
(1) "introduction to the Psychology of Education", p. 78.
(2) "Essays of a Biologist", p. 273.
/f/
(which is really reason at work), is so strong, and inner 
disharmony is so unpleasant and disturbing, that by means of. 
the process of 'rationalization* we achieve a peace with our­
selves which is really quite artificial. The process simply 
shows to what an extremely limited degree rational harmony 
has actually been achieved. It does not show that rationality 
is impossible; it shows only that it is exceedingly difficult.
It does also show one other fact which will be discussed more 
fully later, namely the very great importance for the rational 
ordering of conduct of increased self-knowledge, knowledge of 
all the underlying motives of the mind and the frank facing of 
them in consciousness.
From the point of view which has nov/ been achieved in 
regard to the relation of reason to the life of feeling, and 
the nature of rationality, it should be possible to get beyond 
the traditional opposition between 'Reason' and the 'passions', 
or, as it is still expressed in the text-books on ethics, 
between such abstractions as "Reason" and "desire", and to 
express the moral problem in some form more adequate to the 
actual facts of mind and conduct as they are now being disclosed. 
"Shall we," asks McDougall, "be content to say with Plato and 
some modern moralists, that Divine reason sits in the head, 
controlling fierce passions that reside in the belly, as a
(1)
charioteer controls with whip and rein a team of savage steeds?" 
And he very rightly answers, hardly! Traditionally, and still 
in some quarters, emotion has been regarded as the enemy and the 
disturber of reason, just as instinct and impulse have been 
regarded as its rivals. It now seems possible to come to 
terms with both and to express their relation more adequately.
If this is done rationality may still be taken as an ideal.
Reason has undoubtedly been one of the most fruitful conceptions
under which the moral life has been regarded. It has always 
stood for an intelligent organization of life as opposed to 
its control of pure impulse on the one hand or by dogma on the 
other. But there can be no denying its frequent one-sidedness 
in the treatment of human nature. As Dewey points out. 
Moralists have spent time and energy in showing what happens 
when appetite, impulse is indulged without reference to conse­
quences and reason. But they have mostly ignored the counter­
part evils of an intelligence that conceives ideals and goods 
which do not enter into present impulse and habit. The life 
of reason has been specialized, romanticized, or made a heavy 
burden. This situation embodies the import of the problem of 
actualizing the place of intelligence in conduct"!  ^ There have 
been abstractions ^n both sides, but it does now seem possible 
to get beyond them. It might of course be argued that the 
traditional opposition between ’reason* and 'passion* corres­
ponds to a radical disharmony or dualism in human nature which 
is ultimate and which must simply be accepted. It certainly 
corresponds to something deep and universal; but it does not 
seem likely that it is a dualism v/hich cannot be overcome.
This seems to be a wrong way of looking at the facts. It 
seems rather that with effort the disharmonies of human nature 
can be overcome and not a final but a progressive synthesis be 
reached.
Before we go on to consider what the nature of this 
synthesis appears to be it may be pointed out that this problem 
of reason and feeling is far from being a mere problem of theory. 
It is, in fact, the first problem of practice and very near to 
everyone. In its practical aspects this problem and the 
direction in which a solution is to be looked for has recently
(1) Op. cit., p. 275.
been clearly stated by Havelock Ellis in a chapter on "The 
Art of Morals". He says, what modern psychology has been 
making very obvious, that there is something of a dualism in 
civilised man. "Objectively he has become like the gods and 
able to distinguish the ends of life; he has eaten of the 
fruit of the tree and has knowledge of good and evil. Sub­
jectively he is still not far removed from the savage, oftenest 
stirred to action by a confused web of emotional motives, among 
which the interwoven strands of civilized reason are as likely 
to produce discord or paralysis as to furnish efficient guides, 
a state of mind first, and perhaps best, set forth in its 
extreme form by Shakespeare in Hamlet. On the one hand he 
cannot return to the primitive state in which all the motives 
for living flowed harmoniously in the same channel; he cannot 
divest himself of his illuminating reason; he cannot recede 
from his hardly acquired personal individuality. On the other 
hand he can never expect, he can never even reasonably hope, 
that reason will ever hold in leash the emotions. It is clear 
that along neither path separately can the civilized man 
pursue his way in harmonious balance with himself. We begin 
to realize that vdiat we need is not a code of beautifully cut- 
and-dried maxims - whether emanating from sacred mountains or 
from philosophers' studies - but a happy combination of two 
different ways of living. We need, that is, a traditional and 
instinctive way of living, based on real motor instincts, 
which will blend with reason and the manifold needs of personality, 
instead of being destroyed by their solvent action, as rigid 
rules inevitably are. Our only valid rule is a creative 
impulse that is one with the illuminative power of intelligence."
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(1)
A recent writer, in criticizing certain aspects of the
current psychology of conduct, has pointed out that, underlying
much of it there is the assumption that "behind the self and
more real than the self, are a number of impersonal and indeed
mechanical forces called instincts into which the self can be
analyzed away". There are undoubtedly good grounds for this
criticism. The success which has attended the efforts at
psychological analysis has resulted in a strong tendency to
think of the self as split up into elements, whether styled
instincts or anything else, which function independently or
interact mechanically. Psychological analysis is, of course,
necessary and extremely valuable, but it should never lead us
to forget the essential unity of the self as a concrete fact,
and the need for studying it as such. "We are all of us,"
(2)
says a biologist, "too prone to think that a phenomenon is
somehow 'explained* or interpreted better by analyzing it into
its component parts or discovering its origin, than by studying
it in and for itself." We must not forget that analysis
considers elements in abstraction and that they are only to be
rightly understood when considered in relation to the whole of
which they form a part. The need for recognizing what is
termed the 'unity of the organism* is at present being felt in
(3)
the science of biology. It is thus stated by C. S. Sherring­
ton. "The living creature is fundamentally a unity. In trying 
to make the 'how* of an animal existence intelligible to our
(1) A. Glutton Brock: "Evil and the New Psychology",
"Atlantic Monthly", 1922.
(2) Julian Huxley: "Essays of a Biologist", p. 171,
(3) Gf. W.E. Ritter: "The Unity of the Organism". His main 
formula is: "The organism in its totality is as essential to
an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an 
explanation of the organism"'.
IP
Imperfect knowledge we have for purposes of study to separate
its whole into part-aspects and part-mechanisms, hut that
separation is artificial. It is as a whole, a single entity,
that the animal, or for that matter the plant, has finally
and essentially to be envisaged. We cannot really understand
(1)
its one part without its other."
This point of view is' just as essential in psychology:
in fact in dealing with a mind and particularly with the human
(2)
mind it is even more essential. And it is particularly
necessary when, as at present, evidence is being drawn so
freely from the sphere of the abnormal and the disordered and
applied to the understanding of the nature of mind and behaviour
(3)
in general. it must never be forgotten, as MacCurdy has 
pointed out that "the clinician works with disintegrated func­
tions and is always in danger of assuming that disintegrated 
elements have,* in combination, the functions exhibited when 
they are isolated by disease, or that in the evolutionary past 
they have had such functions. But this is a mistake. Any
element, when it combines with others to form a more complicated
(4)
functional structure is 'ipso facto* altered".
(1) "Some Aspects of Animal Mechanism", Presidential Address, 
British Association, 1922.
(2) L.T. Hobhouse ("Mind in Evolution", p. 105 n.) discusses 
the question "whether the fundamental elements of human nature 
are of the nature of separate units which interact like indepen­
dent powers, or whether what is inherited is an abstraction and 
what is acquired another abstraction, the two together forming 
the concrete whole of actual behaviour". He goes on, "In the 
main I believe the latter account to be true of human nature, 
the former to be true of the lowest and partly true of the 
higher animals, and it is this increasing unity of the organism 
as a whole which I take to be one of the distinguishing marks
of the human as compared with the animal mind".
(3) "Problems in Dynamic Psychology", p. 269.
(4) Failure to recognize his fundamental principle results 
in conclusions like the following: "Unlike the embryonic organs
which disappear after fulfilling whatever rôle they may play 
during the embryonic phase of our physical existence, unlike 
the rudimentary structures which are carried forward but lie 
formant and useless in the adult, the mental vestiges of our 
earlier existence, our primordial cravings, our racial instincts, 
persist in their raw and naked forms alongside the more complex, 
subtle emotions - ideals and aspirations which we acquire in
1^ 1
We must, then, think of the self as functioning as a 
unity, and as characterized by some type of organization.
But this does not take us very far. It is very obvious, and 
does not need pointing out that some sort of unity and organiza­
tion is effected in mental life between factors inherited and 
acquired by interaction with the environment, natural and social. 
The question is, what is the nature of this unity and how may 
the organization of it be most adequately conceived. This is 
the difficult question. If we must think of the self as a 
whole, we want some adequate conception of mental wholeness.
The simple idea of harmony, taken alone, does not seem sufficient, 
What is needed is some embracing conception which will enable 
us to take into account, and to show in their right relation 
all the phenomena of mental life which analysis has laid bare: 
a conception which will show how, from original tendencies, 
more complex mental structures are built up and interrelated; 
which will take into account the stresses which are incidental 
to the effecting of mental organization - facts of conflict, of 
repression and of dissociation, and facts of unconscious mental 
functioning: a conception which will show how guidance and also 
control are brou^t about and hov/ the higher are related to the 
lower functions. This sounds a large order: but we must have 
some such embracing conception in terms of which to think of the 
self as a whole if we are to endeavour to do justice, not to 
some facts of mind and conduct, as so many current one-sided 
views do, but to all the facts as they now stand.
The present writer believes that the conception of inte­
gration is the one required. All that is meant by this con­
ception will take some explaining.
The term 'integration* is now being used more.and more
frequently in connection with mental organization, but so far
%(1 )
with no very definite meaning. As a conception it has
scarcely yet explicitly stated in connection with the theory
of conduct, though in a vague way it seems to be implicit in a
good deal of recent writing and to be the conception towards
(2)
which thought is moving. Lloyd Morgan appears to be the
only writer who has so far worked it out at all fully in the 
psychological sphere. He wants to regard differentiation and 
integration, so far as the mind is concerned, ’’not as mere 
words” but as "vitalizing concepts”. He understands by inte­
gration ’that kind of systematic relatedness which obtains in 
an organism and in a mind, where the functioning of sub-systems, 
as parts of the whole, depends on that of the system as a whole”. 
The unity of the whole, in the case of such an organism and 
mind, is thus not that of simplicity, but of ‘integrated com­
plexity’.
This conception is, of course, borrowed from the sphere
;
of biology where, in recent years, ^t has proved exceedingly 
fruitful. It is the progress of the biological sciences which 
has led to the recognition of the importance of the conception 
and suggested its application to mind. Integration has been 
worked out on the organic side of the body-mind system. The 
analogous conception of psychical integration does seem to offer 
a promising way of tackling the problem of mental organization,
II,
Let us first endeavour to get clear what is understood by 
integration in the realm of the organic, particularly in relation 
to the physiology of the nervous system. Physiologists are
(1) Cf. Tansley: ’The New Psychology”, p, 163: ’Progressive 
integration is the key process in the evolution of animal and 
human behaviour”: also E.A. Holt, "The Freudian Wish", p. 145: 
"Wisdom and virtue are in principle one, and that principle the 
progressive, life-long integration of experience”.
(2) Several of the more philosophically inclined of the psycho­
pathologists are now making use of it, cf, W,A, White: The 
Foundations of Psychiatry".
now agreed in regarding integration as the main function of 
the central nervous system# This idea was first developed 
by Sherrington in his "Integrative Action of the Nervous 
System"# In this important work he showed how, in the multi- 
cellular animal, the nervous system, throu^ its integrative 
activity constitutes an individual out of a mere collection 
of organs. In a recent address Sherrington returns to this 
topic: "The nervous system," he says, "is that bodily system 
whose special office from its earliest appearance onward 
throughout evolutionary history has been more and more to 
weld together the body's component parts into one consolidated 
mechanism reacting as a unity to the changeful world about it.
It more than any other system has constructed out of a collec­
tion of organs an| individual of unified act and experience.
It represents the acme of accomplishment of the integration of 
the animal organism ... In the brain, the integrating 
nervous centres are themselves further compounded, inter­
connected, and recombined for unitary functions .... the 
cortex with its twin halves corresponding to the two side-halves 
of the body is really a single organ knitting those halves 
together by a still further knitting together of the nervous 
system itself. The animalfe great integrating system is there
still further integrated ..... From small beginnings it has
become steadily a larger and larger feature of the nervous
system, until in adult man the whole rest of the system is
(1)
relatively dwarfed by it." It is important for our purpose 
to note the manner in which this integration is effected. 
Physiologists now look upon the nervous system as consisting 
of a functional hierarchy in which one form of activity is 
controlled by another standing higher than it in the evolutionary
(1) Op . cit.
scale. This idea of functional levels of control was first
advanced by Hmghlings Jackson. It has been considerably
(1)
developed by Head and others. Head shows in detail that the 
integration in the organism effected by the nervous system, 
means the dominance, within the system, of higher over lower 
forms of neural activity. This integration of functions in 
a hierarchy is, he maintains, based on a struggle for expression 
between many potentially different physiological activities.
"The aim of the evolutionary development of the central nervous 
system is to integrate its diverse and contradictory reactions 
so as to produce a coherent result adapted to the welfare of 
the organism as a whole." In pathological states, where there 
is some degree of loss of control, the most recently acquired 
and most complex functions disappear first, and the other levels 
of control in the reverse order to that of their acquisition.
But it is important to note that when the control of the higher 
centres is thus destroyed it does not reveal the lower and 
earlier centres unchanged by the advent of those above them.
Their activities have been profoundly modified. "It would be 
wrong to suppose that the removal of a dominant mechanism 
reveals the reactions of a phylogenetically older organ in all 
their primitive simplicity. The integrative activity of the 
higher centres has profoundly modified the functions of those 
below them in neural hierarchy; some have been caught up to 
take part in the new complex, whilst others are held in check 
or inhibited." In the gradual evolution of functions the 
reactions of the lower centres have been changed to meet fresh 
conditions, and it is pointed out that "the more complex an 
organism and the more efficiently it responds with discrimination
(1) Of. H. Head: "Studies in Neurology" (esp. Vol. II); 
also Croonian Lecture, Proceedings Royal Socy., 1916; and The 
Conception of Nervous and Mental Energy", Paper read at Inter­
national Congress of Psychology, 1923.
to external forces, the greater will be the need for such 
readjustment". The relation of the higher to the lower 
function is expressed again as follows. "The functions of 
the central nervous system are not a palimpsest, where a new 
text is written over an earlier manuscript, partly erased.
The more primitive activities have been profoundly modified 
by the advent of the new centres, which utilize some of the 
faculties originally possessed by the older mechanism. In 
many cases the higher function could not be exercised, without 
the existence of these lower powers which it dominates and 
controls. l#ien, however, the higher mechanism is thrown out 
of action the functions of the lower centres are free to exhibit 
their activity unchecked."
The organism, then, is non conceived of as a system of
systems, in Rivers’s words, as consisting of "unity within
unity, group within group, the integration of which into a
(1)
harmonious system is the function of its highest regions".
The physiologists, quite rightly from their point of view, would
regard psychical integration as something more than an analogy
from organic integration. It is simply a further stage in the
process of organic integration. "The aim of consciousness,"
says Head, "is to produce a unity of action directed to the
welfare of the organism as a whole." It is an undoubted fact,
as Sherrington points out, that it is in the nervous system
"that mind as we know it has had its beginnings and with the
progressive development of the system has step for step
(2)
developed"; and further within this system "the portion to 
which mind transcendantly attaches is exactly that where are 
carried to their highest pitch the nerve actions which manage
(1) "Psychology and Politics", p. 60. cf. also W.A. White: 
"Foundations of Psychiatry" (p. 37). "The organism appears as a 
hierarchy of functions,each functional level controlling or in­
hibiting those that lie beneath it and in turm being controlled 
or inhibited by those above. There are no well-defined bound­
aries. ...each higher level represents the working out more 
accurately of the problems of the lower, a virtual unfolding 
and development of the lower levels."
(2) Op. cit.
'the individual as a whole, especially in his reactions to the 
external world"; and this, he says, is surely significant. 
Undoubtedly it is and it may quite well be, as C.S. Myers has 
recently declared, that "the outstanding problems of mind and 
life must ultimately be solved in similar terms". But there 
is here not the least intention to attempt to explain problems 
of mind in terras of problems of life* We are concerned simply 
with an analogy: with integration within the psychical system 
itself. It seems possible to regard the mental organization 
as of the same general type as the organization which obtains 
within the organism. Julian Huxley has recently pointed out 
that this general type Tias been developed over and over again 
in the course of evolution, for different functions: it is the 
hierarchical one, in which some parts are dominant, others sub­
ordinate, the dominant parts helpless without the subordinate, 
the subordinate different, through the fact of their subordina­
tion, from what they would otherwise have been, doing most of 
the hard work, but under the guidance of the dominant. Only
in this way is a unitary organization arrived at in which there
(1)
is the minimum of waste, of antagonism between the parts".
III.
The conception of psychical integration has been very
suggestively worked out in a series of articles by Lloyd
(2)
Morgan. We will outline his scheme fairly fully. He treats 
this conception in a very wide setting, no less wide than the 
whole process of ’emergent evolution* which works upwards "from
(1) Op.cit. p. 155. Cf. also: "One of the most important 
biological generalizations is that progressive evolution is accom­
panied by the rise of one part to dominance, and, wherever there 
are many paj^s to be considered, by the arrangement of the rest 
in some form of hierarchy, each part being subordinate to one 
above, dominant to one below".
(2) ’Consciousness and the Unconscious", Presidential 
Address, Psychology Section, British Assn., 1922; "Instinctive 
Behaviour and Enjoyment", "British Journal of Psychology", 1921; 
"Psychology and the Medical uurriculum", "Journal of Neurology 
and Psycho-pathology", 1920.
materiality through life to consciousness which attains in man 
its highest reflective level". He makes a striking attempt to 
link up the psychological with the biological in "one consistent 
scheme of natural development". Of organic integration he 
writes: "We find a number of sub-systems - respiratory, circu­
latory, reproductive and so on - within the comprehensive life- 
system of the organism. We find these functional activities 
inter-related in many very subtle and delicate ways in the life 
that is common to them all. We consider, for example, the inte­
grative action of the nervous system, and of that which may now 
be called the ’hormonic* system of internal secretions distri­
buted by the blood stream. The working of any one sub-system 
may facilitate or enhance the working of another, or it may 
partially arrest or even inliibit it". In such a comprehensive 
system it is important to remember that neither the whole nor 
the parts are historically prior; they have been evolved together 
with reciprocal interplay throughout. Lloyd Morgan goes on 
to suggest that what holds good for the life system, holds good 
also ’mutatis mutandis’ for the psychical system. "As in the 
discussion of life problems, so too in that of mind problems, 
the stress in ultimate interpretations is on integration. It 
is now realised, that within the psychical system, only a small 
part of the integration which obtains, though no doubt a very 
important part, is established in the light of our personal 
consciousness, thereafter to descend towards the unconscious in 
habit. Par more integration (however it was originally 
established) is ours through inheritance. This affords the 
unconscious foundations of our mental life. But it need not 
remain subliminal; it may surge up above the threshold with 
enjoyment which is in itself new in the supraliminal region of 
that person, though it is swiftly integrated with much that is 
old. It brings with it no ideas or memory images, though it
UH-
colours affectively our mental outlook towards presentations, 
old and new". He assumes that throughout the whole range 
of the life process there is correlated ’enjoyment* psychical 
in its nature. And in the inner or psychical aspect of life 
there is progressive emergence just as there is in the outer 
aspect. At its lower levels it is unconscious. Later con­
sciousness, with its external reference, emerges. With the
emergence of consciousness, "We say that dispositions or 
interests, or innate tendencies, or emotional systems, or 
instincts, or impulses, are awakened to activity from a state 
of more or less unconscious slumber, (V/e are sure to use some 
rather metaphorical expressions.) These are then regarded as 
the sub-systems of the mind. Each has some measure of autono­
mous integration; all are in some measure inter-related; and 
in a well-balanced mind, the net results of a bewildering 
number of psychical processes, many of them previously sublimi­
nal and unconscious, are caught up in subservience to conscious 
integration. But taken in detail there is much interplay 
between the psychical sub-systems as such, with facilitation, 
partial arrest, more or less inhibition, and perhaps derange­
ment of function. There may be failure of normal integration 
within one systematic whole, or even such dislocation as we 
speak of as complete dissociation. And any of the psychical 
sub-systems - the so-called sexual complex for example, - may 
be active in the subliminal region of the unconscious, or may 
rise into the supraliminal field and may modify the course of 
conscious events. There is thus integration within the sub­
systems severally, and integration of these sub-systems collec­
tively so as to constitute a whole with (let us hope) due 
balance and poise. The unity of the whole is not that of 
simplicity but that of integrated complexity".
Within the mind thus conceived there are distinguished 
levels of psychical integration. Of these there are three.
l.oS
or at least three main ones. They are: 1. Reflective inte­
gration in the sphere of the throught processes; 2 Unreffective 
integration in the sphere of perceptual intelligence. These 
two are consciously established in the life-time of the indivi­
dual. But there is also: 3. Integration of the unlearnt order
in the sphere of the unconscious. This latter is ours by 
inheritance.
Perceptive integration is consciously, but not reflectively 
established. It means the unreflective but intelligent 
profiting by experience and the adaptation to new conditions 
of life. It is "the salient feature in the mental life of 
many animals . But in man "it passes from its proper level 
to that of reflective consciousness and is there re-integrated 
in the new significant field of value". But this is not the 
only process". "As reflective habitudes of valuing get firmly 
rooted, such re-integration spreads downwards to give value to 
more and more of that which has been established under the 
lower and earlier integration of the perceptive order. Behaviour 
is reorganized as conduct in terms of value." The process is 
thus a double one: there is ascending and descending integration^ 
This is important "when the emergent level of reflective con­
sciousness is reached, the outcome of prior unreflective inte­
gration passes up from its lower level. But as re-integration 
at the upper level^prooeaeos, more and more of the unreflective 
substratum undergoes reflective regrouping around the values 
which are the new centres of that higher re-integration. 
Unreflective integration ascends from below; reflective 
re-integration descends from above. But they are different; 
thé new ’form* of integration is other than the old. There 
is always some ’conflict* which has been a fruitful theme in
(1) For an account of the physiological correlates of these 
three levels cf. the British Journal of Psychology article.
2_o(f
drama from the time of the Greeks onwards. And in our so-
called normal life (to say nothing of that which is abnormal)
this conflict of systems with different centres of groupings 
and fields of influence, is daily and hourly in evidence".
Below the perceptual level there is a deeper psychical strata 
founded on life inheritance - the unconscious level. We have 
already discussed Lloyd Morgan's treatment of this level of 
integration in considering the nature of the unconscious.
Its 'form* is inherited. But this given ’form* may be reinte­
grated at the perceptive or at the reflective level. It does 
not necessarily remain unconscious. It may surge up into 
consciousness. "This insurgent factor, welling up from the
unconscious, may and often does, come into conflict with the
outcome of perceptive or unreflective, and still more markedly 
with the outcome of our reflective integration." But once 
this unconscious or instinctive factor has appeared in the 
conscious field and has there been integrated into the structure 
of conscious life, its existence can be distinguished only by 
an effort of analysis. "It cannot ever be separated from the
conscious factors which eraergently combine with it in perceptive
//
or in reflective re-integration.
Though the unlearnt, the perceptive and the reflective 
levels of integration can be thus distinguished there is, of 
course, no breach of continuity between them. And, in connec­
tion with the notion of ascending and descending integration, 
it is important to note that what is reflectively established 
may, through habit, assume the status of unreflective integration, 
and the uhreflectively established, that of the unconscious.
One final quotation from Lloyd Morgan will give a general 
picture of the mind viewed in this way. "In the organism there 
Is differentiation of function; but the life of the organism is 
the integration of all functions. In the higher animals there 
is differentiation of instinct; but the psychical life of the
animal is the integration of instincts, supplemented by 
intelligent guidance. At certain times, however, one of 
these instincts may so dominate the psychical life that others 
are temporarily repressed. The whole poise of the psychical 
system is then altered. In man there are also in due course 
developed in the supraliminal consciousness distinctively human 
’interests’. Now one and now another of these ’interests’ may 
be dominant; with relative suppression of others, which may 
become subliminal, and with subtle alterations of mental poise. 
Furthermore, the whole system of such human ’interests’ may be 
more or less markedly differentiated from that more directly 
founded on the instincts of animal life. Not only this; the 
human ’ihterests’ may be further differentiated into those which
are socially approved and those which are not. But aome- in
abnormal cases of dissociation differentiation is balanced by 
concomitant integration. There is: 1. That which subserves 
organic life; 2. That which furthers animal behaviour including
reproduction; 3. That which leads to the development of human
interests; and 4. That which accords with the social conscience 
...... all these are unconsciously or consciously interrelated
in such wise that some measure of total integration is partly 
retained and partly established in each one of us, with subtle 
and sometimes swift variations in dominance, with facilitation 
or arrest of this or that, and sometimes with temporary or 
permanent throwing of this or that out of gear. In which of us
is integration, conscious and unconscious, all that the heart 
could desire?"
This extraordinarily comprehensive view of the mind and 
its organization seems capable of co-ordinating in a very
valuable way the large body of facts which the study of mind
and conduct now discloses. as it stands it is, of course, a 
somewhat formal scheme which requires much filling in; but it 
seems to provide what is now the fundamentally right way of 
regarding the problem of mind and conduct.
IV.
It must not be imagined that any attempt is here to be 
made to fill in the details of Lloyd Morgan's scheme of mental 
integration - or to work out any other scheme. Nothing of the 
kind can be attempted. We must be content with indicating 
what seems to be the right way of looking at the problem.
Something, however, may be said of the various processes 
which are involved in the effecting of integration and of its 
faulty forms. It must be realized that while, as is pointed 
out, a certain degree of integration is ours by inheritance, 
the complex integration which obtains within the whole psychical 
system is only very gradually achieved, and in different indivi­
duals it is achieved in all degrees of completeness. It has
(1)
recently been pointed out that one of the main features distin­
guishing the adult from the child mind is a greater co-ordination, 
in the case of the former, among the various component parts of 
the mind, a higher degree, that is, of psychical integration.
It is also clear that adult minds differ^ very widely in this 
respect. There are some with "souls well knit"; others whose 
minds are only very loosely organized. In the former there has 
been extensive differentiation and a corresponding degree of 
integration. The originally given basis of the mind has given 
rise to and been organized into the sub-systems of the sentiments 
(Lloyd Morgan's 'interests'), and these have themselves been 
ordered into a hierarchy, so that they control one another 
within the one all-comprehensive system which is the character 
of the individual. Mental disorders appear as failures, for 
various reasons to achieve a normal degree of integration.
Integration appears as the factor of central importance in mental
(2)
hygiene.
(1) Ernest Jones: "Some Problems of Adolescence", British 
Journal of Psychology, 1922.
(2) Cf. J. C. Plugel ("The Psycho-analytic Study of the 
Family, p. 3), "A person whose instincts and impulses are co­
ordinated sufficiently to maintain, as regards all the leading 
aspects of life, a relatively harmonious functioning of the whole
(Contd.)
The process of effecting integration may be approached
from many different points of view. In this process mental
conflict, and the manner of dealing with it appear as factors
of the first importance. Different methods of dealing with
the conflicts which arise between the various sub-systems of the
mind can be distinguished. One method, and the least effective
from the point of view of integration is that of repression.
The nature of repression has already been discussed. It is
the endeavour to force one of the competing impulses, and the
sub-system which it represents, from the mind. as a method
of dealing with conflict it is a failure. Impulses cannot be
destroyed in this way nor parts of the mind simply dismissed.
As Dewey points out, "Every impulse is, as far as it goes,
force, urgency. It must either be used in some function,
direct or sublimated, or be driven into a concealed, hidden
activity ........ The evil of checking impulses is not that
they are checked. Without inhibition there is no instigation
of imagination, no redirection into more discriminated and
comprehensive activities. The evil resides in a refusal of
direct attention which forces the impulse^ into disguise and
concealment, until it exacts its own unavowed uneasy private
(1)
life subject to no inspection and no control". As we have 
already seen, repression tends to result in the building up and 
the maintaining of barriers between different parts of the mind 
or in some degree of dissociation. The method of repression
(Note Contd.)
personality, can preserve mental health in circumstances under 
which a less integrated mind would fail, owing to the waste of 
energy occasioned by the internal struggles of the conflicting 
tendencies and emotions aroused in situations of difficulty 
or danger".
(1) "Human Nature and Conduct", p. 165, of. also J.A. Had- 
field: "Psychology and Morals": "We cannot control our instincts 
as long as we repress them; only by bringing them into conscious­
ness and accepting them as part of ourselves can we control 
them"•
cannot result in the achievement of any high degree of inte­
gration.
There is another method of dealing with mental conflict 
somewhat more effective than the method of repression. This 
is the method of displacement or sublimation. By displacement 
is meant the transference of one of the competing impulses from 
its original object to a new object so that it gains an indirect 
and modified expression. IVhen this modified expression possesses 
a higher moral or social value, than the original impulse the 
process is usually described as one of sublimation. At the 
present time ’sublimation* is a highly popular concept and is 
often referred to as though it solved all problems of conduct, 
which it certainly does not. As a method of dealing with con­
flict it represents a compromise. It means some re-arrangement 
in the way impulses are linked up in the various sub-systems of 
the mental organization. It may prove effective, but it is 
blind and groping and not of itself likely to lead to any very 
complete form of integration.
It is what has been termed the method of ’conscious con­
trol* which makes possible the organization of the mind in a 
really effective hierarchy of systems. The highest type of 
integration is that which is effected in the whole mind by 
activity at the self-conscious, reflective level. "Individual 
minds,” says McDougall, "become more completely integrated in 
proportion as they achieve a full self-consciousness." Prom 
many different points of view psychology is now stressing the 
importance of increased self-consciousness, meaning by it, in 
this sense, increased awareness of the contents of all the levels 
of the mind, and so complete^ knowledge of its motive forces.
(1) For an account of the development of self-consciousness 
and the self-regarding sentiment of. McDougall; "Introduction 
to Social Psychology", Oh. VII.
Increased self-consciousness of this type means an increased
field of conscious control, and it is now the aim of most
methods of psycho-therapy to bring about such an increased 
( 1 )
self-knowledge. This method of resolving mental conflict 
is the exact opposite of the method of repression. Instead 
of being thrust out of sight, competing impulses are brought 
into the focus of consciousness and their claims consciously 
adjusted. To quote one writer; "In so far as we can succeed 
in bringing to the focus of consciousness all the thoughts, 
feelings, emotions and tendencies aroused in us by a particular 
situation, just so far shall we be able to bring about a satis­
factory solution of the conflict between opposing tendencies -
a solution which is at once the wisest and the best of which our
(2)
personality is capable". The ends of the conflicting 
impulses are subsumed under each other, the lower under the 
higher and the narrower under the wider. We here see reason, 
which is the tendency towards harmony and integration being 
consciously employed.
(1) Cf. W. Brown; "Psychology and Psycho-therapy" on 
"Au to gnosis".
(2) J. C. Pliigel: "Freudian Mechanisms as Factors in Moral 
Development", British Journal of Psychology, Vol. VIII. Cf. also 
C. S. Sherrington (op. cit.): "Circumstances can stress in the 
individual some perhaps lower instinctive tendency that conflicts 
with what may be termed his normal personality. This latter,
to master the conflicting trend, can judge it in relation to 
his main self's general ethical ideals and duty to self and the 
community. Thus intellectualising it, he can destroy it or 
consciously subordinate it to some aim in harmony with the rest 
of his personality. By so doing there is gain in power of will 
and in personal coherence of the individual. But if the 
morbid situation be too strong or the mental self too weak, 
instead of thus assimilating the contentions element, the mind 
may shun, and so to say, endeavour to ignore it. That way 
lies danger. This discordant factor escaped from the sway of 
the conscious mind produces stress and strain of the conscious 
self; hence to use customary terminology, dissociation of the 
self sets in bringing in its train those disabilities, mental 
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As was pointed out in the Introduction, the problem of 
understanding the nature and relation of the forces that 
move man to action is not becoming any simpler. The whole 
tendency of recent investigation has been to emphasize the 
extraordinary richness and manysidedness of mental life and 
the complexity of the motive forces of the mind. As a result, 
theorizing about conduct is in a flux. New knowledge has 
come like a flood and has broken down all the neat schemes of 
mind and its make-up and the theories of action based on them. 
One thing is now certain, no theory will suffice which, by an 
artificial simplicity, fails to do justice to this richness 
and complexity. "How often," says Dewey, "have we been invited 
to build up our social, political and ethical explanations in 
terms of some single and supposedly dominant mental constituent! 
How often discussion and dispute have been at bottom only a 
question as to which of rival single claimants we shall yield 
allegiance. Instincts to power, to control of others, fear 
of authority, sex, love of pleasure, of ease, all have been 
appealed to, and explanations constructed in terms of one or 
another exclusively. Henceforth it is, I oubodot, pure wil­
fulness if anyone pretending to a scientific treatment starts
from any other than a pluralistic basis: the complexity and
( 1 )
specific variety of the factors of human nature." The delving 
into the foundations of human life, the franker acknowledgment 
of the community of human and animal nature and the consequent 
recognition of the importance of instinctive-emotional factors 
in mental life, has led to hasty and one-sided theories, and 
to a crop of popular generalizations about human conduct. It 
is, of course, exceedingly difficult to do justice to all the
(1) "The Need for Social Psychology", Psychological Review, 
Vol. 24.
facts, and these theories, by their very one-sidedness and
exaggeration have brought about the recognition of factors
which had been more or less ignored. We have now to think
of human nature and all its activities not merely in terms
Of intelligence and reason, but also in terms of emotions,
sentiments and impulses resting back upon inherited instincts.
If we think of the self as a whole, and to do this is necessary
if we take the moral point of view, we must think of it as a
whole of a very complicated sort. "I ask myself," says Lloyd
Morgan, "what a man walks about with under his hat. What is
he? _ Well, he is (1) a marvellously complex physico-chemical
system; he is (2) an organism; he is also (3) an animal, with
certain fundamental instincts; and he is (4) a man, with sundry
human interests. But as organism he is something more than a
physico-chemical system; as animal he is something more than
ah organism; as man he is something more than an animal.
Still he is all of these; all at once; and all in delicate 
(1)
interrelations." And all these aspects of the self must be
taken into account. It is quite true that it is the human
interests which make man characteristically man, and which 
are primary from the moral point of view. In him what may 
be termed spiritual values have become the true ends of life 
and have been superimposed upon the biological ends given in 
the instincts. But it must never be forgotten that such values 
are, from the psychological point of view, secondary creations 
which have their roots deep in original nature though they may 
seem, in their developed forms, far removed from it. Nor is 
there any loss involved in the frank recognition of this fact.
In the face of modern psychology no one can possibly 
deny the irrationality of much of huAan conduct. It is to a
(1), Journal of Neurology and Psycho-patholoy, Nov. 1920.
very limited degree that reason governs the lives of average 
men and women; and the disillusionment which has resulted from 
the recognition of this fact is not at all to be regretted.
But while it is a fact, there is no need to make it a norm.
The moral to be drawn is, surely, that men should be as reason­
able as they can, by effort, make themselves. Of all the 
psychologists who have been engaged in demonstrating the 
irrationality of human nature, those who have preserved a 
sense of proportion have ended by looking to reason as the 
characteristic feature of man, and to rationality as the 
ideal of individual and social life. As an ideal it has 
certainly not been shaken, though the extreme difficulty of 
achieving it has been demonstrated and its meaning considerably 
enlarged and enriched. It is now possible to see more clearly 
all that is really involved in reasoned living - to see that 
it involves the progressive organization, and not the denial of 
the life of feeling and impulse. Rivers has said that modern 
investigations seem to show that two things are needed if 
reason and sanity are to be achieved in human life: these are 
self-knowledge and courage: knowledge of the nature of the 
mind and all its conflicting elements and courage to face 
these and consciously to reduce them to order than than to 
attempt to escape from them by repression. It is the growing 
richness and accuracy of self-knowledge which makes their 
rational ordering possible. Viewed very broadly the whole 
evolution of man may be regarded as a progressive growth in 
the degree and range of self-consciousness and so of the 
possibility of self-direction. It is increased self-conscious­
ness which has brought to man all his moral problems,and it 
seems that it is only a still further increase of it that can 
solve them. Morals thus appears to return to the Socratic 
principle of self-knowledge, and of the close connection of 
knowledge and virtue. But it returns to it equipped with an
organized mass of new material drawn from different sources 
and gained by many new methods of investigation.
s i i s i S i i i
kvïïLtm-f, ’'*'-•■• <.on>’eptl6K of tfco 
■ A'l;- ifalfio ta; Fsyrfaolo|S:r.’ '’ Mi;,.:.. ,
?«uiîîta: f, s. t
V'-’ ^ h
À, .-"-Sur:
m . a # # .  <
G-x,.
a n d
Mind of . Primitive M-mta''
''var'lvAia '1' . :,:
) . ,  Ari::» co holla::
%. : ino . ycLOJ/
bTIfly OYf:' .V
''A::loT:tic Mcnbaly"', iDft. 
CWu :\-:-.y ;'d f 23;/ChO.-Ihv :'.-
:  V  ..  V.. -,.V.
Itv an.d .fod%n\r ï
oy \:h and -j
. » , ,
frenldentlal Ad::ra%s, ,:y 
'''I. q#ctlon^^ :"
o'f. iv
CSBVRRj . t a
ùhan.^ pê In P&ldf f'
*Th#/#6D8r&&idn.&#d G#ntro
4&Man, an, Adaptive ay.i
JOHN: Laîwrv rorv:ch
"%0^êtW.et.iôn In /Phil(X!<
'‘X m  ta ill r-afta.:? vinl • . • ■•





"a Reconsideration of the Jaraes-Lange
Theory of, the Emotions." Psych. Review,
: 1916.
"is the Conception of the Unconscious of 








n  NDLA.y 
BURT,
"Psychology and Primitive Culture."
"Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion."
"The Mind of Primitive Man."
"Various Meanings of the Term Unconscious." 
Proceedings, Aristotelian Society, 1923.
"Evil and the New Psychology."
"Atlantic Monthly", 1922.
"Psychology and Psycho-therapy."
"Talks-on ^ Psycho-therapy." ,
"Responsibility and Modern Psychology",
' "Psyche", Oct., 1922.
"Preud*s'Theory of the Unconscious",
"British Journal of Psychology", VI,
"Psychology and the Emotions",
School Hygiene, 1916.
"The Mental Differences Between Individual^ *, 
Presidential Address, Psychology 




"Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear 
* ) and Rage.,.
"The Generation and Control of Emotion", 
"British Journal of Psychology", IX.
^"Man, an Adaptive Mechanism."
"Human Nature and Conduct."
"Reconstruction in Philosophy."
"Intelligence and Morals" in "The Influence 
of Darwinian on Philosophy".
"The Need for Social Psychology", 




"An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Education."
"The Classification of the Instincts." 
Paper read before the International 
Congress of Psychology, 1923.
"The Elements of Scientific Psychology."
"Mysticism, Preudianism and Scientific 
Psychology."
"Are there any Instincts?" Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1919. lal
ENGLISH, W.B.; 
ELLIS, HAVELOCK:
"Dynamic Psychology and the Problem of 
Motivation", "Psychological Review", 
1921.





"Instinct Psychology and Faculty Psychology", 
"Mind", 1921.
"Is the Conception of the Unconscious of 
of any Value in Psychology?"
"Mind", 1922.
"Introduction to Sociology."
"Freudian Mechanisms Factors in Moral 
Development", "British Journal of 
Psychology", Vol. VIII.
"Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis."





'The Psychology of Society,"












"The Psychology of Insanity."
"The Conception of the Subconscious"
(in "Subconscious Phenomena").
"The Relations of Sentiment and Complex", 
"Brit. Journal of Psychology", XIII,
"Studies in Neurology."
"The Conception of Nervous and Mental
Energy", Paper read before International 
Congress of Psychology, 1923.




"Human Natui-^ e and its Remaking."
"The Dilemma in the Conception of'Instinct 
as Applied to Human,Psychology",
"Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology", XV.
"The Freudian Wish,"
"Essays of a Biologist."








"The Biology of Children in Relation to 
Education", in "Some Suggestions of
Modern Science Concerning Education".:■ •  ,
"Commort-Sense Ethics."
"Papers on Psycho-analysis."
"Some Problems of Adolescence", "British 
Journal of Psychology", XIII.
"The Classification of the Instincts",
: paper read before International 
Congress of Psychology, 1923.
"The social Philosophy of Instinct."
"Analytical Psychology."
"Instinct and the Unconscious", "British 
Journal of Psychology", X,
KOPPKA, K .:
KEMPP, E.J.
"Die Grimdlagen der Psychischen 
Entv^ ricklung. "




"a Study in Moral Problems."
"Moral Responsibility and the New
Psychology", "Hibbert Journal", 1922.
"Is the Conception of the Unconscious of 







"Problems in Dynamic Psychology."
"An Introduction to Social Psychology."
"An Outline of Psychology."
"Instinct and Emotion", "Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society", 1914-5.
"The Present Position in Clinical Psycholo^’ 
"Proceedings Royal Society of Medicine", 
1918.
"Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion", 
"Mind", 1920.
"Is Conscience an Emotion?" "Hibbert 
Journal", 1920.
"The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social 




"A Psychological Retrospect of the Great 
War."
"Psychology and the Unconscious", "British 
Journal of Psychology, Medical Section",
1921.
MORGAN, C. LLOYD; "Instinct and Experience."
"Instinctive Dispositions", "Scientia", 
Oct., 1920.
"iPsychology and the Medical Curriculum", 
"Journal of Neurology and Psycho­
pathology", Nov., 1920.






"Consciousness and the Unconscious", 
Presidential Address, Psychology 
Section, British Assn., 1922.
"instinctive Behaviour and Enjoyment", 
"British Journal of Psychology", XII,
"Biological. Foundations, of. Human Character", 
"Edinburgh Review", July, 1923.
"Subconscious Phenomena."
"The Nature of Sentiments", "Psyche", ,1922.
"The Independence of Psychology", 
"Discovery", 1920.
"The Relations of Sentiment and Complex", 
"British Journal of Psychology", XIII.
"The Evolution of Feeling", "Australasian 




"Psycho-analytic Schools: Old and New", 
"Lancet", 1922.







"Some Applications of Psycho-analysis."
"Expression of Emotion in Cases of Mental








"Is Conscience an Emotion?"
"The Psychology of Reasoning."
"Instinct and the Unconscious."
"Mind and Medicine."
"Psychology and Politics."
."The Relations of Sentiment and Complex", 








SMITH, M. HAMBLIN: 
SMITH, W. WIATELY:
’intelligence and Behaviour”, ’’Psycho­
logical Review”, 1922.
’The Mind in the Making.”
’’Can Men he Rational?” R.P.A. Annual, 1923
’The Life of Reason”, Vol. I.
’’The Foundations of Character.”
’Character and the Emotions”, ’’Mind”,
N.S. VI.
’’Instinct and Emotion,” Proceedings 
Aristotelian Society, 1914-5.
’’The Relations of Sentiment and Complex”, 
’British Journal of Psychology”, XIII,
"Some Aspects of Animal Mechanism”,
’Presidential Address, British Assn.”,
1922.
’Anger: Its Religious and Moral Signifi­
cance.”
’’The Psychology of the Criminal. ”






’’The Original Nature of Man.”
’’The Nature of General Intelligence and
Ability”, Paper read before International 
Congress of Psychology, 1923.
’’The Nature of Instinct”, Psychological 
Bulletin, Apl., 1923.
’’Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.”
’’The Moral Life” in ’Creative Intelligence".
’The Present Task of Ethical Theory”.
’’International Journal of Ethics , XX.
VARENDONCK, J.: ’’The Psychology of Day-Dreams.”








"Psychology from the Standpoint of a
BehaviouristI ItStudies in Infant
Psychology", Scientific Monthly, 1921, 
"Mental Adjustments•"
"The Mechanisms of Character Formation."
"Foundations of Psychiatry."
"a Critical Examination of Psycho-analysis."
"Dynamic Psychology."
"McDougall’g Social Psychology in the 
Light of Recent Developments", Journal 
of Philosophy, 1921.
- V
TELEPHONE [MUSEUM 1953 
#!3S LOUISE uACOBS 
Literary AND Typewriting Office 
45, Great Russelu Street, W.O.
Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
